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A recollection of our former vassalage in religion and civil
government, will unite the zeal of every heart, and the energy of
every hand, to preserve that independence in both which, under
the favor of Heaven, a disinterested devotion to the public cause
first achieved, and a disinterested sacrifice of private interests will
now maintain.
-Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1808
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Preface
This book is based on my work in the history of ideas at Cambridge
University. Some of the research, however, was done earlier, when I
did not consider its relevance to practical life or intend to pursue gradu-
ate studies. At that time, my love for the study of ideas was particu-
larly keen if they were abstract. Now, I find the material in this book
relevant to current life in the United States, and perhaps other places,
especially where it concerns the question of whether the political power
of a government should be used to impose religion on its people. This
was a burning issue in jefferson's time, as it is today. Since there are
many in the United States who fervently believe we should use gov-
ernmental power in support of religious values, and many who just as
fervently believe we should not, the heat from this issue is likely to be
felt for some time.
If he were here today, jefferson would support the latter group; he
was instrumental in the passage of both state and federal laws that
kept religion out of politics and politics out of religion. This book
explains why he acted as he did and why he believed that all people in
the United States, including those who support the use of political
power in matters of religion, would benefit from the separation of
state and church. I find jefferson's thinking in this respect fundamen-
tally sound. Indeed, I cannot help speculating-given the religious
authoritarianism and sectarian bigotry that existed in the colonies in
1776 and have not been altogether eradicated today-that without
the efforts of jefferson and others, especially Madison, to establish
the First Amendment to the Constitution, we could have become an-
other Bosnia, Northern Ireland, or Middle East. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, as a keen student of history, jefferson saw law as a means to
prevent sectarian disputes from erupting into persecution, strife, and
war as they had done on a massive scale in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century France and seventeenth-century Germany, where Catholics
and Protestants killed masses of people during their sectarian wars.
Xli Preface
Since Jefferson did more than any other Founding Father to shape
and articulate the ideas and ideals upon which American civilization
is based, it seems logical to judge him by the positive or negative im-
pact of those ideas and ideals. Yet there are those who argue that we
should judge him by his character as a man and by twentieth-century
standards of what is good despite the fact that others have written on
the injustice and absurdity of judging historical figures by today's stan-
dards. Indeed, there are those who even suggest that we should ignore
his ideas or scorn him because he allegedly was too passive in his
efforts to eradicate slavery and, to a great extent, isolated in his racist
views. The charge of passiveness is ironic. Criticized for this more
than any Founding Father, some of whom were completely passive
and not criticized, Jefferson was the most active, making several legis-
lative attempts to outlaw slavery in America. Although his efforts
were unsuccessful, they did inspire the Northwest Ordinance, which
permanently eliminated slavery from half of the United States. More-
over, Jefferson's racist idea of freeing slaves but having them live in
separate territory was not confined to him or a few like him but was
favored by many late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century abolition-
ists, including Abraham Lincoln.
Yet even if the allegations of these ad hominem and ad tu quoque
arguments were true, they have no relation to the truth or goodness
of Jefferson's legacy of ideas and ideals. Socrates pointed out this prin-
ciple of logic with a rebuke in Phaedrus: "The men of old ... deemed
that if they heard the truth even from 'oak or rock,' it was enough for
them; whereas you seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not
true, but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes."
I am deeply indebted to three persons in connection with this book.
First among these is Bhek Pati Sinha, who has been a close friend of
my family for many years. During that time his generosity in sharing
his vast knowledge of ideas kindled and sustained my interest in this
subject. In fact, it was he who, during a visit to Monticello, when I
expressed an interest in the ideas and ideals of the third president of
the United States, suggested that I do research on Jefferson. Second
among these three is my wife, Linda. She gave me continuous support
during this endeavor, which on many occasions meant sacrificing her
own pleasure and convenience. The third member of this trinity is
Richard Tuck, my Ph.D. supervisor at Cambridge. His suggestions
and criticism helped me avoid many errors. I am also indebted to J.R.
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Pole of Oxford and Mark Goldie of Cambridge for their helpful com-
ments and criticisms. And to the staff of the rare books reading room
of the excellent University Library of Cambridge-where I sometimes
found myself reading books by those who influenced Jefferson in the
same editions as he owned or recommended-I express my gratitude
for their courtesy and efficiency.
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Introduction
Ralph Barton Perry's comment "The history of American democracy
is a gradual realization, too slow for some and too rapid for others, of
the implications of the Declaration of Independence" illustrates the
importance America has ascribed to the Declaration's succinctly ex-
pressed ideals.1 Given that importance, the question arises, What are
those ideals, especially as Thomas jefferson, the principal author of
the Declaration, intended them to be? Answering this question has
proved difficult for scholars, partly because jefferson, by his own ad-
mission, neither originated the ideas and ideals contained in the first
American document nor clearly explained where he got them.2
Since knowledge of the source of the ideas jefferson placed in the
Declaration is important to understanding its ideals, much has been
written on this subject. Yet the images of the Declaration's principles
remain confused and blurred, for there have been diverse opinions as
to who the thinkers and philosophers were who contributed to the
Declaration via jefferson, not to mention different interpretations of
particular contributors. So diverse are the opinions of scholars who
have written on the political theory of Thomas jefferson and the Dec-
laration of Independence over much of this century that support can
be found for virtually every contemporary political ideology within
this vast array of literature, as a few samples will show.
Despite its diversity, this literature can be divided into two general
categories. The first is dominated by what is called the liberal or
Lockean orthodox interpretation, according to which government is
formed to protect the natural rights of the individual. C.B. Macpher-
son's possessive individualism interpretation of Locke (the dominance
of individual self-interest over the well-being of the community) has
come to be associated with this category,3 even though many scholars
maintain that it distorts Locke, who emphasized morality as a restraint
on actions that would damage the community.4 The second category
comprises a variety of revisionary interpretations that minimize or
2 Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
exclude the influence of Locke, most of which are communitarian as a
result of subordinating individual rights and interests to the overall
well-being of the community. The communitarian revisionists as Tho-
mas Spragens perceives them, however, are not opposed to liberalism.
Rather, they have attempted "to recapture some of the ... moral depth"
that liberalism "lost as a result of the philosophical shifts and political
divisions" it "encountered during its several hundred year history."5
The pillar of the first category is Carl Becker's seminal work The
Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Ideas, pub-
lished in 1922. There Becker stated of "the political philosophy of
Nature and natural rights" promulgated in the Declaration, "The lin-
eage is direct: jefferson copied Locke, and Locke quoted Hooker." 6
For almost fifty years no one challenged Becker's Lockean perspective;
his ideas were more or less confirmed by succeeding generations of
scholars.?
The late 1950s, however, marked the beginning of the second cat-
egory. This was the inception of the "classical republican" movement
within the revisionist school, culminating in a different conclusion as
to the source of the political theory of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. In republicanism the state is based on "virtue," which consists
in individuals subordinating their personal interests to the overall public
good of the commonwealth. This communitarian element of republi-
canism, with its "lament for a lost golden age,"8 is, of course, different
from Lockean liberalism based on governmental protection of indi-
vidual rights, including the right to property acquired through labor.
Caroline Robbins's Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, published
in 1959, laid the foundation for classical republican revisionists. She
maintained that the political thought of Aristotle, Machiavelli,
Harrington, and Sidney, among others, provided the basis as well as
the extension of classical republicanism.9 It was Bernard Bailyn, how-
ever, who provided the basis for interpreting jefferson's political ideol-
ogy as classical republican. His contention in The Ideological Origins
of the American Revolution, published in 1967, that jefferson was a
thorough reader of the Greek and Roman classics and that classical
republicanism was present in the colonies led other scholars to won-
der whether jefferson and the Declaration might be interpreted in terms
of republicanism rather than Lockean liberalism.10
j.G.A. Pocock, one of the most prominent explicators of classical
republicanism, did perceive this ideology in the Declaration. In his
extensive writings Pocock defined the type of person who would form
the foundation of the ideal republican state as one who was economi-
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cally independent through property ownership. Such independence gave
an individual the ability to liberate himself from his self-interests,
thereby enabling him to concern himself with the public good or over-
all well-being of the commonwealth. Pocock called such economic in-
dependence "virtue" and its lack or loss "corruption." If an individual
lost his economic independence, his moral health would be undermined
by a dependence on "government or social superiors." His concern
for the public good would then give way to concern for his own eco-
nomic survival, which would be contingent upon abiding by the po-
litical concerns or even the political dictates of those upon whom he
was dependent. Such "demoralization" of individuals could also arise
from exclusive concern with "private or group satisfactions" for purely
selfish reasons. Once deterioration of the moral health of individuals
started, it was "likely to prove uncheckable," since "men could not be
born with new natures." This view of the moral nature of man was
described by Pocock as "at once post-Christian and prehistoric. "11
What wrought havoc with civic "virtue" and brought about "cor-
ruption," according to Pocock, was "patronage": one branch of gov-
ernment making others, and individuals too, dependent upon it through
credit, national debt, or the army. Factions attempting to effect such
dependency he called "Court," and those in favor of classical republi-
canism he called "Country." The Country ideology, which emphasized
"mixed government and personal independence," "belonged to a tra-
dition of classical republicanism and civic humanism, anchored in the
Florentine Renaissance [Machiavelli], Anglicized by James Harrington,
Algernon Sidney, and Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, but look-
ing unmistakably back to antiquity and to Aristotle, Polybius, and
Cicero." This ideology was widely disseminated and accepted in the
eighteenth century, according to Pocock, accounting "for much of the
classicism" of that period, which was characterized by a "civic and
patriotic" disposition. 12
Pocock maintained in The Machiavellian Moment (1975) that the
American revolution was a manifestation of a Renaissance humanist,
classical republican "Machaivellian moment," since the colonists
claimed they were resisting a corrupt British imperial Parliament. He
also maintained that liberalism of a Lockean natural rights variety in
colonial America was a myth. 13 It is hardly any wonder, then, that
when speaking of the role of the Declaration of Independence in the
American Revolution, he said it was
a quasi-Lockean rhetoric that enumerated the wrongful acts by which
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the government of that state [Great Britain] had lost its lawful
authority over the American people.... The result, however, was less
the dissolution of all government over that people than the exaltation
of their existing governments into states; rather, it was contended-by
arguments that made use of Locke's doctrine of a right to emigrate-
that these governments already existed in history and by right of their
historic origins enjoyed a contractual autonomy. The chain of
arguments to this point was juristic; it deployed the concept of right
rather than the republican concept of virtue.14
Pocock's conclusion that the Declaration was "quasi-Lockean rheto-
ric" suggests that he saw a different aspect of the Declaration's "rheto-
ric" than its Lockean part. He mentioned such an aspect, one that was
classical republican, when he said of the content of the first American
document: "King and Parliament must be represented as totally corrupt
and aiming at total corruption; the new states must establish sovereignty
in the only form that aimed at the systematic institutionalization of vir-
tue. For the reason that they must become states, they must become
republics. The rhetoric of right as the precondition of independence
merged with the rhetoric of liberty and virtue as the preconditions of
one another. "15 This view of the Declaration tends to reduce its Lockean
aspect to one that was immediately useful to the colonies in separating
themselves from their mother country but not one that would have the
lasting significance of its classical republicanism. Other scholars, among
them Gordon Wood, Lance Banning, Forrest McDonald, and John
Murrin, largely if not completely support this view. 16
A nonclassical republican, communitarian revisionary interpreta-
tion of the source of Jefferson's ideas in the Declaration, one that ex-
cludes Lockean influence, is Garry Wills's Inventing America: Jefferson's
Declaration of Independence (1978). Wills maintained that virtually
all the ideology of the Declaration came from the Scottish Enlighten-
ment thinkers, especially the moral sense philosopher Francis
Hutcheson. 1? Hutcheson's moral sense, as Wills described it, "was di-
rected to others-it was the principle of sociability, of benevolence,
not selfishness." Wills went on to state that "no politics built upon the
moral sense could make self-interest the foundation of the social con-
tract." Hutcheson's ideas on rights were consistent with the moral
sense, and Wills described a Hutchesonean right as "a power over
others." Such a power, however, was legitimate only "so long as be-
nevolence or innocence are directing" it, and the criterion or "test" of
a rightful power was its contribution to the public good. 18 To put it
another way, a Hutchesonean right is a power to compel others to
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perform benevolent acts that enhance the well-being of the commu-
nity-which makes Hutcheson a communitarian.
Wills then elaborated on jefferson's phrasing in the Declaration and
that of some Hutchesonean passages and concluded that jefferson
placed Hutcheson's ideas in the Declaration, even though he was care-
ful not to argue that jefferson borrowed directly from Hutcheson. This
interpretation gives the Declaration a communitarian rather than an
individualistic emphasis born of Lockean ideas on rights. Wills, it should
be mentioned, minimized the impact of the Scottish philosopher Henry
Home, Lord Kames on jefferson's moral sense ideas. Kames, as Wills
pointed out, made a distinction between justice, which he defined as
refraining from doing harm to others, and benevolence, which he de-
fined as performing acts that benefit others.19
Still another nonclassical republican revisionary interpretation of
jefferson's political ideas, one with a Marxist cast, is found in Richard
Mathews, The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson (1984). Mathews
maintained that jefferson did not subscribe to either classical republi-
canism or possessive individualism. The retrospective aspect of the
classical republican and civic humanist ideology was alien to jefferson's
thinking, since the author of the Declaration, as Mathews stated, "ar-
gued the necessity for every generation to exercise its natural right to
create anew its political life. " jefferson's idea of "freedom," continued
Mathews, "requires that each generation must have a chance to begin
society over again every twenty years," at which time "all the laws
would automatically become void." This would entail a revisionary
approach to law to make it correspond with the "human and social
evolution" jefferson saw continuously taking place. Such a change of
law could be accomplished through revolution, and jefferson, said
Mathews, "was America's first and foremost advocate of permanent
revolution. "20 .
As respects Lockean possessive individualism, Mathews is of the
opinion that Jefferson argued against a capitalistic economy by urging
men to live in rural communities with the "small farm" as the means
of supporting their families: "This pastoral life style," said Mathews,
"is based, not on profit, but on science, moderation, and beauty," a
way of life that would give men "leisure" and thereby time "to think."
It would produce the type of unspecialized man whom, Mathews stated,
"Marx described in The German Ideology" and "hoped to restore to
his universality." Mathews, like many of the revisionist scholars, made
jefferson a communitarian. He found evidence for what he described
as "communitarian anarchism" in his study of the American Indians,
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"which resulted in a deep admiration of these tribal communities"
and "helped to convince jefferson that man was a social, harmonious,
cooperative, and just creature who, under the appropriate socioeco-
nomic conditions, could happily live in a community that did not need
the presence of the Leviathan. "21
Another extremist interpretation is Conor Cruise O'Brien's Long
Affair (1996). O'Brien, however, sees jefferson's ideas as in accord
with those of the Ku Klux Klan and terrorist Timothy McVeigh in-
stead of Marx, as Mathews does, even though he goes along with
Mathews's view that jefferson was an advocate of perpetual revolu-
tion. Apparently, neither O'Brien nor Mathews seriously considered
jefferson's idea that when a democratic constitution, agreed upon by
the people or their representatives, needs amendment or is not ad-
hered to, "we can assemble with all the coolness of philosophers, and
set it to rights, while every other nation on earth must have recourse to
arms to amend or restore their constitutions. "22
Certainly there are critics of the view that classical republicanism
or indeed any ideology with a communitarian thrust was the predomi-
nating ideology of the American revolutionary and postrevolutionary
periods. joyce Appleby and Isaac Kramnick are prominent among such
critics; so are john Diggins, Thomas Pangle, Steven Dworetz, and Garret
Ward Sheldon, all of whom have reasserted a Lockean influence on
the Declaration.23 Yet the communitarian side of what has now be-
come an ongoing debate among scholars has not been inactive. Barry
Alan Shain, for example, in The Myth of American Individualism
(1994), gives what he calls a "majoritarian" communitarian interpre-
tation of the Declaration and perceives no Lockean influence on that
document at al1.24
Considering the diversity of opinion as to the source of the ideas
jefferson incorporated in the Declaration, one of the twofold purposes
of this work is to trace where he got those ideas by examining the
writings of some of the authors he read before he drafted that docu-
ment. Comparing statements in these works with some jefferson wrote
in the Declaration and others scattered throughout his extensive writ-
ings will show their impact on his thinking and how they shaped his
worldview as succinctly expressed in the Declaration. The second pur-
pose of this work is to demonstrate that jefferson's worldview was
promulgated in the Declaration not only as political theory that justi-
fied political independence from Great Britain but also as heterodox
theology, which jefferson believed was inextricably linked to the effi-
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cacy of the Declaration's democratic polity. I argue that this succinctly
stated theology, with its heterodox concepts of God and man, was
among the primary truths of the democratic polity institutionalized in
the Declaration. In addition, I argue that jefferson saw the concepts of
God and man upheld by orthodox theological circles in the colonies as
antithetical to the Declaration's theological and political ideals. Schol-
ars such as Paul Conkin have argued that it is impossible to determine
jefferson's worldview because he "always ended up with such an eclectic
mix of ideas as to defy systematic ordering. He was a creature of mood
and sentiment much more than a rigorous thinker."25 There is some
truth in this, yet to say that jefferson's ideas "defy systematic order-
ing" seems extreme. And even if Conkin is right, some would argue
that it is the business of scholars to try to bring coherence to jefferson's
thought, however unsuccessful such attempts may be.
The first chapter describes some of the principal beliefs held in the
predominant orthodox theological circles of the colonies at the time
of the Declaration. The second chapter deals with the sources of
jefferson's heterodox theology, emphasizing its deistic, universal, and
impartial God. The third chapter explains the premises and principles
of jefferson's politics. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters discuss the
nature and significance of jefferson's concept of man as an essentially
moral being (not tainted by original sin) endowed with reason and
rights. They show why jefferson adopted ideas, philosophies, and the-
ologies that affirmed and upheld the morality, reason, and rights of
man and why he rejected those that denied these three attributes of
human nature or claimed authority over them. These chapters also
emphasize jefferson's epistemic views, including those contained in
the Declaration, and their relation to his concept of a democratic pol-
ity, as well as his reasons for rejecting philosophical skepticism. The
seventh chapter documents jefferson's defense of the Declaration's
political theory and heterodox theology against the orthodox religious
views of the time. The conclusion discusses his hope and trust that the
natural rights of man underlying the Declaration would finally prevail
the world over.
I believe that my interpretations of jefferson's ideas and ideals as
stated in the Declaration are original in two ways: first, they demon-
strate that a succinctly stated heterodox theology is institutionalized
in the Declaration as a primary truth and necessary corollary of its
political theory; second, they demonstrate through analysis the vital
function of jefferson's and the Declaration's epistemic views in
jefferson's and the Declaration's concept of.democracy. I think these
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interpretations are important because without them the ideas and ide-
als of the Declaration of Independence cannot be understood as
jefferson intended them to be understood. Writing on early modern
political thought, Mark Goldie stated that "philosophical theology is
not properly recognized in modern histories of political thought writ-
ten from a secular standpoint. "26 Certainly jefferson's and the
Declaration's political thought in the eighteenth century have been
written about, for the most part, from a secular perspective that offers
at best a limited account of theology. This work is intended to demon-
strate in a comprehensive way the interdependence of political thought
and philosophical theology (including epistemology) in jefferson's
worldview as expressed in the Declaration of Independence.
1
C)~(!)
The Theological Context
It is important to an understanding of Jefferson's views to note the
antiegalitarian, antidemocratic implications of Judeo-Christian ortho-
doxy in the colonies at the time of the American Revolution. It is not
easy, however, to determine what colonial religious orthodoxy was
because religious pluralism was rampant in the latter half of the eigh-
teenth century in the British Atlantic colonies of North America. Promi-
nent among religious groups from the beginning of the war with Great
Britain in 1775 to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence on
4 July 1776 were Calvinist or Calvinist-related sects. According to
Ralph Barton Perry, they included 575,000 Congregationalists, the
majority of whom were New England Puritans; 410,000 Presbyteri-
ans; 75,000 Dutch Reformed; 25,000 Baptists; and 50,000 German
Reformed, who were also influenced by Zwingli. Of the remaining
colonial population, Anglicans probably exceeded 1,000,000, but there
were also many nominal Anglicans among the 476,000 slaves in the
South who followed the faith of their masters. Methodists and Luther-
ans were few, and Jews numbered about 2,000.1 James McGregor Burns
adds that there were in addition 25,000 Catholics and 200,000 mem-
bers of German churches apart from Reformed.2 As John Locke said
of such different religious groups, each believed that it alone was or-
thodox and others erroneous and heretical, and as Ian Harris says,
"he denied that there was any judge of orthodoxy on earth."3 Jefferson
agreed and indeed sounded much like Locke when he said the various
sectarian groups of the world were "all different, yet everyone confi-
dent it is the only true one," and added with a touch of sarcasm, "A
man must be very clear-sighted who can see the impression of the fin-
ger of God on any particular one of them. "4
Knowledge of the differences among these various religious groups
at the time of the Revolution, however, is less important to this work
than knowledge of their similarities: the orthodox theological beliefs
shared by the colonial religious groups that were antithetical to the
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heterodox theology and political theory of Jefferson's worldview as
reflected in the Declaration of Independence. Among these shared be-
liefs were an aspect of God common to Judaism and the theologians
who founded or contributed to the theologies of the colonial Christian
denominations, and an aspect of man held by those theologians.
One general aspect of orthodoxy common to Judaism and Chris-
tianity in the colonies was the claim of having been chosen by God to
the exclusion of other religions, denominations, and sects. This claim
began with l the founding of Judaism and Christianity, both of which
are based on revelation-specifically, exclusive revelations made by
an eternal, transcendental God who is above and beyond human un-
derstanding. These revelations are exclusive because they are closed
to the vast majority of human beings and cannot be attained by virtue
of any human effort. They come only from God and in only two ways:
either God grants them to one or a very few human beings-proph-
ets-chosen by Him to the exclusion of all others, or He gives them
thr9ugh the incarnation of God in human form on earth. What God
reveals in these two ways is truth: the truth of God, the truth of cre-
ation, the truth of humanity, and the true morality. Once made, these
divine revelations are set forth in writing and thereby become the word
of God, or scripture. They are considered final and conclusive-good,
true, and complete for all eternity.
The dispute between Judaism and Christianity is not over the con-
cept of exclusive revelation common to both religions but over the au-
thenticity of the recipients, the authenticity of their claimed revelations,
and, when they conflict, which revelations are truly final and conclu-
sive. Judaism claims that the revelations God gave to Moses are final
and conclusive and that they contain the whole of religious truth; noth-
ing, therefore, can be added. As Maimonides described Judaism, "Re-
member that ours is the true and authentic Divine religion, revealed to
us through Moses, the master of the former as well as the later proph-
ets."s This is, of course, the reason Judaism rejects the revelations of
Jesus. Christians, however, claim that Jesus' revelations are later and
greater than those of Moses and, as set forth in the New Testament, are
final and conclusive and contain the whole of religious truth because
they come from God in the form of the Son, the second person of the
Trinity. Jesus' words "I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man
cometh unto the Father, but by me" {John 14:6)6 make this clear, ac-
cording to Christians. Each religion thus believes itself chosen by God
to be the only recipient of the complete version of God's truth and holds
that anyone who wants religious truth or salvation must come to them.
The Theological Context 11
As a result of exclusive revelation, Judaism and Christianity both
establish a hierarchy of authority from God above to a prophet or
incarnation, thence down to scripture or church or temple, and thence
to the rabbis or priests or ministers. Beneath this hierarchy are the
people, subject to its authority, thereby having no choice but to believe
and obey what is contained in God's exclusive revelations and the in-
structions and interpretations of them provided by the intermediaries
or agents of God (the rabbis, priests, or ministers). Therefore, indi-
viduals who align themselves with predominating versions of Judaism
and Christianity are not allowed to remain a part of that religion if
they use their reason to deny the truth claims of God or His hierarchy
of authorities. Rational conclusions must agree with these authorities,
which do not give reason the freedom to reject their truth claims.?
Exclusive revelation in this manner restrains and constrains the use of
individual reason in religion and thereby claims authority over the
people in the name of God.
Putting man under the authority of God's chosen agents or interme-
diaries gives rise to the belief by each religion, denomination, or sect
that it alone has been given the true version of exclusive revelation
and is thereby chosen by God, which in turn gives rise to sectarian
bigotry and persecution. In addition, exclusive revelation makes scrip-
ture infallible. Scripture is God's exclusive revelation in written form,
and since it came from an all-wise, all-knowing, all-powerful, and be-
nevolent God, it cannot be erroneous. This is precisely how the vast
majority of colonial Americans, as well as most of the world's Chris-
tians and Jews at that time, regarded the Old and/or New Testament.8
As a result, men who followed these religions were subject to an infal-
lible, inerrant, God-given, authoritative epistemology. To them the re-
vealed word of God in the Bible was the source of knowledge of the
truth not only of God, man, and morality but also of science, since
creation as described in Genesis was part of the Bible and was there-
fore regarded as literally true. Miracles too, a vital part of both the
Old and the New Testament, were regarded as true. The miracles de-
scribed in scripture established proof of the authenticity of the proph-
ets and the incarnation, who were the recipients and disseminators of
God's revealed word or truth.
Predestinator God
One aspect of truth believed to have been revealed through exclusive
revelation was the nature of God, a part of which was His predestinator
function, which gave rise to the doctrine of predestination. This doc-
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trine is part of Judaism as a result of God's choosing through his grace
the "seed" of certain individuals to become the chosen people and
nation of Jewish religion.9 It is also part of both Catholic and Protes-
tant theology. In Christianity, predestination is grace or a special favor
from God, but instead of being granted to a people, as in Judaism, it is
granted only to certain individuals at the time of creation. Christian
predestinating grace directs or destines individuals to the state of sal-
vation in the future, a state they cannot attain by moral actions alone,
according to predominating versions of Christianity.
As Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote in Summa Theologica: "It is fitting
that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His provi-
dence.... Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of
its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is
directed by the archer towards a mark.... For to destine is to direct or
send.... Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a
part of providence." Aquinas emphasized that not all are predestined
to salvation: "It is clear that predestination is a kind of exemplar of
the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the
divine mind" (emphasis added). This "ordering of some persons" is
an election or choosing by God of certain individuals for salvation
and the exclusion of others. Aquinas specified that the reason for God's
choice of some over others was love: "Predestination logically presup-
poses election; and election presupposes love.... Whence the predes-
tination of some to eternal salvation logically presupposes that God
wills their salvation; and to this belongs both election and love:-Iove,
inasmuch as He wills them to this particular good of eternal salvation;
since love is to wish well to anyone, ...-election, inasmuch as He
wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates
some. . . . For by His will, by which in loving He wishes good to
someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to
others." 10 In short, God loves and prefers some persons and not others
from the very beginning. God is motivated by this loving preference to
grant predestinating grace to those He loves and to withhold such
grace from those He does not love.
Some theologians, it is true, maintained that predestination was
antithetical to the performance of good works by an individual, based
on free will, as a contributing factor to salvation. Catholics, however,
established a delicate and somewhat precarious balance between pre-
destinating grace and good works, both of which they deemed neces-
sary for salvation. St. Ignatius of Loyola, even though he said, "It
must be true that no one is saved except he who is predestinated,"
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expressed apprehension about the negative impact an emphasis on
predestination might have upon the performance of good works. Yet
he did not wish to emphasize good works without grace, for such
works alone would not guarantee salvation. To avoid these extremes,
he advised caution in stressing either predestination or good works in
connection with salvation: "We must speak with circumspection con-
cerning this matter, lest perchance stretching too far the grace of pre-
destination of God, we should seem to wish to shut out the force of
free will and the merits of good works, or on the other hand, attribut-
ing to the latter more than belongs to them." Loyola maintained that
persons who thought they were predestined by God for salvation or
damnation would very likely neglect good works, or even indulge in
sin, and then rationalize their actions by arguing, "If my salvation or
damnation is already determined regardless of whether I do ill or well,
it cannot happen differently." Therefore Loyola advised not only cau-
tion but moderation when talking of predestination by stating,. "We
should not speak on the subject of predestination frequently. "11
Martin Luther also promulgated the doctrine of predestination, find-
ing a scriptural basis for it in both Old and New Testaments. He main-
tained that the difference between Isaac and Rebecca's twin sons Jacob
and Esau was election or predestination by God: Jacob was predes-
tined; Esau was not. He quoted Jesus' words in John 13:18 and 6:44
in support of predestination: "I speak not of you all: I know whom I
have chosen" and "No man can come to me, except the Father which
hath sent me draw him." Luther maintained further that good works
born of the free will of individuals could not be reconciled with pre-
destination, and yet the elect would overcome the inclination to sin-
born of Adam and Eve's original sin-and would indulge in good works.
This effect of predestination, however, was not because of the moral
redemption and free will of the elect. Election did not change their
inclination to sin; their good works were due to the intervention of
God in their lives, not their free will. It was God's righteousness, God's
guidance, and God's strength, said Luther, that enabled those elected
to refrain from sin and perform good works.12
Predestination was part of Huldreich Zwingli's theology, as well.
He pushed the doctrine to its extreme implications by maintaining
that those predestined, whether born before or after the advent of
Jesus, could not be damned by original sin or the lack of Christian
sacraments; election saved them: "Jacob was beloved by God before
he was born; original sin, therefore, cannot have damned him. So
Jeremiah, John and others.... This ... concerns election and predes-
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tination. . .. Therefore, blessedness and grace are from election, so
also is rejection, not from the participation in signs or sacraments. "13
John Calvin emphasized the doctrine of predestination more than
any other Christian theologian. In his Institutes of the Christian Reli-
gion he specified: "We call predestination God's eternal decree, by which
he determined with himself what he willed to become of each man.
For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreor-
dained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man
has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as
predestined to life or death." Calvin developed his exegesis on predes-
tination with a discussion of God's election or choosing of some peoples
or nations whom He favored over others for a magnificent destiny,
citing the Jewish people and nation as an example: God chose the
"whole offspring of Abraham, to make it clear that in his choice rests
the future condition of each nation." He cited Deuteronomy 32:8-9 in
support of this claim: "When the Most High divided the nations, and
separated the sons of Adam ... the people of Israel were his portion,
... the cord of his inheritance." Calvin emphasized that according to
Moses, God chose the Jewish people and their nation as His own be-
cause of His preferential love for the patriarchs, not because of any
merit in the Jews. He again quoted scripture to support this position
(Deuteronomy 4:37), which specified that God, because of this love of
the patriarchs, "chose their seed after them." 14
Maimonedes too maintained that the Jews' favored position with
God was based not on merit but on God's loving grace: God's choice
of the Jewish people and nation "did not happen because of our mer-
its but rather as an act of Divine grace. "15 Calvin, by emphasizing lack
of merit and even demerit on the part of the Jews, made it clear that
God granted grace of His own free will and that no meritorious action
or even law could bind Him to grant it. If God could be bound in any
way, He would not be free, according to Calvin, who said: "In the
election of a whole nation God has already shown that in his mere
generosity he has not been bound by any laws but is free, so that equal
apportionment of grace is not to be required of him. The very inequal-
ity of his grace proves that it is free." 16 Like individuals, nations were
treated unequally by God, according to Calvin. God in an arbitrary
fashion favored and disfavored whomever and whatever he pleased.
Calvin applied to individuals his arguments in support of God's
freely given grace to peoples and nations. He maintained that no per-
son could by the merit of good works put God in his or her debt and
thereby compel Him to grant the reward of salvation: "God of his
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mere good pleasure preserves whom he will, and moreover ... he pays
no reward, since he can owe none." Calvin cited Paul (Romans 11:5-
6) to substantiate his position that salvation by God's freely given pre-
destinating grace was opposed to salvation earned by individual good
works: "If it [salvation] is by grace, it is no more of works; otherwise
grace would no more be grace. But if it is of works, it is no more of
grace; otherwise work would not be work."1?
Calvin completely ruled out an individual's good works as a means
to attain salvation. Eternal life or death was determined solely by God's
freely given grace at the time each individual was created, before he
had a chance to perform any works, good or bad. Calvin even denied
that God's foreknowledge of an individual's future good or bad works
determined whether or not God would grant salvation or impose dam-
nation: if God granted grace or condemned men to damnation based
on foreknowledge, that grace or condemnation would not be freely
given; it would be the result of an individual's (future) merit or de-
merit. In addition, Calvin believed, as did Luther, that all virtue in any
individual was the result of election, which brought divine righteous-
ness, guidance, and the strength to be moral despite the elect's inborn
inclination to sin or moral taint, the effect of original sin. Election or
predestinating grace did not change an elect's tainted nature. It merely
provided divine help to overcome that nature. As Calvin put it, some
individuals were "elected to be holy, not because already holy." He
again quoted Paul (2 Timothy 1:9) to support his position: God "called
us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to
his own purpose, and the grace that was given to us by Christ before
time began."18
The predestinating God of the New Testament who granted loving
grace to some, as Aquinas pointed out, was also a practitioner of hate,
according to Calvin, who used both the Old and the New Testament
to support his view.19 In Malachi 1:2-3, God said of the twin sons of
Isaac and Rebecca, "Yet I loved jacob, And I hated Esau." In Romans
9:11-13, Paul not only repeated the message from Malachi but put it
in the context of predestination, for God's statement of jacob's elec-
tion was made to Rebecca preceding the birth of her twins: "(For the
children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that
the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works,
but of him that calleth;) It was said unto her, The elder [Esau] shall
serve the younger Uacob]. As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but
Esau have I hated."
Saint Augustine, one of the early advocates of predestination who
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influenced later theologians, including Calvin, also quoted Romans
9:11-13. In his Enchiridion the Bishop of Hippo perceived that the
Apostle Paul's account of what God said in these verses, as well as the
Old Testament's similar statements in Malachi, would very likely cast
God in an unjust light. This was because God professed love and ha-
tred for Jacob and Esau respectively before either had committed any
actions that could be the basis of these feelings or judgments. "For it
seems unjust," said Augustine, "that, in the absence of any merit or
demerit from good or evil works, God should love the one and hate
the other." He justified God's opposite treatment of Jacob and Esau,
however, first by stating that both were born under God's wrath and
condemnation as a result of the effects of original sin-"Thus both the
twins were born children of wrath, not on account of any works of
their own, but because they were bound in the fetters of that original
condemnation which came through Adam"-and then by maintain-
ing that God could freely grant or deny his love and grace as He pleased,
despite the fact that both Jacob and Esau deserved condemnation.
Therefore, God "loved Jacob of His undeserved grace, and hated Esau
of His deserved judgement." Thus God was just in His unequal treat-
ment of Jacob and Esau, in Augustine's opinion, but was nonetheless a
God of hate for all mankind as a result of the effects of original sin in
the absence of His freely given grace.20
The doctrine of predestination, then, was a pervasive aspect of or-
thodox Judeo-Christian theology. It was in Catholicism as well as Prot-
estantism, since Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Loyola, Luther, Zwingli,
and Calvin all believed in it.
Tainted Humanity
According to orthodox versions of Christianity both Catholic and Prot-
estant, the inability of men and women to save themselves by their
own moral acts was due to the inherited effects of the original sin of
Adam and Eve. Unlike predestination, the fall is not a part of Judaic
belief but is fundamental to the doctrine of virtually every Christian
denomination. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Loyola, Luther, Calvin, and
Zwingli all described it as an affliction of moral taint or propensity to
commit sin to which no human being is immune.21 As a result of this
taint, human nature is not to be trusted for moral determinations or
moral behavior. "For cursed be the one that trusteth in man," said
Saint Augustine, quoting Jeremiah 17:5.22 Trust should be in God, not
man. God's revelation or scripture, with emphasis on His law, became
the principal object of trust in God for Protestantism, whereas God's
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agents in the form of the Church and its priests assumed that position
in Catholicism.23 The difference was not absolute but a question of
emphasis, since the Reformers did not exclude the church nor the Catho-
lic hierarchy the word of God as an object of trust in God.
One of the effects of the doctrine of original sin was that it deprived
people of moral authority both individually and collectively. The source
of moral authority in Catholicism was found in the "tradition and the
teaching of the Church" and its priests, who, as intermediaries be-
tween God and man, administered that authority.24 Protestants were
subject to the moral authority of scripture as administered by the clergy.
For example, Puritans in New England elected a pastor, but this demo-
cratic element then stopped abruptly because it was his duty to in-
struct the congregation on moral ordinances, and he would talk down
to the congregation from the authority of his office and scripture.25
Despite the Protestant emphasis on the authority of scripture over that
of church and priests, Lutherans and most Calvinist denominations
maintained an ecclesiastical authority to interpret the scriptures ac-
cording to their particular theological perspectives, and that authority
applied to revealed moral law as well as doctrine. This scriptural and
ecclesiastical authority, or Protestant scholasticism, granted that men
had the use of reason but only if its conclusions agreed with the teach-
ings and precepts of scripture as interpreted by ecclesiastical author-
ity; Protestant scholasticism in this respect paralleled medieval scho-
lasticism. Its authoritarian approach vitiated Luther's concept of the
priesthood of all believers and the Reformation's original emphasis on
direct individual access to God's revelations in scripture and freedom
to interpret those revelations.26 There was de facto authority of church
and clergy even in liberal sects that allowed individual interpretation of
God's revealed word, for their clergy were the individuals who usually
had the greatest knowledge of scripture; hence, their congregations in
most instances yielded to their views of moral law as well. Regardless of
denomination, Forrest Wood maintains, by virtue of their position in
the church or the community, the colonial clergy all made some claim to
moral infallibility and thereby authority over their congregations.27 Such
was the moral authority of orthodox Christian leaders at the time of the
American Revolution, Adolph Koch argued, that it kept the laity in
their place and provided them with a "slave's morality. "28
Nor was the authority of the colonial clergy confined to doctrine
and morality. It extended to politics. In 1780 Joseph Galloway wrote
of the political influence of the ecclesiastical authorities of various sects
on their followers before the Revolutionary War, especially the Pres-
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byterians. He said that in the synods of that denomination, "all their
general affairs, political as well as religious, are debated and decided"
and "from hence their orders and decrees are issued throughout Amer-
ica; and to them as ready and implicit obedience is paid as is due the
authority of any sovereign power whatever. "29 Discussing the New
England clergy's political authority and preachments in colonial
America, Richard BuelJr. and Edmund S. Morgan wrote that the clergy
of all colonial sects never stopped giving instruction in political thought
in the 1760s and 1770s.30 It seems clear, therefore, that colonial Ameri-
can religions stultified individual determinations of morality, religious
opinion, and politics on the part of their own members and followers.
The concepts of God, man, and the source of religious truth com-
mon to the theologies of colonial Christian groups at the time of the
Declaration of Independence, and their resultant authority over the
individual, were not only antithetical to the political theory but also
the heterodox theology of that document. Jefferson's ideas, therefore,
would conflict with those concepts, as well as with Judaism's theology
of a chosen people and nation, before 1776. Among those who would
shape his thinking during this period was Lord Bolingbroke, who was
instrumental in his abandonment of orthodox theological views. As a
result of Bolingbroke's influence, and that of the Enlightenment as
well, Jefferson emerged with a critical disposition toward Judeo-Chris-
tian theology and a commitment to the universal God of nature or
natural theology.
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Bolingbroke and the Enlightenment
Jefferson's heterodox religious views were founded on an Enlighten-
ment outlook in general and the writings of Henry St. john, Lord Vis-
count Bolingbroke, in particular. It is the God of his heterodoxy that
appears in the Declaration of Independence rather than the God of the
Bible.
jefferson's introduction to the Enlightenment by William Small
marked the beginning of a thought process that led to his rejection of
the doctrines of the Anglican faith in which he had been raised.1 A
product of the Scottish Enlightenment, Small received a master's de-
gree from Marichal College in Aberdeen in 1755. In 1758 he moved
to Virginia to teach mathematics and natural philosophy at William
and Mary College in Williamsburg-a unique appointment since pro-
fessorships were generally filled by clergymen of the Church of En-
gland.2 Small was well qualified for his position, however, since he
was extraordinarily knowledgeable. As john Dos Passos wrote, he
"knew what the first rate men of England and Scotland were writing
and thinking" and no doubt passed much of that knowledge to
jefferson, who began his studies at William and Mary in 1760.3
jefferson's acknowledgment of the impact of Small on his life is found
in his Autobiography:
It was my great good fortune; and what probably fixed the destinies
of my life that Dr. William Small of Scotland was the[n] professor of
Mathematics, a man profound in most of the useful branches of
science, with a happy talent of communication, correct and gentle-
manly manners, & an enlarged & liberal mind. He, most happily for
me, became soon attached to me & made me his daily companion
when not engaged in the school; and from his conversation I got my
first views of the expansion of science & of the system of things in
which we are placed. Fortunately the Philosophical chair became
vacant soon after my arrival at college, and he was appointed to fill it
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per interim: and he was the first who ever gave in that college regular
lectures in Ethics, Rhetoric & Belles lettres.4
Unfortunately, little else is known of William Small.5 He left William
and Mary in 1764, approximately two years after Jefferson's studies
under his direction were completed and after he had, as Jefferson stated,
"filled up the measure of his goodness to me, by procuring for me, from
... G. Wythe, a reception as a student of law. "6 The fact that Small was
a talented man, however, is substantiated by his subsequent activities in
Birmingham's Lunar Society, where he became "an intimate friend of
[Erasmus] Darwin, [Mathew] Boulton, and Uames] Watt."7
When Jefferson said that Small gave him his "first views on the
expansion of science & of the system of things in which we are placed,"
he was no doubt referring to the system of the cosmos described by
Copernicus and Newton and derived from human sensory perceptions
and reason, not the heaven-and-earth system of Genesis based on God's
revelation. Although Jefferson did not elaborate on Small's science, a
system he described in one of his commonplace books is based on
science and therefore along the line of Small's. This commonplace book
consists of Jefferson's notes on various authors he studied as a young
man. 8 Among the longest entries are extracts from criticism of biblical
religion that he had copied by 1775 from Bolingbroke's five-volume
Philosophical Works. 9 It is in these extracts that a scientific descrip-
tion of the "system of things in which we are placed" is found.
Bolingbroke's background and studies reveal how he cultivated his
critical Enlightenment disposition toward religion. He began a bril-
liant political career when he entered Parliament in 1700 and subse-
quently became one of Queen Anne's secretaries of state. He negoti-
ated the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, but his future in politics collapsed
when the Tory government ended in 1714 and the Whigs gained power.
Anticipating Whig reprisals, Bolingbroke went to France. During his
ten-year exile he met and became friends with Voltaire and Montesquieu
and studied philosophy and history. Among those who influenced his
thinking were Samuel Pufendorf, Benedict Spinoza, Pierre Bayle,
Nicolas Malebranche, Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Anthony Ashley
Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury; deists John Toland, Anthony Collins, and
Lord Herbert of Cherbury; and various Renaissance humanist and
classical writers. 1o
The Enlightenment definition of philosophy, according to Peter Gay,
was "the organised habit of criticism. "11 The instrument of that criti-
cism was human reason. According to Ernst Cassirer, the practitioners
of Enlightenment values used their critical reason to oppose the "power
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of convention, tradition, and authority in all fields of knowledge."
Cassirer believed that the French Enlightenment especially used this
approach in the fields of theological and religious knowledge.12 The
philosophes' examination of these fields often led them to conclude,
as Bolingbroke did, that there was little or no truth content in some of
the most important Christian doctrines. The philosophes thereby chal-
lenged orthodox Christian epistemic authorities-the incarnation,
prophets, revelation, church, and clergy-and affirmed the critical rea-
son of each human being as the principal truth authority in theology
and religion. Bolingbroke, who had intimate contact with the French
Enlightenment and contributed to it, wrote on religion in a way that
represents what Gay and Cassirer said about the Enlightenment. His
criticism stirred a great deal of controversy after the posthumous pub-
lication of his work in 1754.13 It prompted Dr. Samuel Johnson to
comment that Bolingbroke was "a scoundrel for charging a blunder-
buss against religion and morality; [and] a coward because he had not
the resolution to fire it off himself [while he was alive]. "14
Bolingbroke's contribution to Jefferson's religious ideas was pro-
found. Gilbert Chinard wrote that the religious views in Jefferson's
extracts from Bolingbroke were responsible for those Jefferson "held
in common with the philosophes" in his earlier years, indeed the prin-
cipal source ofJefferson's religious views throughout his life: "No single
influence was stronger on Jefferson's formation and none was more
continuous. He followed Bolingbroke in his distrust of metaphysical
disquisitions. . . . He accepted his belief in some sort of a universal
religion not limited to the Jews. Most, if not all of the ideas he ex-
pressed in his correspondence with John Adams during the last twelve
years of his life, could be illustrated with quotations taken from the
abstracts of Bolingbroke in his commonplace book."15
A statement Jefferson made in 1821 demonstrates this lasting im-
pact. His comments in response to an inquiry on his views of Thomas
Paine and Bolingbroke were steeped in admiration. Bolingbroke, he
said, "was called a tory, but his writings prove him a stronger advo-
cate for liberty than ... the whigs of the present day." Both men "were
alike in making bitter enemies of the priests and pharisees of their day.
Both were honest men; both advocates for human liberty Lord
Bolingbroke's [writing] ... is a style of the highest order His
conceptions, too, are bold and strong.... His political tracts are safe
reading for the most timid religionist, his philosophical, for those who
are not afraid to trust their reason with discussions of right and
wrong."16
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jefferson was among those who were "not afraid to trust their rea-
son," as he carefully read Bolingbroke's philosophical tracts. Indeed,
Bolingbroke was a major contributor to his idea that there should be
no authority over or restraints upon individual reason in any field,
including religion. jefferson put this idea into practice during his years
of study prior to writing the Declaration of Independence, a period he
recalled in 1814 as one when he was "bold in the pursuit of knowl-
edge, never fearing to follow truth and reason whatever results they
led and bearding every authority which stood in their way."17 john
Locke also contributed to this disposition. In chapter 21 of his Essay
concerning Human Understanding~"Of Power," Locke stated, "I with
an unbiased indifferency followed Truth, whither I thought she led
me. "18 The similarity of this statement to jefferson's may well have
been due to jefferson's early knowledge of chapter 21 of Locke's Essay
(see chapter 6).
Science, Genesis, Deism, and Natural Law
The way Bolingbroke wrote on the "system of things in which we are
placed" would have appealed to jefferson for its religious as well as its
scientific content, for jefferson developed an early interest in both het-
erodox religion and science.19 Bolingbroke began his description of
the "system of things" with an attack on Moses' primitive account of
it (Genesis 1:3). Light and darkness, day and night, earth and sea,
heaven and earth, and stars as mere lights was Genesis's simplistic
description of the system. This contrasts sharply with what Copernicus
described as a universe with an endless number of stars, many of which
were like the sun with systems of planets. Indeed, the Genesis version
undermined the veracity of the Old Testament, according to Boling-
broke: Moses was supposed to be divinely inspired, and no one so
inspired could mislead men with such blatant falsity. To the contention
of some that Moses was merely conforming himself to the ignorance of
the people, since his purpose was to instruct them not in natural phi-
losophy or science but in the true doctrine of the one God, Bolingbroke
responded: "Was it necessary to that purpose that he should explain to
them the Copernican system? No, most certainly. But it was not neces-
sary to this purpose neither, that he should, give them an absurd ac-
count, since he thought fit to give them one, of the creation of our physi-
cal, and we may say, of our moral system. "20 The implication of this
argument was that either Moses was not divinely inspired and was there-
fore a fraud, or God misled him and the people with the "absurd ac-
count" in Genesis of the "system of things in which we are placed."
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Bolingbroke went on to attack the biblical view that the world and
all that is in it were created for man and under his dominion (Genesis
1:26-30) and that the earth and man were the center of creation. These
ideas, he said, were not in accord with scientific knowledge. He em-
phasized that the universe was not made for any particular creature or
any particular part of that universe: "The system of the universe must
necessarily be the best of all possible systems," and this could not be
the case "unless the whole was the final cause of every part, and no
one nor more parts the final causes of the whole."21 Neither were the
parts made for the whole: "The celestial phenomena were no more
made for us than we were for them." Rather, he believed, a reciprocity
between the parts and the whole was established by the creator at the
time of creation; each was made for the other. He concluded that in the
universal system man is just one among many creatures, which implies
that the creator is a God who does not favor any creature over another.
"That noble scene of the universe, which modern philosophy has
opened," he said, "gives ample room for all the planetary inhabitants."22
The substratum of Bolingbroke's conception of the universe and his
biblical criticism was Lockean sensory-based epistemology. Bolingbroke
emphasized the empiricism of An Essay concerning Human Under-
standing.23 Consistent with that emphasis he believed that the miracles
depicted in the Bible, frequently offered as proof that its revelations
were authentic, were themselves not authenticated by objectively veri-
fiable sources, and therefore it was ridiculous to accept them. More-
over, from a theological perspective, Bolingbroke believed that miracles
performed by God in order to direct and sustain His creation under-
mined the concept of God as an all-perfect and all-wise being who
established law in His creation to govern it. As Bolingbroke put it,
"Nothing can be less reconcileable to the notion of an all-perfect be-
ing, than the imagination that he undoes by his power in particular
cases [miracles] what his wisdom [and law born of wisdom], to whom
nothing is future, once thought sufficient to be established for all
cases. "24 This was an argument that simultaneously attacked the bib-
lical God of miracles and upheld the God of deism and natural theol-
ogy. If God found it necessary to intervene in the world with miracles,
it was tantamount to an admission that He was not all-wise and all-
perfect. If He were, He would have established at the time of creation
a system of nature with perfect laws that would govern it for all time
and under all circumstances. A system with such laws would make
miraculous intervention unnecessary. Bolingbroke's reasoning here
seems indebted to Spinoza's similar argument that miracles, which go
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against God's laws, go against the God who made those laws and that
it is absurd to think God would go against Himself in this way.25
The alternative to the God of revelation who intervened in the world
with miracles was the watchmaker God of deism, natural theology,
and natural religion, one who established the laws of nature in the
material universe at the time of creation and then left it alone.
Bolingbroke believed in such a God. He was, however, of the opinion
that each law and each manifestation or effect of events governed by
that law was itself a miracle, for without that law there would be no
governing of events and no order in creation. In short, in the absence
of law there would be chaos. Further, God's orderly creation of the
universe was the result of not just one law of nature but an aggregate
of many laws that did not change but governed the motion of objects
in a manner which, under similar conditions, was always the same.
Hence, the entire universe was an aggregate of the effect of laws or
miracles, as Bolingbroke described the laws of nature. The laws that
governed the universe could be empirically detected by the human sen-
sory intellectu"al faculty or empirical reason. The miraculous order they
established in the universe was what proved the existence of God,
who placed them there, according to Bolingbroke, and not the un-
proved miracles of revealed scripture, which were known only by hear-
say. Affirming the miraculous laws of nature, natural theology, and
natural religion and dismissing the questionable miraculous events of
the Bible, Bolingbroke said:
The missionary of supernatural religion [revelation] appeals to the
testimony of men he never knew, and of whom the infidel he labors to
convert never heard, for the truth of those extraordinary events which
prove the revelation he preaches: and it is said that this objection was
made at first to Austin the monk by Ethereld the saxon king. But the
missionary of natural religion can appeal at all times, and every
where, to present and immediate evidence, to the testimony of sense
and intellect, for the truth of those miracles which he brings in proof:
the constitution of the mundane system [laws of nature] being in a
very proper sense an aggregate of miracles.26
Here again he sounded like Spinoza, who argued that we gain knowl-
edge of God by gaining knowledge and understanding of His laws,
which govern the world, and not through miracles such as those de-
scribed in revelation, which leave us in ignorance.27
One problem with the biblical God who constantly intervened in
the course of nature or natural events with His miracles was that He
made science and scientific law, which depend upon predictability to
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be viable, unpredictable. His very intervention in the process of nature
was a cause of that unpredictability. The God of deism or natural the-
ology, on the other hand, who established His laws of nature in the
universe at the time of its creation and then left it alone, was a God
whose predictability could be depended on, once those laws were dis-
covered. Deism was therefore conducive to science, and it would seem
this was among the factors that influenced jefferson, who was an ad-
vocate of science, to adopt a deistic theology.28
Related to Bolingbroke's empiricism was his distaste for metaphysi-
cal speculation. He maintained that metaphysics was the presumption
or assumption of something beyond the scope of what can be empiri-
cally proved and was therefore unreliable. "I combat," he said, "the
pride and presumption of metaphysicians. "29 Mysteries he ranked even
lower than metaphysical speculations; they could not even be known,
for a mystery by definition is not known. Echoing john Toland,
Bolingbroke stated: "No man can believe he knoweth not what nor
why. And therefore he, who truly believeth, must apprehend the
proposition, and must discern it's connection with some principle of
truth.... Now let me ask again, can any man be said to apprehend a
proposition which contains a mystery, that is, something unintelligible;
or any thing more than the sound of words?"30
jefferson, under the influence of Bolingbroke, also abhorred meta-
physicians and mysteries. He referred to what metaphysicians "fabri-
cated" as "metaphysical insanities. "31 When commenting on the Trin-
ity-which he rejected, as did Bolingbroke32-he echoed the sense of
the foregoing statement: "Men of sincerity," he said, could not "pre-
tend they believe" in the unknowable "mysticisms that three are one,
and one is three; and yet that the one is not three, and the three are not
one. "33 He expressed the same ideas when he stated, "I had never
sense enough to comprehend the trinity and it has always appeared to
me that comprehension must precede assent."34 As Chinard points out,
although these comments were made after the writing of the Declara-
tion, they seem to reflect the early influence of the Bolingbroke ex-
tracts he copied as a young man. (See chapter 7 for further evidence of
jefferson's early reflection on and rejection of the Trinity.)
jefferson's own belief in God, like Bolingbroke's, was based on
empirical observations of nature and the conclusions derived from them,
along with the knowledge of the laws of nature he obtained through
the study of science. In a letter to john Adams he depicted this natural
theology approach to gaining knowledge of God as confirmation of a
deistic divine being, using teleological and cosmological arguments:
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I hold, (without appeal to revelation) that when we take a view of the
universe, in its parts, general or particular, it is impossible for the
human mind not to perceive and feel a conviction of design, consum-
mate skill, and indefinite power in every atom of its composition. The
movements of the heavenly bodies, so exactly held in their course by
the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces; the structure of our
earth itself, with its distribution of lands, waters and atmosphere;
animal and vegetable bodies, examined in all their minutest particles;
insects, mere atoms of life, yet as perfectly organized as man or
mammoth; ... it is impossible, I say, for the human mind not to
believe, that there is in all this, design, cause and effect, up to an
ultimate cause, a Fabricator of all things from matter and motion.35
These comments did not refer to the God of miracles found in scrip-
ture or revelation. Jefferson specifically stated that he did not appeal
to revelation. The God he described was a "Fabricator of all things,"
one whose "consummate skill" was evidenced by His creation. Laws
made by that God for the universe were the laws of nature or scientific
laws, such as those that held the "heavenly bodies so exactly in their
courses." These comments describe a God who constituted perfect
laws to direct and govern His creation at the time He created it. By
making these comments and by not appealing to what Bolingbroke
described as the imperfect God of revelation and scripture, whose laws
were so defective that He had to use miracles to govern the universe,
Jefferson demonstrated that he had adopted the deism, natural theol-
ogy, and natural religion of Bolingbroke.
Revelation and Law
Bolingbroke also attacked the scriptural laws governing humankind
as well as the God of the Bible who revealed those laws, by question-
ing whether the God of the Bible was just. He believed that punish-
ments and rewards, as a vital part of law, should be meted out "in a
due proportion" to the degree of badness or goodness of human ac-
tions. The God of the New Testament, according to Bolingbroke, failed
to pass this test of justice; was it just, he asked, "to reward the greatest
and the least degr[ee] of virtue, and to punish the greatest and the least
degree of vice, alike?" Yet the God of the New Testament granted
salvation to saintly individuals as well as those who were moderately
good; for persons of either category the state of bliss in heaven would
be the same. In like manner, that God condemned to hell, a place that
tormented everyone equally, both depraved individuals and those who
were moderately bad. Bolingbroke ridiculed those who believed that
the God who rewarded such extremes equally was just: "I ask what
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these persons would say if they beheld a man, who had done some
trifling good to society, recompensed like one who had saved his coun-
try or if they, who were convicted of petty larceny, should be delivered
over to the hangman, at one of our sessions, with those who had been
found guilty of assassination and robbery. "36
Bolingbroke continued his attack with an analogy depicting two
individuals of equal virtue in this life but of "very opposite fortunes":
one "extremely happy," the other "unhappy." If both are equally re-
warded after death, reasoned Bolingbroke, then "there arises such a
disproportion of happiness in favor of one of these virtuous men, as
must appear inconsistent with justice." Such injustice on the part of
the New Testament God "can be imputed to nothing but partiality,
which theism will never impute to the supreme being, whatever artifi-
cial theology may do, and does in many instances. "37 The "theism" or
theology that Bolingbroke mentions here as an alternative to the "ar-
tificial theology" of revelation was that of natural religion or natural
theology, and the God of that "theism" was a deistic, impartial God,
the antithesis of the partial God of revelation.
As for the specific biblical laws that govern people, Bolingbroke
concentrated his attack on those of the Old Testament, denying the
justice both of those laws and of the God that revealed them. He be-
gan by stating that manmade laws are imperfect because the passage
of time eventually renders them obsolete due to the gradual changes in
conditions that time inevitably brings. As Bolingbroke put it, manmade
laws are often rendered "useless and even hurtful" in the "natural
course of things." He argued that since human legislators cannot fore-
see the natural changes that would eventually make their laws inap-
propriate or unjust, they certainly cannot foresee the accidental or
extraordinary conditions that would occasionally render their laws
obsolete. He then defined a perfect law as one "made with such a
foresight of all possible accidents, and vvith such provisions for the
due execution of it in all cases, that the law may be effectual to govern
and direct these accidents instead of lying at the mercy of them," add-
ing that another measure of a perfect law was the "clearness and pre-
cision of it's terms." 38
From this definition he argued that if God truly made the laws of
the Old Testament, they would, since He was perfect, manifest both
these characteristics of perfection-but in fact they manifested nei-
ther: "We cannot read the bible," he said in regard to the first test of
perfection, "without being convinced that no law ever operated so
weak and so uncertain in effect as the law of Moses did." And since
the least of "accidents and conjunctures" was enough to "interrupt the
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course, and defeat the designs, of it," such accidents would cause the
people "not only [to] neglect the law, but [to] cease to acknowledge
the legislator." Moreover, it was absurd to blame this ineffectiveness
of Mosaic law on the stubbornness of the people in order to rescue
"the honor of the law" and the idea that God made it. God's perfect
law, Bolingbroke maintained, would overcome these and similar diffi-
culties: "We speak here of a law supposed to be dictated by divine
wisdom, which ought, and which would have been able, if it had been
such, to keep in a state of submission to it, and of national prosperity,
even a people rebellious and obstinate enough to break through any
other." As to the "clearness and perfection of its terms," the second
measure of the perfection of law, Bolingbroke was blunt in his criti-
cism. To him the language of the Old Testament laws was even worse
than that used in many manmade laws: "The language in which this
law was given is, the learned say, of any languages, the most loose and
equivocal, and the style and manner of writing of the sacred authors,
whoever they were, or wherever they lived, increased the uncertainly
and obscurity [of the law]."39
By contrast, the laws of nature as placed in creation by God pro-
vided not only scientific laws governing the material objects of the
universe but also laws governing human behavior. These laws, like
those that govern the universe, could be detected by reason. Bolingbroke
compared them with the laws of the Old Testament, especially those
in Deuteronomy 13.40 There men were instructed to kill anyone who
tried to influence or entice them to follow another God and thereby
practice idolatry: "And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die;
because he hath sought to thrust thee away from the Lord thy God"
(Deuteronomy 13:10). This rule applied even to "thy brother, the son
of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or
thy friend" (Deuteronomy 13:6). That there was no room for mercy in
dealing with such persons was made clear by the command "Neither
shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou
conceal him: But thou shalt surely kill him" (Deuteronomy 13:8-9).
Idolatrous cities were to be dealt with in the same manner: "Thou
shalt surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword,
destroying it utterly, and all that is therein and the cattle thereof ...
and [thou] shalt burn with fire the city, and all the spoil thereof every
whit, for the Lord thy God" (Deuteronomy 13:15-16). All this car-
nage and destruction was to be done "for the Lord thy God" and at
His command.
Bolingbroke rejected such laws and the God of the Old Testament
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who made them. Simultaneously he accepted the God of natural the-
ology and that God's laws of nature, which would not allow nlurder-
ous acts. To Bolingbroke the God of natural theology was all-perfect
because of the nature of His laws whereas the Old Testament laws
were an example of the imperfection and lack of justice of the biblical
God. As he put it:
I say that the law of nature is the law of god. Of this I have the same
demonstrative knowledge, that I have of the existence of god, the all-
perfect being [of natural theology]. I say that the all-perfect being
cannot contradict himself; that he would contradict himself if the
laws contained in the thirteenth chapter of Deuteronomy, to mention
no others here, were his laws, since they contradict those of nature;
and therefore that they are not his laws. Of all this I have as certain,
as intuitive [knowledge], as I have that two and two are equal to four,
or that the whole is bigger than apart.41
Here Bolingbroke not only stated that "demonstrative knowledge" of
God and the law of nature were obtainable with reason, via the em-
piricism described by Locke, but he also used "intuitive knowledge"
as Locke did in An Essay concerning Human Understanding. 42
While Jefferson was practicing law, his citation of Deuteronomy
during a case in 1771 indicated his knowledge of that book of the Old
Testament.43 Considering this citation and Bolingbroke's influence on
him, it becomes understandable why he objected to government based
on the law of the Bible and preferred the law of nature. Consistent
with those objections and preferences was a legal opinion he wrote as
to why Christianity and the laws of the Old Testament were not part
of the English common law, a system he praised as "the glory and
protection to that country" in A Summary View of the Rights of Brit-
ish America (1774).44 Jefferson did not specifically mention a reason
for that praise, but it could well have been due to a theory of some
common law jurists and legal thinkers-William Blackstone, Thomas
Wood, Edward Wynne, Richard Woodson-that English common law
had a nonbiblical ethical source and foundation: the law of nature.
Lord Mansfield also subscribed to this theory as did Sir Richard Aston.45
jefferson would have been aware of this theory, since he had, accord-
ing to Robert Ferguson, extraordinary knowledge of the "English le-
gal tradition. "46
The legal opinion is undated but was placed in jefferson's second
commonplace book in the latter half of 1776.47 In it jefferson main-
tained that the Saxons brought the common law to England, free from
any Christian influence, in the fifth century, because the introduction
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of Christianity into Saxon England did not take place until the seventh
century, after the conversion of the Saxon king "about the year 598."
The subsequent admission of Christianity as part of the common law
occurred, in Jefferson's opinion, because of fraudulent judicial deci-
sions resulting from "the alliance between Church and State in En-
gland," which "has ever made their judges accomplices in the frauds
of the clergy. "48
Jefferson cited the decisions of various judges, including those of Sir
Mathew Hale and Lord Mansfield that led to this "fraud," as linked to
a change of the word "ancient" used to describe "scripture" by Chief
Justice John Prisot in a 1458 Year Book case.49 Jefferson maintained
that "ancient scripture" referred to the ancient written law of the Chris-
tian church and observed that "Finch's law Book published in 1613"
changed Prisot's "ancient scripture" to "Holy scripture." The words
"ancient scripture," argued Jefferson, would not have been much use to
those who wished Christianity to be a part of the common law because
they could only have referred to the Old Testament if they did not refer
to the ancient laws of the church: hence the alteration.50 The change to
"Holy scripture" precipitated a series of judicial decisions which, with
absolutely no legal foundation, included Christianity in the common
law, according to Jefferson.51 They culminated in Judge Mathew Hale's
taking the "whole leap" when he "declared at once, that the whole
bible [Old Testament] and [New], testament, in a lump make part of the
Common law." Jefferson concluded his opinion with the statement:
"Thus they [the Judges] incorporate into the English code, laws made
for the Jews alone, and the precepts of the gospel, intended by their
benevolent author as obligatory only in foro conscientiae; and they arm
the whole with the coercions of Municipallaw."52
Jefferson wrote later of this sequence of events as "the most re-
markable instance of Judicial legislation, that has ever occurred in
English jurisprudence, or perhaps in any other"; it was "the adoption
in mass of the whole code of another nation." 53 Most Christians would
have greeted such an adoption as a blessing, but not anyone who had
read and assimilated Bolingbroke's ideas on the imperfection and in-
justice of biblical law, as Jefferson's extracts indicate he had done.
Historical Methodology
The most substantial of Bolingbroke's challenges to the authenticity
and veracity of both Old and New Testament theology came from the
strict empiricism he applied to the verification of religious historical
events recounted in scripture, beginning with the authentication of the
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character of those who witnessed them. "History to be authentic," he
said, "must give us not only the means of knowing the number but of
knowing the character of witnesses. "54 Unless witnesses were objec-
tive and honest, the facts they presented were, according to Bolingbroke,
a proof that "would not be admitted in judicature, as Mr. Locke ob-
serves." He added that a court of law would not admit "any thing less
than an attested copy of the record." He believed that such strict legal
authentication and verification of testimony should apply to all his-
tory, indeed that the verification of historical religious events was even
more important than the verification of legal matters such as property.
In legal matters if facts must be attested to when even "the sum of ten
pounds may not be at stake," was it not more important, he asked, that
similar measures "be taken, to assure ourselves that we receive nothing
for the word of God, which is not sufficiently attested to be SO?"55
Bolingbroke took religion seriously, as he thought everyone should,
and he did not think people should be duped out of religious truth-
any more than they should be duped out of property-by false testi-
mony. He was therefore highly critical of the veracity not only of scrip-
tural claims but of those of the Catholic Church, which, he said,
"established many maxims and claims of right, by affirming them con-
stantly and boldly against evident existent proofs of the contrary." In
addition he stated that the Church's reliance on tradition for religious
truth often led to untruth: "A story circumstantially related, ought not
to be received on the faith of tradition; since the least reflection on
human nature is sufficient to shew how unsafely a system of facts and
circumstances can be trusted for it's preservation to memory alone,
and for it's conveiance to oral report alone; how liable it must be to all
those alterations, which the weakness of the human mind must cause
necessarily, and which the corruption of the human heart will be sure
to suggest." To make sure that people were not duped or misled about
the truth of historical religious events, Bolingbroke established four
criteria as a method of authentication, attestation, and verification:
To constitute the authenticity of any history, these are some of the
conditions necessary. 1. It must be writ by a contemporary author, or
by one who had contemporary materials in his hands. 2. It must have
been published among men who are able to judge of the capacity of
the author, and of the authenticity of the memorials on which he writ.
3. Nothing repugnant to the universal experience of mankind must be
contained in it. 4. The principal facts at least, which it contains, must
be confirmed by collateral testimony, that is, by the testimony of
those who had no common interest of country, of religion, or of
profession, to disguise or falsify the truth.56
32 Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
Much of the history in the Pentateuch could not be verified by any
of these four criteria, according to Bolingbroke. First, Moses was not
a contemporary of a great deal of it-creation, for example: even
"Adam himself" would not have known "what passed on the first five
days" of creation. Moses did not fulfill the second criterion either:
"Were the writings of Moses published among people able to judge of
them and of their author? ... I believe not." As for the third criterion,
Bolingbroke said, if occasionally things "repugnant to the experience
of mankind" are found in human histories such as Livy's, these are
isolated by readers who accept the rest. But this was "not the case"
with the Old Testament, where "incredible anecdotes" were so fre-
quent that "the whole history is founded on such[;] it consists of little
else, ... and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of
nothing." Finally, there was no collateral verification of the Old Testa-
ment writings by objective or disinterested witnesses, as the fourth
criterion required. The witnesses to Moses' history, he said, "are in
truth but one, the testimony of Moses himself. "57 The combined effect
of these statements is a sweeping rejection of the authenticity of his-
torical events recorded in the Old Testament, including its accounts of
miracles. Bolingbroke specifically rejected some of these: "That the
Israelites had a leader and legislator called Moses, is proved by the
consent of foreign[ers] whom I call collateral witnesses. Be it so. But
surely it will not follow that this man conversed with the supreme
being face to face; which these collateral witnesses do not affirm. The
Israelites were an egyptian colony, and conquered Palestine. Be it so. It
will not follow that the red sea opened a passage to them, and drowned
the Egyptians who pursued them. "58
New Testament miracles were also attacked by Bolingbroke, although
not in the same way. He pondered why it was that "the miracles wrought
to propagate Christianity had greater effect out of Judea than in it." He
also reflected on the "glorious purposes of this [New Testament] revela-
tion," which was made by "the son of god himself" and concluded that
"the stupendous miracles in the heavens, and on the earth, that were
wrought to confirm it ... must have left reason nothing to do, but have
forced conviction, and have taken away even the possibility of doubt."
Yet this did not happen among the Jews who would have been the clos-
est witnesses "of the signs and wonders that accompanied the publica-
tion of the gospel," since within the Jewish community neither "the
learned" nor "the scribes" nor "the pharisees" nor "the rulers of the
people" nor the people themselves, for the most part, accepted the rev-
elation of the gospel. On the contrary, the Jews by and large not only
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rejected that revelation but became the "persecutors of Christianity."
This rejection made Bolingbroke suspect that the miracles of the gospel
were not authentic: "If we suppose ourselves transported back to that
time, and inquiring into the truth of this revelation on the very spot
where it was made, we shall find that, far from being determined by
authority in favor of it, our reason would have had much to do in com-
paring the various and contradictory testimonies, and in balancing the
degrees of probability that resulted from them. "59
Without completely denying the gospel events, then, Bolingbroke
asserted here that they were shrouded with doubt. jefferson, in a letter
to his nephew Peter Carr challenging the accuracy of the revealed word
of the gospel, sounded much like the Bolingbroke of his extracts: "When
speaking of the New Testament, ... you should read all the histories
of Christ, as well as those whom a council of ecclesiastics have decided
for us, to be Pseudo-evangelists, as those they named Evangelists. Be-
cause these Pseudo-evangelists pretended to inspiration, as much as
the others, and you are to judge their pretensions by your own reason,
and not by the reason of those ecclesiastics. "60 Here jefferson, like
Bolingbroke, expressed doubt about the orthodox view of gospel events
but did not make any outright denial of them; he wanted his nephew
to make his own judgment with his own reason. He affirmed here, as
had Bolingbroke, that individual reason rather than scriptural or eccle-
siastical authority should be the sole authority to determine what was
true in matters of religion.
In rejecting the scriptural accounts of miracles, jefferson often used
Bolingbroke's third criterion for determining authentic history: that is,
to disregard any event "repugnant to the universal experience of man-
kind." To William Short in 1820, jefferson mentioned Livy in this
way in a manner virtually identical to that of the Bolingbroke extracts:
"When Livy and Siculus, for example, tell us things which coincide
with our experience of the order of nature, we credit them on their
word, and place their narrations among the records of credible his-
tory. But when they tell us of calves speaking, of statues sweating blood,
and other things against the course of nature, we reject these as fables
not belonging to history." 61
Writing to john Adams, jefferson again used the third criterion in
his rejection of miracles. He was milder than Bolingbroke in his de-
nunciation of some miracles described in the Old Testament but vehe-
ment about one in the New Testament. The Decalogue, the Old Testa-
ment says, was miraculously "written by the finger of God," but
jefferson asked:
34 Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
Where did we get the ten commandments? The book indeed gives
them to us verbatim, but where did it get them? For itself tells us they
were written by the finger of God on tables of stone, which were
destroyed by Moses; it specifies those on the second set of tables in
different form and substance, but still without saying how the others
were recovered. But the whole history of these books is so defective
and doubtful, that it seems vain to attempt minute inquiry into it; and
such tricks have been played with their text, and with the other texts
of other books relating to them, that we have a right from that cause
to entertain much doubt what parts of them are genuine.
But Jefferson gave no such benefit of the doubt to the New Testa-
ment's account of the miraculous Virgin Birth:
And the day will come, when the mystical generation of jesus, by the
Supreme Being as His Father, in the womb of a virgin, will be classed
with the fable of the generation of Minerva in the brain of jupiter. But
we may hope that the dawn of reason and freedom of thought in
these United States, will do away [with] all this artificial scaffolding,
and restore to us the primitive and genuine doctrines of this the most
venerated Reformer of human errors.62
Jefferson in the last part of this statement made reference to restoring
"the primitive and genuine doctrines" of Jesus by getting rid of miracles,
which he regarded as imposture. Bolingbroke was no doubt one of
Jefferson's first contacts with the idea that much of orthodox Chris-
tian doctrine was "artificial theology" or imposture.63
Biblical versus Natural Religion
In Christianity Paul was a major source of imposture, according to
Bolingbroke. It was Paul, not Jesus, who formulated the fundamental
orthodox Christian doctrines of original sin, atonement, and salva-
tion by faith and the grace of God.64 Belief in most or all of these
doctrines was necessary for salvation, according to orthodox Chris-
tians. Therefore, said Bolingbroke, orthodox Christians must believe
that Jesus died without giving his followers "sufficient knowledge of
the terms of salvation" and that Paul remedied this deficiency with his
formulation of Christian doctrines. But Paul's remedy could only be
"the grossest absurdity" and "little more than blasphemy," since it
was also the view of orthodoxy that it was the Son of God who was
sent by his Father "to make a new covenant with mankind." To be-
lieve that the work of the Son and the Father needed to be supple-
mented by a man such as Paul, then, was to take the position that the
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work of God was done "imperfectly." In short, according to Boling-
broke, orthodox Christianity, if carried to its logical conclusion, re-
sulted in the absurdity that persons "who were converted to Chris-
tianity by Christ himself, and who died before the supposed
imperfection of his revelation had been supplied by the apostles, by
Paul particularly, lived and died without a sufficient knowledge of the
terms of salvation."65
Bolingbroke maintained that "a religion, revealed by God himself
immediately, must have been complete and perfect, from the first pro-
mulgation in the mind of every convert to it." If Christianity was a
new covenant with humankind, the result of God's grace in sending
his own Son-who was God in the second person of the Trinity-to
establish that covenant, then any supplementations or alterations to
the teachings of the Son, such as those promulgated by Paul, were not
part of that covenant. If they were, then, as Bolingbroke put it, "How
often, I say it with horror, might not god change his mind?"66 Jefferson,
like Bolingbroke, rejected Paul's teachings, and this rejection (see chap-
ter 4) can be traced to his extracts from Bolingbroke's writings.
Bolingbroke's critical rejection of Christian doctrine was severe,
especially with respect to the fall of man, which he maintained was the
foundation of orthodox Christianity: "If redemption be the main and
fundamental article of the Christian faith," then "the fall of man is the
foundation of this fundamental article." But the doctrine of the fall,
he believed, was incompatible with the nature of God. For God to
create a being so defective that it would fall, and then condemn it to
damnation unless He intervened with His grace, was "absolutely ir-
reconcilable to every idea we can frame of wisdom, justice, and good-
ness, to say nothing of the dignity of the supreme being. "67 Bolingbroke
rejected the doctrine of atonement on similar grounds. He pointed out
the absurdity as well as the lack of goodness and justice of a God who
would sacrifice the blood of His innocent Son to atone or give satis-
faction for men, all of whom offended Him as a result of the fall:
God sent his only begotten son, who had not offended him, to be
sacrificed by men, who had offended him, that he might expiate their
sins, and satisfy his own anger. Surely our ideas of moral attributes
will lead us to think that god would have been satisfied, more
agreeably to his mercy and goodness, without any expiation, upon the
repentance of the offenders, and more agreeably to his justice with
any other expiation rather than this.... Let us suppose a great prince
governing a wicked and rebellious people. He had it in·his power to
punish, he thinks fit to pardon them. But he orders his only and
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beloved son to be put to death to expiate their sins, and to satisfy his
royal vengeance.68
These ideas on atonement are strikingly similar to those of the six-
teenth-century theologian Faustus Socinus, and Jefferson mentioned
Socinians in the notes on religion he made in 1776 just after the adop-
tion of the Declaration of Independence.69 Like Socinus, Bolingbroke
was unable to reconcile the Christian doctrine of atonement with his
concept of a just God and therefore rejected this doctrine "in all its
circumstances," which included the fall-as did Jefferson.7o
Bolingbroke maintained that this imperfect or defective God of bib-
lical revelation was partial, unjust, cruel, capricious, immoral, and
unmerciful. As a result, He was not a fit object of love and worship,
whether as the Jehovah of the Old Testament or the Predestinator of
the New Testament. As an alternative to the biblical God of revela-
tion, Bolingbroke offered the all-perfect God of natural theology, who
could be discovered by human reason and was worthy of adoration:
Natural religion represents an all perfect being to our adoration and
to our love; and the precept "thou shalt love the lord thy god with all
thy heart["]; will be effectual in this system. Can any man now
presume to say that the god of Moses, or the god of Paul, is this
amiable being? The god of the first is partial, unjust, and cruel;
delights in blood, commends assassinations, massacres and even
exterminations of people. The god of the second elects some of his
creatures to salvation, and predestines others to damnation, even in
the womb of their mothers.71
As Bolingbroke remedied the imperfect science and law contained in
revelation by replacing them with science and law born of reason, he
remedied the imperfect God of scripture by replacing Him with the
rationally discovered all-perfect God of natural religion.
Jefferson too believed in the God of natural religion, and his criti-
cisms of the Old and New Testament God sound much like Boling-
broke's. "Cruel" and "remorseless" were the terms Jefferson applied
to the partial or "family God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, and
the local God of Israel." In a similar vein, he said that the Jewish faith
"had presented for the object of their worship, a Being of terrific char-
acter, cruel, vindictive, capricious and unjust. "72 He saw the New Tes-
tament God as the same sort of being. He abhorred the Predestinator
God of Calvin and Paul who, as Bolingbroke stated, "elects some of
his creatures to salvation . . . and others to damnation even in the
womb of their mothers."73
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Calvin included the doctrine of predestination among his five points,
which Jefferson considered as "blasphemies" against God.74 But Jeffer-
son knew long before he drafted the Declaration of Independence that
predestination extended beyond Calvinism to other predominating
theologies and denominations of Christianity; predestination was a
part of the Thirty-Nine Articles, article 17, of the Anglican faith, in
which he was raised. 75 Nevertheless, it was Calvin's theology empha-
sizing predestination that bore the brunt of Jefferson's scorn for the
Predestinator God of the New Testament, as reflected in a letter to
John Adams: "I can never join Calvin in addressing his god. He was
indeed an atheist, which I can never be; or rather his religion was one
of daemonism. If ever man worshipped a false god, he did. The Being
described in his 5 points, is not the God whom you and I acknowledge
and adore, the Creator and benevolent Governor of the world; but a
daemon of malignant spirit. It would be more pardonable to believe in
no god at all, than to blaspheme Him by the atrocious attributes of
Calvin."76 Apart from condemning and denying the Predestinator God
of Calvin and the New Testament in this statement, Jefferson affirmed
the existence of another God, "the Creator and benevolent Governor
of the world," whose attributes both he and John Adams acknowl-
edged and adored. That God was the God of natural theology since
Jefferson affirmed that God. His praise of that God as adorable ech-
oed that of Bolingbroke.
Bolingbroke consistently maintained that it was inconceivable to
him, and Jefferson certainly agreed, that God would show partiality
to any religion, denomination, sect, or individual. This was no doubt
the reason that, as Chinard stated, Jefferson accepted Bolingbroke's
"belief in some sort of a universal religion not limited to the Jews. "77
Chinard could have continued that neither would that religion be lim-
ited to Christians or the people of any religion. A truly universal reli-
gion would be all-inclusive and therefore have a truly impartial God,
since partiality would be contradictory to universality or all-inclusive-
ness. Bolingbroke described such a deistic, impartial, universal, all-
inclusive God in his theology of natural religion, which (as noted above)
he called "theism." After denouncing the biblical God for His partial-
ity, Bolingbroke said that this was an attribute "theism will never im-
pute to the supreme being. "78
This message, with all its tolerance and political implications, took
root in Jefferson's mind, as the very first paragraph of the Declaration
of Independence reveals:
38 Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the
separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God [emphasis added] entitle them, a decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the Separation.79
This passage does not refer to the God of revelation or the Bible but to
"Nature's God," or Bolingbroke's deistic God of natural religion. The
impartiality of this God to all nations and peoples can be seen in
jefferson's reference to "one People," the colonists, who were under
the "Laws of Nature." According to these "Laws" and "Nature's God"
who established them, a people or a nation was not chosen by God
over other peoples and nations of the earth. Rather they were all given
a "separate and equal Station" by those "Laws of Nature" and "Na-
ture's God." jefferson's God of the Declaration is, therefore, antitheti-
cal to any God who would manifest partiality by choosing one people
or nation over others, as did the God of the Old Testament. The God
of the Declaration repudiates such partial choosing, for all peoples
and all nations are equal in His eyes.
This impartial Bolingbrokean God was not only antithetical to a
God who would grant grace to one people over others, but also anti-
thetical to the Christian God who would grant some individuals sav-
ing grace while denying such grace to others. Saving grace, therefore,
was no part of the "Nature's God" of the Declaration. It was also
alien to persons who were the product of "Nature's God." Such per-
sons were very different beings from those created by the God of the
predominating versions of Christianity. They were not, according to
jefferson, abject, helpless, depraved victims of original sin, dependent
upon God's grace for salvation and under His hierarchy of religious
authority. Rather, they were independent moral agents who could them-
selves know and perform good works according to the moral laws of
nature and thereby earn their salvation. Such persons by their very
nature made saving grace unnecessary. jefferson had adopted this con-
cept of humanity before writing the Declaration (see chapter 4).80 The
idea that men were not dependent on God's grace for salvation but
could earn it by good works was contained in one of the books that
jefferson recommended for purchase in a letter to his brother-in-law
Robert Skipwith in 1771.81 Titled The Oeconomy of Human Life, it
was a short book of fifty-eight pages alleged to have been "translated
from an Indian Manuscript written by an antient Bramini. "82 Millicent
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Sowerby has written that some believe it to be the work of Robert
Dodsley, an "English poet, dramatist and bookseller," and "Philip
Dormer Stanhope, fourth Earl of Chesterfield. "83
The book was essentially a moral treatise, and though jefferson
seemed familiar with all the books he recommended to Skipwith,84
this one was especially important to him. Desbordes sent him a French
translation of Oeconomy long after jefferson's first contact with it,
and in writing to thank Desbordes in july 1807, jefferson stated that
"this elegant little morsel of morality has always been a great favorite
of mine. "85 In it, the concept that salvation is not granted by God's
grace but earned by good works is poetically expressed: "Virtue is a
race which God hath sent him [man] to run, and happiness the goal;
which none can arrive at until he hath finished his course, and receiveth
his crown in the mansions of eternity." 86
jefferson was extremely critical of a God who, like the God of the
New Testament, created men who would fall and thereby become in-
capable of independent moral agency, unable to earn their own sal-
vation through the performance of good works. He called such a God
"a bungling artist. "87 jefferson's early rejection of the grace made nec-
essary by such a "bungling artist" was manifest in the Declaration's
allusion to an impartial "Nature's God," a God who was antithetical
to partial grace. That rejection continued in his later years. "Were I to
be the founder of a new sect," he wrote in 1819, "I would call them
the Apiarians, and after the example of the bee, advise them to extract
the honey of every sect. My fundamental principle would be the re-
verse of Calvin's, that we are to be saved by our good works which are
within our power, and not by our faith which is not within our power. "88
Calvin believed that not only salvation but also faith and good works
were the result of God's grace;89 by rejecting grace, jefferson in this
statement comes down firmly on the side of good works by individual
human beings as the means of attaining salvation.
"Nature's God" of the Declaration, like the laws of nature, was not
made known to humanity by God's exclusive revelation or the custo-
dians of such revelation, whether church or priestcraft. "Nature's God"
could be detected with the reason of each individual human being.
jefferson, by referring to "Nature's God," thereby departed from the
Old and New Testament in giving reason precedence over revelation
as a means of gaining knowledge of God. In addition, he remedied
three deficiencies of the biblical God and biblical religion that
Bolingbroke had pointed out. First, he avoided being under the au-
thority of revelation, which was alien to science. Second, he avoided
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being subject to the laws of revelation as regulators of human behav-
ior, laws that were not only imperfect but inferior to human laws de-
rived from reason. Third, he avoided being under the authority of a
God who was unjust and partial, cruel and vindictive, whimsical and
capricious. By contrast, "Nature's God," or the God of natural theol-
ogy, natural religion, and deism, was a God whose natural laws could
be discovered by reason and science, who left men free to make their
own laws with their reason, and who was worthy of adoration, since
He was a perfect God with sublime attributes.
Although Bolingbroke was not the only influence on Jefferson's the-
ology of equality as expressed in the Declaration (John Locke was
another and a great influence on the political ideology of the docu-
ment as well), the extracts from Bolingbrokes's writings provided the
basis for Jefferson's reference to "Nature's God" and his rejection of
orthodox Christian doctrine. Adrienne Koch called it more than rejec-
tion; Jefferson, she said, before and during the time he drafted the
Declaration of Independence, manifested a concealed "hatred for cer-
emonial institutionalized Christianity. "90 Hatred seems too strong a
term to describe Jefferson's reaction against New Testament religion,
but there was a bitterness there that extended also to Old Testament
religion and theology. One principal reason for that bitterness, appar-
ently, was that he thought the partiality of biblical theology could not
provide appropriate organizing principles for an egalitarian democratic
society.
3
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Locke and the Declaration
That John Locke's Second Treatise of Government made a profound
influence on Jefferson can be seen in the ideas expressed in the Decla-
ration of Independence. This view has long been held by many schol-
ars, including Carl Becker and Morton White.1 Yet, there have been
challenges to the idea of Locke's influence; Richard Mathews, for ex-
ample, argued that Jefferson's political theory was devoid of both
Lockean possessive individualism and classical republicanism.2 It was
Garry Wills, however, who made the most publicized challenge to the
view that Locke influenced Jefferson and the Declaration. In his In-
venting America, Wills said, "There is no indication [that] Jefferson
read the Second Treatise carefully or with profit." He went on to state,
"There is no conclusive proof that he read it at all (though I assume he
did at some point)." Wills gives three reasons for his opinion. First,
there is no evidence that Jefferson owned a copy of the Treatise except
for the brief period of a few months between late 1769, when he re-
ceived one from a bookseller, and 1 February 1770, when a fire de-
stroyed his home at Shadwell-including his library with the excep-
tion of a very few items such as his commonplace books.3 Second, he
never copied a single passage of the Treatise in either his literary or his
government commonplace book. Third, though he did paraphrase a
portion of chapter 11 of the Second Treatise before the Declaration of
Independence in his government commonplace book,4 Wills alleged
that this citation was erroneously and inappropriately used. He de-
scribed this error by stating that Jefferson, when gathering historical
evidence that kings were elected, appended "a reference to the elev-
enth chapter of the Treatise on legislative supremacy-which is not
the same matter at all."5
By examining the context in which the Lockean paraphrase was
commonplaced, however, along with the contents of the chapter cited,
it can be shown that Jefferson did cite Locke correctly and appropri-
ately and in a manner that indicates considerable knowledge of the
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Second Treatise. Jefferson's government commonplace book demon-
strates that he had done considerable historical research on the gov-
ernments of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Poland, and Great Britain by
studying the writings of Robert Molesworth, Rene Aubert de Vertot,
Thomas Salmon, and William Robertson.6 The people of Denmark,
he said, endeavored to elect a king who was "valiant, just, merciful,
affable, a maintainer of the laws, a lover of the people, prudent and
adorned with all other virtues fit for government." If they made a
wrong choice and the king proved a tyrant, however, the people fre-
quently "deposed him, often times banished, sometimes destroyed him."
They did so by calling the king before the representative body of the
people, or if he was too powerful for this, "they dispatched him" and
then chose a new king. At the death of a king who had served the
people well, preference would be given to his family in choosing a
successor, especially his eldest son "when all other virtues were equal"
among those considered for his replacement. Jefferson concluded that
this process of selecting a king "was the antient [sic] and is the present
constitution of Sweden, ... and it may certainly be deemed the present
constitution of Great Britain."7
Jefferson's research notations enumerated several historical prece-
dents for nonhereditary and nontestamentary successors to the throne
of England, some of which were accomplished by election.8 He pref-
aced these precedents with the statement "The following instances of
the right of electing a king by the people of England prove such a right
reserved to them." He maintained that the constitution of Great Brit-
ain, in its pure unaltered state, gave the people the right to elect their
king and that Parliament had usurped this right by passing unlawful
acts that established succession without election. He argued that
England's legislative body, as originally established in the constitution
by the people, consisted of an elected king in addition to Parliament.
Therefore, acts of Parliament to establish successors to the throne with-
out an elected king's approval were made by a legislative power al-
tered from the way the people originally established it. Such acts, con-
cluded Jefferson, were not binding. It was in support of this conclusion
that he paraphrased chapter 11 of Locke's Second Treatise:
Acts of parI. have indeed been passed for settling succession; but they
are void in their nature; because a king, elected by the people, is one
of the branches to whom the people have deputed the power of
making laws; and they have never bound themselves to submit to any
laws but such as have received the approbation of the Commons, the
Lords, and a king so elected, and his being merely a delegated power,
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cannot be deputed to others by the whole delegates, much less by two
branches of them only, to wit the Lords and Commons. Locke. Gov.
2.11.9
Apart from the question of whether Jefferson's historical references
were accurate and his interpretation of them correct, he was correct
and appropriate in his use of Locke as an authority for his argument.
Substantiation of this is found by reference to that part of Locke's
chapter "Of the Extent of the Legislative Power" which he paraphrased:
"The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any
other hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they,
who have it, cannot pass it over to others. The People alone can ap-
point the Form of the Commonwealth, which is by Constituting the
Legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when
the People have said, We will submit to rules, and be govern'd by
Laws made by such Men, and in such Forms, no Body else can say
other Men shall make Laws for them." 10
What Jefferson proved, at least to his satisfaction, in his historical
research and paraphrased citation of the Second Treatise was the basic
authority of the people over the legislative body, including an elected
king. He believed this was a fundamental part of the ancient constitu-
tion of England and the present one too, if the usurpation of Parlia-
ment were remedied. That ancient constitution, as he interpreted it,
was what he referred to in his Notes on the State of Virginia as having
the "freest principles," which, "with others derived from natural right
and natural reason," formed the basis of government in America. ll
What Locke's chapter 11 stressed and Jefferson made use of in his
paraphrase was that to alter the legislative power without the consent
of the people who established it, and then to make laws with that
altered legislative body, was to violate the sacred principle of govern-
ment by consent of the people. Laws made in such a way were not
laws and did not need to be obeyed, said Locke:
This Legislative is not only the supreme power of the Common-
wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the Commu-
nity have once placed it; nor can any Edict of any Body else, in what
Form soever conceived; or by what Power soever backed, have the
force and obligation of a Law, which has not its Sanction from that
Legislative, which the publick has chosen and appointed. For without
this the Law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its
being a Law, the consent of the Society, over whom no Body can have
a power to make Laws, but by their own consent, and by Authority
received from them. 12
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The combination of these ideas with Jefferson's conclusion that kings
were an elected part of the legislative power under the legitimate con-
stitution of England had obvious implications for the colonies, which
resented laws passed by Parliament that they deemed oppressive. It
rendered all laws made by Parliament illegal until sanctioned by an
elected king. It would seem, therefore, that Jefferson was applying his
interpretation of English history and knowledge of Lockean political
theory to the colonies before he drafted the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. It would also seem that since he knew chapter 11 of the Second
Treatise well enough to paraphrase provisions that applied to the le-
gality of legislation relative to the successors of elected kings, his knowl-
edge of that chapter extended beyond those provisions and indeed to
the entire work. Evidence of this may be seen in the similarity of many
of the provisions of the Second Treatise with those of the Declaration,
which clearly shows that Jefferson not only had extensive knowledge
of Locke's work but put it to use in drafting the Declaration. These
similarities can be shown by comparing passages from the first print-
ing of the Declaration as approved by the Continental Congress (see
the appendix) with some from the Second Treatise. There were, of
course, alterations in Jefferson's rough draft before the approved copy
was printed. In order to demonstrate that the ideas conveyed in the
first printed copy were Jefferson's, I annotate each passage quoted to
show that either the passage was not altered, or that the alterations
were made by Jefferson himself, or that they did not change the mean-
ing of his rough draft language.
General Similarities
In chapter 19 of the Second Treatise, titled "Of the Dissolution of
Government," a provision similar to those paraphrased by Jefferson
from chapter 11 as respects the authenticity of law passed by an al-
tered legislative body goes even further. It not only states that laws
passed by an altered legislative are not laws and need not be obeyed
but adds that legislative alteration dissolves the government and gives
the people the freedom to form a new one. As Locke put it:
The Constitution of the Legislative is the first and fundamental Act of
Society, whereby provision is made for the Continuation of their
Union, under the Direction of Persons, and Bonds of Laws made by
persons authorized thereunto, by the Consent and Appointment of
the People, without which no one Man, or number of Men, amongst
them, can have Authority of making Laws, that shall be binding to
the rest. When anyone, or more, shall take upon them to make Laws,
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whom the People have not appointed so to do, they make Laws
without Authority, which the People are not therefore bound to obey;
by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may
constitute to themselves a new Legislative, as they think best, being in
full liberty to resist the force of those, who without Authority would
impose any thing upon them. Everyone is at the disposure of his own
Will, when those who had by the delegation of the Society, the
declaring of the publick Will, are excluded from it, and others usurp
the place who have no such Authority or Delegation. 13
The basic purpose of the Declaration of Independence of 4 July
1776 was to make a formal statement that the authority of the British
government over the former colonies had been dissolved. 14 It listed as
the just causes of that dissolution the "repeated Injuries and Usurpa-
tions" inflicted on the colonies by the "King of Great-Britain. "15 Many
of the specific "Injuries and Usurpations" (enumerated below) were
alleged to be the result of altering the legislative power appointed by
the colonial people. In short, the dissolution of government as the
effect of legislative usurpations or alterations-the core concept of the
foregoing Lockean passage-became a principal thrust of the Declara-
tion. Legislative alterations or usurpations caused the people, as Locke
put it, to "come again to be out of subjection," allowing them to "con-
stitute to themselves a new Legislative." The Declaration followed
this Lockean premise by stating that the colonial people had the right
as respects their government "to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new Government" 16 as a result of legislative usurpations or alterations
as well as some other abuses which, Locke maintained, dissolved a
government.
Other provisions of the Second Treatise are also strikingly similiar
to general ideas contained in the Declaration. One that supplied the
format Jefferson used is found in the last paragraph of chapter 18,
"Of Tyranny." It urged men to observe the actions of a prince because
those actions, not his pretensions or protestations, were what revealed
his true intentions and purposes:
But if all the World shall observe Pretenses of one kind, and Actions
of another; Arts used to elude the Law, and the Trust of Prerogative
(which is an Arbitrary Power in some things left in the Prince's hand
to do good, not harm to the People) employed contrary to the end,
for which it was given: if the People shall find the Ministers, and
subordinate Magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured,
or laid by proportionably, as they promote, or oppose them: If they
see several Experiments made of Arbitrary Power, and ... a long
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Train of Actings shew the Councils all tending that way, how can a
Man any more hinder himself from being perswaded in his own
Mind, which way things are going.17
At the beginning of the Declaration, in the "all the World" manner
of Locke, jefferson made an explicit appeal to world public opinion
when he stated that "a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind"
requires that when "it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve"
their government, "they should declare the causes which impel them"
to such action. 18 The causes that led to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence were alleged in that document to be offenses committed by the
king against the colonies. These were described as "a long Train of
Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object"-
abuses, that is, revealing the king's true purpose to be "a Design to
reduce them [the colonists] under absolute Despotism. "19 Here, as in
Locke, attention is directed to actions. Even the terminology is similar.
In addition to "a long Train of Actings" in chapter 18, Peter Laslett
has pointed out that "a long Train of Abuses" in the Declaration is
identical with language in chapter 19 of the Treatise. Locke speaks
there of "a long train ofAbuses [emphasis added], Prevarications, and
Artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the
People. "20 Notice that in addition to the "abuses" phrase, jefferson
used "Design" in describing the king's purposes or objects in the same
way Locke did. "Despotism," however, was not the only design or
object of the king's actions. A second one mentioned in the Declara-
tion was "the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny" over the colo-
nies.21 Then, after citing despotism and tyranny as the king's general
objects or designs, jefferson alleged that the king committed specific
actions or abuses for the attainment of those objects or designs, quite
"a long train" of them. Finally, toward the end of the Declaration,
jefferson wrote a conclusion about the king that he believed any reader
would deem justified as a result of having read the enumerated spe-
cific abuses: "A Prince whose Character is thus marked by every act
which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free People. "22
In this manner, jefferson's format in the Declaration conformed to the
one Locke specified in his chapter 18, which instructed men to ob-
serve the actions of their prince in order to determine his "design" or
object.
The idea of despotism or despotic power also shows a similarity
between the Second Treatise and the Declaration. Locke defined such
power as "Absolute, Arbitrary Power" which, being absolute and ar-
bitrary, can be used "to take away" the lives of individuals subject to
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it. Such power came in conflict with "the fundamental Law of Na-
ture," which was, according to Locke, cCthe preservation ofMankind. "
Because this law was "the Will of God," Locke stated that each man
was "bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully."
In other words, each individual had the obligation to protect himself
or herself from despotic power in the state of nature which continued
to apply after a government was formed. Therefore, if the government
had absolute arbitrary power with its potential to do harm to an indi-
vidual by exercising it in a despotic way, individuals could and should
resist it since they were obligated to preserve themselves. As Locke
expressed this point when he wrote of governmental power: "It being
out of a Man's power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a
liberty to destroy him; God and Nature never allowing a Man so to
abandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: And since a man
cannot take away his own Life, neither can he give another power to
take it."23 Jefferson in the Declaration approached the problem of des-
potic power from the perspective of the unalienable rights of man rather
than an obligation to God. Nonetheless, the thrust of his argument is
similar to Locke's, as is seen in this statement: "But when a long Train
of Abuses and Usurpations ... evinces a Design to reduce them [the
people] under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to
throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their fu-
ture Security."24
Still another similiarity between the Second Treatise and the Decla-
ration is the contention that the people had the power to judge whether
or not the government's power had become absolute or arbitrary and
whether the government was doing them harm. They did this, accord-
ing to Locke, by appealing to God for His judgment on government,
and only they could judge when the circumstances of government
warranted such an appea1.25 The people would, of course, not ask God
for His judgment unless they deemed the circumstances of govern-
ment adverse to them and it would be expected that God's judgment
would be favorable to their interests as they perceived those interests.
Realistically, this would be the way the people could be expected to
perceive God's judgment. Indeed, realists would say that it was the
people, not God, making the judgment as to whether or not the power
of their government was absolute or despotic or was doing them harm.
Therein lay a problem: if used whimsically and capriciously by the
people, such judicial power would lead to a constant dissolution of
government and cause what Locke described as "a perpetual founda-
tion for Disorder." To assuage the fears of those who believed the
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people would thus abuse their judicial power if they had it, Locke
argued that they would not "throw off" a government "till the Incon-
venience is so great, that the Majority feel it, and are weary of it, and
find a necessity to have it amended." As he stressed in chapter 19:
"People are not so easily got out of their old Forms, as some are apt to
suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowl-
edg'd Faults, in the Frame they have been accustom'd to. And if there
be any Original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or
corruption; 'tis not an easie thing to get them changed, even when all
the World sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aver-
sion in the People ... have been seen in this kingdom. "26
Jefferson made the same point in the Declaration. He too sought to
allay the fears of those who thought that giving the people the power
to judge their government would be disruptive to political stability. To
the historical argument of Locke, he added a prudential one: "Pru-
dence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should
not be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all
experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer,
while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the
Forms to which they are accustomed. "27
Specific Similarities
Perhaps the most striking similarities between the Second Treatise and
the Declaration may be seen in the specific abuses alleged against the
king in that document.28 According to the first of those allegations, the
king "has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and neces-
sary for the public Good."29 According to Locke, the "public good" is
an end or purpose of government.30 Moreover, when governors ne-
glect or oppose laws that are necessary to achieve an end of govern-
ment, the power of government, which is derived from the people, is
dissolved and reverts back to the people, who are free to form a new
government. As Locke put it: "For all Power given with trust for the
attaining of an end~ being limited by that end~ whenever that end is
manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be (or-
(eited~ and the Power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who
may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and
security. "31 In the context of this comment, the first specific abuse
alleged by the Declaration was a serious one, since by refusing to as-
sent to laws "necessary for the public Good" the king opposed an end
of government. This alone, according to a Lockean criterion, provided
grounds for the dissolution of government.
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The second abuse alleged by jefferson was the king's refusal to al-
low the governors of the colonies "to pass Laws of immediate and
pressing Importance, unless suspended in their Operation till his As-
sent should be obtained."32 Laws "of immediate and pressing Impor-
tance" were conducive to the public good and thus an end of govern-
ment. Then jefferson mentioned neglect, the second of Locke's two
reasons for dissolving the government when that neglect vitiated one
of government's ends. He did this by stating as respects laws passed by
colonial legislatures held in suspense pending the king's assent, "And
when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them" (em-
phasis added).33
The third abuse alleged that the king had "refused to pass other
Laws for the Accommodation of large Districts of People, unless those
People would relinquish the Right of Representation in the Legisla-
ture. "34 Such arbitrariness on the part of the king is one of the specific
ways in which the legislative is altered, according to Locke in chapter
19, which states generally that the alteration of legislative power from
the way the people have established it dissolves the government. It
states specifically of an executive who becomes arbitrary, "When ... a
single Person, or Prince, sets up his own Arbitrary Will in place of the
Laws, which are the Will of the Society, declared by the Legislative,
then the Legislative is changed. "35 In this passage Locke described a
prince who, after gaining arbitrary power, nullified laws made by past
legislative bodies that reflected the will of society. The result of relin-
quishing "the Right of Representation in the Legislature," stated in
the Declaration, even though it does not mention such nullification
and might not immediately have this effect, would be to subject the
people to the arbitrary power of a king over which they had no con-
trol. That power could be used to nullify the will and the well-being of
the people at any time and thereby result in despotism or tyranny.
Locke defined tyranny as "the exercise ofPower beyond Right, which
nobody can have a Right to," utilized by an individual not for "the
good of those, who are under it" but rather for "the satisfaction of his
own Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other irregular Pas-
sion." 36 The potential for tyranny in the third abuse, not to mention
despotism, was stated by jefferson when he wrote that the people's
"Right of Representation in the Legislature" was "a Right inestimable
to them and formidable to Tyrants only."37
The king's fourth abuse is virtually identical with another way of
altering the legislative as stated in chapter 19 of the Second Treatise:
namely, hindering the legislative. As Jefferson expressed that abuse,
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"He has called together Legislative Bodies at Places unusual, uncom-
fortable, and distant from the Depository of their public Records, for
the sole Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance with his Mea-
sures. "38 Compare Locke's language to this effect: "When the Prince
hinders the Legislative from assembling in its due time, or from acting
freely, pursuant to those ends, for which it was Constituted, the Legis-
lative is altered. "39
The fifth abuse is similar to the fourth except that it alleged that the
king hindered (or altered) the coloniallegislatives in the extreme by
dissolving their "Representative Houses repeatedly." The more basic
offense alleged here, however, was the king's "Invasions on the Rights
of the People," and the reason the colonial legislatures were dissolved
by the king, according to the Declaration, was that they were "oppos-
ing with manly Firmness his Invasions" on their rights.40 The principal
right claimed by the colonists was the freedom to govern themselves, a
basic premise of Locke's Treatise.
The sixth abuse alleged by the Declaration, like the fourth and the
fifth, involves hindering the legislative, which, as Locke stated, alters
the legislative. In this allegation, however, Jefferson made explicit a
Lockean principle: that the dissolution of legislative power is the ef-
fect of its having been altered by people other than those who estab-
lished it-at which time that power devolves to the people. The king,
wrote Jefferson of this allegation, "refused for a long Time, after such
Dissolutions [of colonial representative houses], to cause others to be
elected." As a consequence of this substantial alteration of govern-
ment by the king, he then added, "the Legislative Powers ... have
returned to the People at large for their exercise. "41
The thirteenth alleged abuse is the only one that does not name the
king as the sole abuser: "He has combined with others to subject us to
a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by
our Laws." Here "others" referred to the people of England, and "Ju-
risdiction" to their Parliament.42 The allegation then condemned the
king for "giving his Assent to their [Parliament's] Acts of pretended
Legislation" over the colonists.43 Both Parliament's claim of legislative
authority and the king's assent to it were the Lockean legislative
usurpation and alteration that dissolved the government, since Parlia-
ment had not been authorized by the colonial people to make laws for
them. One such act of Parliament's "pretended Legislation" was "im-
posing Taxes on us without our Consent. "44 On this sensitive issue
Locke specified in the Second Treatise that taxes "must be with his
[each individual's] own Consent,-i.e., the Consent of the Majority,
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giving it either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by
them."45
Following the abuses alleged to have been committed jointly by
king and Parliament, Jefferson again focused exclusively on the king,
this time on his acts of war against the colonies: His Majesty had
"plundered our Seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns, and de-
stroyed the Lives of our People. "46 In the next paragraph he made
further allegations as to the king's acts of war, once again specifying
abuses that, according to the Second Treatise, would dissolve govern-
ment. As Locke put it, a prince "by actually putting himself into a
State of War with his People," would thus "dissolve the Government,
and leave them to that defence, which belongs to everyone in the State
of Nature." Since everyone was entitled, even obligated, to self-de-
fense both in the state of nature and after a government was formed,
according to Locke, even the actions of kings could be defended against:
"Self-defence is a part of the Law of Nature; nor can it be denied the
Community, even against the King himself. "47
It is clear, then, that many of the specific abuses alleged in the Dec-
laration are found in the Second Treatise. It seems equally clear that
what Jefferson did when he drafted the Declaration was to analyze the
offenses of king and Parliament against the colonies. He thereby no-
ticed that many of them corresponded with abuses mentioned in the
Second Treatise. He then arranged the allegations in the Declaration,
as a lawyer would, to demonstrate that the colonies were justified in
dissolving their government. Since anyone of several specific abuses
stated in the Declaration would, by itself, dissolve the government
according to Locke, Jefferson used Lockean theory to support the
Declaration's purpose, which was to make a formal statement that the
authority of the British government over the colonies was dissolved.
Hence, to a very great extent, the Declaration judged both the king
and Parliament by criteria set forth in Locke's Second Treatise. Jefferson
could not have used these criteria without knowledge of that work.
Emigration and Lockean Theory
One abuse mentioned near the end of the Declaration provides evi-
dence that Jefferson had knowledge of Lockean political theory long
before he wrote that document and shows that he used historical pre-
cedents much as they were used in the Second Treatise. Locke stated
that governments of the world that began in peace were the result of
the consent of free and independent men joining to form a common-
wealth in the state of nature. History, Locke maintained, provided
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proof of this, which he made clear when he said there were "examples
of History, shewing, that the Governments of the World, that were
begun in Peace ... were made by the Consent of the People." He cited
Rome and Venice as examples. Greece, he believed, provided another
example when some of the Spartans left their native city "with Palantas,
mentioned by Justin." These Spartans were free men who, "indepen..-
dent one of another, ... set up a Government over themselves, by their
own consent." Locke was convinced that he had proved his theory of
the origin of government by giving "several Examples out of History,
of People free and in the State of Nature, that being met together
incorporated and began a Commonwealth. "48
jefferson, consistent with this Lockean approach, read history to
find precedents for the American colonies' establishment of their own
government. He was interested in the Greek colonies that broke away
from or became disobedient to the cities that had colonized them and
cited examples from the writings of Abraham Stanyan and Sir Walter
Raleigh.49 Chinard said of jefferson that "even when writing the Dec-
laration of Independence he was still preoccupied with precedents. "50
One precedent briefly mentioned in the Declaration concerned emi-
gration. In the next to last paragraph of the printed copy is an innocu-
ous and somewhat obscure statement: "We have reminded them [the
British people] of the Circumstances of our Emigration and Settlement
here. "51 Those circumstances are not elaborated. This statement and
the preceding sentence, "We have warned them from Time to Time of
Attempts by their Legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction
over US,"52 give the impression that the historical circumstances of
emigration to British colonial America must somehow have made null
and void the attempts of Parliament to exert jurisdiction over the colo-
nies. In fact, this was the case, according to jefferson, since the emi-
gration reference in the final approved Declaration was the vestige of
a much longer statement he had made in the rough draft, most of
which was eliminated by the Continental Congress. The original pas-
sage (with the deleted part in italics) read:
We have reminded them of the Circumstances of our Emigration and
Settlement here, no one of which would warrant so strange a preten-
tion: that these were effected at the expense of our own blood and
treasure, unassisted by the wealth or the strength of Great Britain:
that in constituting indeed our several forms ofgovernment, we had
adopted one common king, thereby laying a foundation for perpetual
league and amity with them: but that submission to their parliament
was no part of our constitution, nor ever in idea if history may be
credited. 53
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Jefferson went on to say (and this part remained in the adopted ver-
sion) that the colonists had urged the British people "to disavow these
Usurpations" or parliamentary claims of jurisdiction.54
Thus, the historical precedent mentioned in the final approved copy
of the Declaration was but a brief version of the way Jefferson drafted
it originally. Even the original draft, however, was itself but a brief
version of a cherished theory Jefferson had articulated more compre-
hensively two years earlier in A Summary View ofthe Rights ofBritish
America. That essay, written to instruct the Virginia delegates to a
Continental Congress and ultimately to set before the king certain griev-
ances of all the colonies, was not adopted by the Virginia assembly but
was published in London about one year later. Like the Declaration, it
denied the authority of Parliament over the colonies and condemned
Parliament's "unwarrantable encroachments and usurpations" on the
legislative power of the colonies.55 Its denial and condemnation, as in
the Declaration, were based on the circumstances of emigration-not
only of the colonists who had emigrated to America but of the Saxons
who had emigrated to England. The Summary View used the Saxons
as a precedent to justify the American colonies' establishment of their
own government and laws.
Jefferson had read a great deal about the Saxons, as his government
commonplace book demonstrates. Chinard notes that he painstakingly
reconstructed their history by reading such authors as "Pelloutier,
Molesworth, Vertot, Sullivan, Kames and Blackstone." He also read
the writings of John Dalrymple and Sir Henry Spelman, which pro-
vided him with the idea that feudalism had been imposed upon Saxon
law as a result of the Norman Conquest.56 Before that, the Saxons had
established and governed themselves by their own laws since their ar-
rival in England, according to Jefferson. These laws in their pure form
were not imposed on them by either feudal kings or Judeo-Christian
revelation and its priestcraft, since the Saxons arrived in England be-
fore they were converted to Christianity and long before the Norman
Conquest. This Saxon law, according to Jefferson, was the origin of
the English common law.57 It was a system of law that arose from the
people themselves and had as its basis the law of nature as mentioned
in the last chapter. Jefferson argued that by exercising their natural
right of freedom of emigration, the Saxons had placed themselves back
in the state of nature.58 At that time they had the freedom of that state
to form their own government by their own consent in England and
adopt laws of their own choosing without any interference from their
mother country-which in fact did not interfere.
Having exercised their right of emigration, which put them in the
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state of nature, the Saxons were the perfect historical precedent for
the colonists in America. jefferson argued that the colonists, upon
exercising their right of emigration from England, had the right like
their Saxon predecessors to form their own governments and adopt
their own laws. This precedent, analogous to Locke's historical ex-
amples, justified the colonists' claims of legislatures and laws indepen-
dent of Great Britain. Thus jefferson, aided by reading many authors
during his historical research (some of whom had a different view of
the Saxons and the origin of the common law than the ones he pre-
ferred), adapted the Saxon history and law to serve the interests of the
colonists. In addition he did so in a way that was in accord with Lockean
theory, which also served those interests. As jefferson argued from
historical precedent in the Summary View:
Our ancestors, before their emigration to America, were the free
inhabitants of the British dominions in Europe, and possessed a right,
which nature has given to all men, of departing from the country in
which chance, not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new
habitations, and of there establishing new societies, under such laws
and regulations as, to them, shall seem most likely to promote public
happiness. That their Saxon ancestors had, under this universal law,
in like manner, left their native wilds and woods in the North of
Europe, had possessed themselves of the Island of Britain, then less
charged with inhabitants, and had established there that system of
laws which has so long been the glory and protection of that country.
Nor was ever any claim of superiority or dependence asserted over
them, by that mother country from which they migrated.59
jefferson went on to state that if a claim of governmental jurisdiction
had been made by the mother country over England, the Saxons there
had "too firm a feeling of the rights derived to them from their [Saxon]
ancestors, to bow down the sovereignty of their state before such vi-
sionary pretensions. "60 The thrust of this argument was that what the
Saxons did in England and were allowed to do by their mother coun-
try, the colonists had a right to do in America and should be allowed
to do by their mother country.61
In specifying the "establishment of new societies, under such laws
and regulations as to them shall seem most likely to promote public
happiness" by emigrants in a land "less charged with inhabitants,"
jefferson was applying the Lockean theory of government by consent
of the people in a historical context as Locke did in the Second Trea-
tise: "For there are no Examples so frequent in History, both Sacred
and Prophane, as those of Men withdrawing themselves, and their
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Obedience, from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the Fam-
ily or Community they were bred up in, and setting up new Govern-
ments in other places: from whence sprang all that number of petty
Common-wealths in the beginning of Ages, and which always multi-
plied, as long as there was room enough. "62 This striking similarity
between the Second Treatise and the Summary View leaves little doubt
that Lockean political theory was entrenched in jefferson's mind two
years before he drafted the Declaration. This was when he wrote the
Summary View and formulated his Lockean historical precedent, which
was used in that document as well as the Declaration.
Subsequent to the Summary View, two other documents written by
jefferson gave him the opportunity to formulate grievances against
Great Britain and the king that were consistent with Lockean political
theory. The first was the "Declaration ... setting forth the causes and
necessity of taking up arms," which he drafted in 1775; the second
was a proposed constitution for Virginia, drafted not long before the
Declaration of Independence. Both documents, especially the latter,
listed grievances similar to the ones stated in the Declaration. In fact,
when jefferson drafted the Declaration, he had with him a list of the
grievances stated in his proposed constitution for Virginia, a list he
had rearranged to suit the Declaration.63
Given all the similarities between the ideas of the Second Treatise
and the Declaration, it is not surprising that Richard Henry Lee ac-
cused jefferson of copying the latter from the former. jefferson's later
denial of this charge, made to James Madison, is revealing: "Richard
Henry Lee has charged it [the Declaration] as copied from Locke's
treatise on Government.... I only know that I turned to neither book
nor pamphlet while writing it. I did not consider it as any part of my
charge to invent new ideas altogether and to offer no sentiment which
had ever been expressed before. "64 It is significant that he denied only
copying Locke, not the use of his theory. In a similar denial to Henry
Lee, jefferson said the Declaration was "neither aiming at originality
of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and pre-
vious writing, it was intended to give expression of the American mind.
. . . All its authority rests on the harmonizing sentiments of the day,
whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the
elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney,
etc. "65 Again, there was no specific denial of using Lockean theory;
Locke was mentioned with several other authors who may have con-
tributed to the ideas contained in the Declaration. Yet it was Locke
whom jefferson singled out for praise in 1790, among all those au-
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thors mentioned to Lee when he said of the Second Treatise, "Locke's
little book on Government is perfect as far as it goes. Descending from
theory to practice, there is no better book than the Federalist [Pa-
pers]."66 This high praise of Lockean theory is testimony to Jefferson's
knowledge of it, a knowledge attained before 1776 and put to use
during that year. Jefferson's statement to Lee that the Declaration "was
intended to give expression of the American mind" has been inter-
preted by some to mean that the document is an expression of the
collective mind of the American people or their representatives at the
Second Continental Congress. The "American mind" expressed in the
Declaration, however, was clearly Jefferson's. Apart from the fact that
the language and ideas expressed in the first official printed text were,
for the most part, Jefferson's, there were few if any members of the
Congress, other than Benjamin Franklin, who shared the deist reli-
gious views Jefferson expressed in t4at document, even though most
agreed with its political ideas.
As Julian Boyd has pointed out, some have seen parallels between
the Declaration and James Wilson's pamphlet Considerations on the
Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parlia-
ment (1775), or Jefferson's fellow Virginian George Mason's Declara-
tion of Rights (1776), and regarded one or both as an influence on
Jefferson when he drafted the Declaration.67 Certainly these works,
like the Declaration's ideological passages, do have a Lockean flavor. 68
One explanation is that Lockean ideology was so well known in the
colonies before 1776, according to Carl Becker, Bernard Bailyn, and
Steven Dworetz, that all expressions of it were bound to have similari-
ties.69 Jefferson's extensive pre-1776 knowledge of the Second Trea-
tise, however, was such that he did not need Lockean intermediaries
like Wilson or Mason to acquaint him with Lockean political theory.
Theology and Egalitarianism
Apart from political theory, Locke made a specific contribution to the
theology of the Declaration. He seems also to have influenced Jefferson
in a more general way in matters of theology prior to 1771. Jefferson
firmly believed that each man's reason was his sole authority in theol-
ogy and religion, but only for himself and no one else.70 This idea
arose partly from the influence of his extracts of Bolingbroke's writ-
ings, with their devastating attacks on revelation and the tradition of
the church or ecclesiastical authority. These left man de facto with no
authority in theology and religion but his own reason. The idea would
also seem to have come from his reading of John Locke's Of the Con-
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duct of the Understanding. This work too was on the list of books
jefferson recommended to Robert Skipwith in 1771.71 In it Locke stated:
There is indeed one science, as they are now distinguished, incompa-
rably above all the rest, where it is not by corruption narrowed into a
trade or faction for mean or ill ends and secular interests-I mean
theology; which, containing the knowledge of God and his creatures,
our duty to him and our fellow-creatures, and a view of our present
and future state, is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed
to its true end, i.e. the honour and veneration of the Creator and the
happiness of mankind. This is that noble study which is every man's
duty, and everyone that can be called a rational creature is capable
of.... This is that science which would truly enlarge men's minds,
were it studied, or permitted to be studied everywhere with that
freedom, love of truth, and charity which it teaches, and were not
made, contrary to its nature, the occasion of strife, faction, malignity,
and narrow impositions. 72
Locke's ideas in Conduct on the study of theology, which included
each individual's duty to God and to "our fellow-creatures" were suc-
cinctly echoed by jefferson: "The relations which exist between man
and his Maker, and the duties resulting from those relations, are most
interesting and important to every human being, and the most incum-
bent on his study and investigation. "73 Although this statement was
made in 1822, Chinard saw such statements as a reflection of the last-
ing impressions made on jefferson's conscio'usness by his early read-
Ing.
In another statement from Conduct emphasizing individual reason
in theology and religion, Locke pointed out that the vast majority of
persons were inclined to accept popular opinion as truth, or, as he put
it, "apt to conclude that what is common opinion cannot but be true."
Yet he also maintained that this herd instinct of the masses could not
lead to truth: "I do not remember wherever God delivered his oracles
by the multitude, or Nature truths by the herd." He went on to state
that anyone who wished to know "the truth of things must leave the
common and beaten track, which none but weak and servile minds
are satisfied to trudge along continually in" and exercise his own ra-
tional judgment.74 jefferson echoed these comments in a 1787 letter to
his nephew Peter Carr: "Your own reason is the only oracle given you
by heaven, and you are answerable, not for the rightness, but the up-
rightness of the decision." After cautioning against favoring novel or
bizarre opinions on religious and theological matters, using phraseol-
ogy similar to Locke's "servile minds," he went on to advise his nephew
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not to surrender his mind or reason to the views of others but to let it
reach its own conclusions:
Your reason is now mature enough to examine this object [religion
and theology]. In the first place, divest yourself of all bias in favor of
novelty and singularity of opinion. Indulge them in any other subject
rather than that of religion. It is too important, and consequences of
error may be too serious. On the other hand, shake off all the fears
and servile prejudices, under which weak minds are servilely
crouched. Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every
fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a
God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage
of reason, than that of blindfolded fear. 75
Locke's specific contribution to the theology of the Declaration,
however, was his affirmation of God-given equality. Yet probably even
before Bolingbroke and Locke influenced him, Jefferson was imbued
with the value of equality. Among the quotations he copied in his liter-
ary commonplace book, three indicate the emergent egalitarianism and
theology of equality that would become the foundation of the
Declaration's ideological passages. The first, an entry he made some-
time before-1763 from book 8 of Milton's Paradise Lost, suggests that
inequality disrupts any enjoyable and lasting "society" between hu-
man beings from the perspective of either the superior or the inferior
of an unequal relationship:
Among Unequals what Society
Can sort, what Harmony or true Delight?
Which must be mutual, in Proportion due
Giv'n & received; but in Disparity.
The one intense, the other still remiss
Cannot well suit with either, but soon prove
Tedius alike: ... Id: 1: 383.76
The second quotation, from Nicholas Rowe's play Tamerlane (1701),
was also entered before 1763. It speaks of a universal God who treats
all nations and faiths alike and who welcomes and accepts all forms of
worship, in contrast to a partial God who accepts just one and rejects
all others:
Look round, how Providence bestows alike
Sunshine & Rain, to bless the fruitful year,
On different Nations, all of different Faiths;
And (tho' by several Names & Titles worship'd)
Heav'n takes the various Tribute of their Praise;
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Since all agree to own, at least to mean,
One best, one greatest, only Lord of all.
Rowe's Tamerl: Act. 3. Sc: 2.77
The third, copied in Greek from Euripides between 1762 and 1765,
states that equality is based on natural law and that inequality dis-
rupts human affection: "Better far, ... prize equality that ever linketh
friend to friend, city to city, and allies to each other; for equality is
man's natural law; but the less is always in opposition to the greater,
ushering in the days of dislike. Id. v. 538. "78
It was in the Second Treatise, however, that Jefferson found the
expression of egalitarianism and theology of equality that appears in
the Declaration of Independence. Locke's statement cCAl1 Men by Na-
ture are equal" is a major premise of that theology. God created all
men "equal and independent," since they were "all the Workmanship
of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker." Locke elaborated on
what he meant by equality when he defined it in terms of what it is
not: "Age-'-' and cCVirtue, -'-' cCExcellency ofParts and Merit, -'-' as well as
cCBirth-'-' may cause men voluntarily "to pay an Observance to those
whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due."
Then, after this definition by negation, which acknowledges that men
are not equal in all respects, he provided a positive definition of equal-
ity: "that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom,
without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man. "79
This natural and equal right to freedom had certain limitations,
however, for cCLiberty-, -'-' Locke said, was CCnot a State ofLicence. -'-' Those
limitations were the moral rules of the law of nature, which "obliges
everyone: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who
will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions." Locke
took full account of the limitations that these rules placed on freedom
in his definition of liberty, which he said was "a Liberty to follow my
own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not.... Freedom of
Nature is to be under no other restraint but the Law of Nature."8o
According to Locke, it was precisely because of this equal freedom,
the equal power that was natural to all men, and the ability to find the
moral law of nature that each man in the state of nature had the ca-
pacity to judge whether or not other men had transgressed the law of
nature and, if they had, to punish them.8! To put it another way, in the
state of nature each man was the source of moral knowledge as well as
juridical and punitive authority in his relations with others. He was
not dependent upon the authority of God's revelation, church, or priests,
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or that of kings to provide laws for good social behavior; rather, he
was anterior and superior to these authorities and their rules. As a
result, it was only by the authority of individuals that the legislative
part of government could prescribe rules. It was because of the nature
of men, particularly their equal freedom, that the consent of each was
needed in order to form a legislature. Locke thus turned the tradi-
tional authority of government upside down. Instead of coming down
from God via kings or priests who in the name of God imposed laws
on humanity, that authority arose from the mutual consent of indi-
viduals, who then appointed a legislature and an executive as trustees
to give and enforce laws consistent with the law of nature for the
benefit of the people. 82 That legislature and executive and those laws
were then under the ultimate authority of the people, who made the
final judgment as to whether their trust was carried out.83 The ability
of the people to find the moral laws of nature with their reason was
what enabled them to make that judgment.
The consequence of these Lockean ideas was that no one man or
group of men could claim authority to rule others by the grace of God.
God in Locke's political theory had in effect ordained all persons with
equal authority in government at the time of creation and granted His
grace for the purpose of governing to none. In this sense, God treated
all men equally at creation. The Declaration of Independence echoed
the thrust of this Lockean political theory and theology of equality.
The second paragraph begins:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the Consent of the
Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destruc-
tive to these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such
Principles and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to Them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.84
The God of the Declaration, like Locke's God in the Treatise, created
all men equal by treating them all equally at the time of their creation.
He made this equal treatment manifest when He "endowed" each and
every man with certain "unalienable Rights" and gave all men equal
authority to form governments by their consent. The God of the Dec-
laration, therefore, like the God of the Treatise, did not grant special
favor or grace to anyone at the time of creation, as did the God of
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Christian theology. Indeed, the Declaration's whole concept of equal
creation and treatment by God at creation was contradictory to the
concept of grace, particularly predestinating grace, which had become
repugnant to Jefferson under Bolingbroke's influence. Grace was par-
tiality on the part of God, and Jefferson followed Bolingbroke's lead
in rejecting a partial God. Therefore, in the second paragraph of the
Declaration Jefferson departed from the theology of the dominant ver-
sions of Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, by rejecting their
partial God who was a granter of grace.
It can be argued that God's equal treatment of men as spelled out in
the Second Treatise and the Declaration-His giving them equal au-
thority to form governments while simultaneously not granting His
grace to anyone man or group of men to govern-applied to God's
grace only as respects matters of government; it had nothing to do
with the saving grace that grants individuals salvation. This distinc-
tion may have been maintained by some, but Jefferson in the Declara-
tion of Independence rejected all forms of divine grace, including that
which provided salvation. Grace in any form was not in accord with
"Nature's God" (see chapter 2).
By appealing to Bolingbroke's impartial "Nature's God" in the Dec-
laration, Jefferson departed from the revealed theology of both the
New and the Old Testament.85 Bolingbroke's influence on the theol-
ogy of the Declaration was thus considerable. Yet the specific influ-
ence on its theology of equality was Locke's idea that cCal1 Men by
Nature are equal-H and that God, the "omnipotent and infinitely wise
Maker" created them that way. This provided Jefferson with what he
needed to construct his ideology: a God who was truly universal, whose
love and benevolence included all mankind and excluded none. That
universality began with God's first act toward men, for at the time of
their creation He treated them all equally by endowing them all with
equal rights while showing grace or partiality to none in matters of
either government or salvation.
One part of Lockean political theory posed a problem to Jefferson,
however. It had to do with the law of nature and the Lockean episte-
mology that provided access to that law. Jefferson's solution and those
who helped him find it contributed to his concept of man as an inde-
pendent moral agent.
4
C).(!)
Kames and the Moral Sense
According to the orthodox Christian concept of man, men and women,
because of their depraved fallen condition, could not trust their own
determinations of right and wrong. God was the only trustworthy
source of moral knowledge, and individuals had only mediated access
to that source through scripture, church, and clergy. This effect of the
fall made humanity dependent upon one or more of these intermediar-
ies for trustworthy moral knowledge. As a result these intermediaries,
especially the clergy, became the authorities over others in moral con-
siderations. Before writing the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson
had rejected the orthodox Christian concept of human nature and
adopted a heterodox view. As Adrienne Koch stated, he favored "sys-
tems of independent morality needing no sanction from church and
state."l In Jefferson's heterodox concept of man, "Nature's God," or
the God of natural theology, endowed individuals with the capacity to
attain trustworthy moral knowledge independently. This capacity made
the authority of the individual preeminent in moral determinations
over that of church, scripture, and clergy.
This chapter will examine a major source of Jefferson's ideas on the
moral nature of man and will explain-from the perspective of Lockean
political theory and the problem posed by Locke's moral epistemol-
ogy-why he adopted those ideas as part of the Declaration's theol-
ogy. It will also explain how those ideas are linked to Jefferson's later
revision of Christianity to a heterodox version, with a concept of man
in accord with the one contained in the Declaration's theology.
The Problem of Moral Independence in Locke
Jefferson was familiar, before he wrote the Declaration, with the po-
litical implications of the individual's attaining moral knowledge inde-
pendently. John Locke's Second Treatise, according to which individu-
als had rational access to moral knowledge, was no doubt one source
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of that familiarity. David Hume, whose essays were among the works
that Jefferson recommended to Robert Skipwith in 1771, could also
have contributed to that familiarity as well as to Jefferson's commit-
ment to Lockean democratically derived political systems based on
moral independence.2 "Monarchies," said Hume, "receiving their chief
stability from a superstitious reverence to priests and princes, have
almost always abridg'd the liberty of reasoning with regard to politics
and consequently to metaphysics and morals."3 As a result of this "su-
perstitious reverence to priests and princes," men voluntarily submit-
ted to their moral and political authority, thus abridging the use of
their own reason in morals and politics and leaving them dependent
for moral knowledge on church or state. This dependency, by prevent-
ing them from making independent moral judgments about their gov-
ernment, effectively deprived them of the political control and power
described by Locke in the Second Treatise. It also enabled unscrupu-
lous princes and priests to exploit the people and morally justify their
exploitations to their victims, who were dependent on them for moral
knowledge.
This condition of a superstitious people, which was antithetical to
Lockean political theory, was clearly repugnant to Jefferson at the time
of the Declaration of Independence, when he rejected both the moral
and political authority of the king because of His Majesty's exploita-
tion of his colonial subjects. Jefferson was also anticlerical by that
time and rejected the moral authority of the clergy. There is little doubt
that his reading of Bolingbroke was a major source of his anticleri-
calism.4 Even though he did not extract any of Bolingbroke's anticleri-
cal statements in his commonplace book, Jefferson too believed that
the priestcraft of any religion exploited the people.5 Therefore, to him
the medieval idea that the pope could pass moral judgment on mon-
archs and absolve the subjects of those judged unrighteous from any
obligation to abide by their rule was akin to letting a wolf guard the
sheep.6 Although Jefferson early in life formulated his ideas on monar-
chical and institutional religious exploitation of people, perhaps his
best expression of such exploitation may be found in a letter of 1815:
"Government, as well as religion, has furnished ... its devices for
fattening idleness on the earning of the people. It has its hierarchy of
emperors, kings, princes and nobles, as that has of popes, cardinals,
archbishops, bishops and priests."7
In order to put an end to exploitation by kings and priests, the vast
majority of individuals needed the capacity to attain trustworthy moral
knowledge easily and independently. If human reason could provide
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that capacity, the moral dependency of the masses would be a thing of
the past, and the people could morally judge their governments and
their clergy as well. It was in this direction that John Locke moved in
basing his political theory on the independently attained rational knowl-
edge of the moral law of nature by each individual. The Second Trea-
tise states that reason is the law of nature and "teaches all Mankind,
who will but consult it, that ... no one ought to harm another in his
Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions."8 This language suggests that
knowledge of the moral law of nature is readily or easily accessible to
each human being: to acquire that knowledge, all anyone has to do is
consult his or her own reason. Once knowledge of the law of nature is
thereby attained, individuals can judge the moral transgressions of
other individuals in the state of nature, and a people can judge the
transgressions of their government after one is formed. 9 This moral
knowledge, which each individual could easily attain, places ultimate
political judgment and thereby the ultimate political power that re-
sults from it in the hands of the people. As John Dunn put it, "divine
will," which according to Locke is the moral law of nature, is to be
found not in divine revelation accessible only to one or a few but in "a
set of rationally intelligible prescriptions accessible to all men. "10
Yet even though his political theory was based on individual pos-
session of moral knowledge, Locke was not convinced that people
would "consult" their reason and thereby possess such knowledge.
Indeed the Second Treatise states in effect that most men would not
make such consultations and therefore would remain ignorant of the
moral law of nature: "For though the Law of Nature be plain and
intelligible to all rational Creatures; yet Men, being biassed by their
Interest, as well as ignorant for the want of study of it, are not apt to
allow of it as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular Cases. "11 It is understandable that Locke would regard self-
interest as preventing persons from applying moral law to their own
actions, but to say that men were "ignorant" of the law of nature "for
the want of study of it" was a plain statement that most people did not
know that law. This sort of ignorance challenged the democratic as-
pect of Locke's political theory. It would seem likely that Jefferson was
aware of this provision as a result of his detailed knowledge of the
Second Treatise before he wrote the Declaration of Independence.
Whether or not he knew of this specific provision, he was aware that
Lockean epistemology had limitations as respects its ability to find the
moral law of nature. He could have gained this knowledge by reading
two other works of Locke: An Essay concerning Human Understand-
ing and The Reasonableness of Christianity.
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One purpose of Human Understanding was to state the law of na-
ture, which Locke believed reason could deduce from self-evident
propositions born of ideas in the mind obtained by sensory percep-
tions of the social material world. Locke compared natural law to
"the Sciences~~ and stated that it was "capable of Demonstration:
wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident Propositions, by necessary
Consequences, as incontestable as those in Mathematics. "12 Yet he
failed to actualize this purpose of Human Understanding. Asked by
his friend James Tyrrel to provide a rational demonstration of the law
of nature, he was, as John Dunn pointed out, "confronted by his in-
ability to present morality as a system of universally intelligible obliga-
tory truths" and, with that realization, broke off the Essay concerning
Human Understanding. 13
In The Reasonableness of Christianity, written later, Locke admit-
ted-in a manner that indicted, tried, and convicted human reason-
his failure to provide a rational formulation of the law of nature:
'Tis plain, in fact, that human reason unassisted failed men in its great
and proper business of morality. It never from unquestionable
principles by clear deductions, made out an entire body of the law of
nature.... The greatest part of mankind cannot know [morality],
and therefore they must believe. And I ask, whether one coming from
Heaven in the Power of God, in full and clear evidence and demon-
stration of Miracles, giving plain and direct Rules of Morality and
Obedience, be not likelier to enlighten the bulk of Mankind, and set
them right in their Duties, and bring them to do them, than by
reasoning with them from general Notions and Principles of human
Reason? And were all the Duties of human Life clearly demonstrated;
yet I conclude, when well considered, that Method of teaching Men
their Duties, would be thought proper only for a few, who had much
Leisure, improved Understandings, and were used to abstract Reason-
ings. But the instruction of the People were best still to be left to the
Precepts and Principles of the Gospel. 14
Locke here admitted that reason never deduced "an entire body of the
law of nature" and that "the greatest part of mankind" are not able to
attain moral knowledge with their own reason. These limitations did
not preclude a small portion of mankind-those who had extraordi-
nary rational capacity and who had consulted their reason and stud-
ied the law of nature-from having sufficient knowledge of a part of
that law to make moral judgments. But the fact that such knowledge
was accessible to only a few defeated the democratic aspect of Lockean
political theory by making the major portion of mankind dependent
for moral knowledge upon the few who could know it by rational
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means.1S Such dependency would give these few persons moral au-
thority over the masses similar to that of the clergy over their denomi-
nations or congregations, allowing opportunity for these few to ex-
ploit the many by distorting the moral knowledge they provided in a
way that favored their own selfish interests.
Although there is evidence that Jefferson read Human Understand-
ing before drafting the Declaration of Independence, none indicates
that he had read The Reasonableness of Christianity by that time. 16
He had, however, read indirectly via Bolingbroke what Locke said in
the foregoing quote from it. 17 Bolingbroke, in a passage immediately
preceding one extracted by Jefferson, as Morton White pointed out,
wrote of Locke's statement in Reasonableness on the insufficiency of
"human reason, unassisted by revelation, in its great and proper busi-
ness of morality." In that same passage, Bolingbroke also wrote of
Locke's statement that reason "never made out an entire body of the
law of nature from unquestionable principles, or by clear deduc-
tions." 18
The Solution in Kames
Another source would also have given Jefferson knowledge of the limi-
tations of Lockean epistemology and reason in determining the moral
law of nature. That source was Henry Home, Lord Kames, the Scot-
tish jurist and philosopher. Kames was one of Jefferson's favorite pre-
Declaration authors; in his government commonplace book Kames's
Essays on the Principles ofMorality and Natural Religion is cited in a
section of entries that precede the date of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, as are several articles from Kames's Historical Law Tracts. 19
According to Gilbert Chinard, the pre-Declaration influence of Kames
on Jefferson was extraordinary. He asserted, without elaboration or
explanation, that in Kames's writings Jefferson "found a complete
exposition of the theory of natural rights; and from the evidence fur-
nished by the Commonplace Book it cannot be doubted that the Scot-
tish Lord was for him a master and a guide. "20
There is little doubt that Kames's extensive writings on moral phi-
losophy had a more profound impact on Jefferson than did those of
Francis Hutcheson, whom Garry Wills considers a major early influ-
ence on Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence.21 Ronald
Hamowy, in his critique of Wills's Inventing America, noted that even
though Jefferson owned three Hutcheson works at the time Congress
bought his library in 1815, it is not known when these books were
purchased or whether Jefferson had read them. An Inquiry into the
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Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Synopsis Metaphysicae,
and A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy were the Hutcheson
titles among the five thousand volumes owned by Jefferson at the time
of the sale.22 The last of these does appear in the list of books Jefferson
recommended in the 1767 letter outlining a study plan for the educa-
tion of a lawyer.23 But not one work by Hutcheson was included on
the 1771 Skipwith list, and Hutcheson does not appear in the com-
monplace books. Had he exerted so great an influence on Jefferson's
early adult life as Wills maintains, these omissions seem inconceiv-
able. In contrast to Hutcheson's absence from the Skipwith list, three
works by Kames were included there: The Elements ofCriticism, Prin-
ciples of Equity, and the aforementioned Essays on the Principles of
Morality and Natural Religion.
In the Essays Kames took the position-in response to the writings
of Samuel Clarke":'-that complex or abstract reason was not effective
in giving men knowledge of moral rules or the law of nature.24 His
rationale was similar to Locke's statement in The Reasonableness of
Christianity that the majority of men have little capacity for moral
reasonings, particularly complex or abstract moral reasonings.25 Ka-
mes believed, as did Hutcheson, who influenced him, that man was
endowed by his creator with inner feelings or emotions, called a moral
sense, which gave him knowledge of his moral duties and enabled him
to perform those duties. Using Locke's Reasonableness phrase "the
bulk of mankind," Kames argued:
Supposing our duty could be made plain to us, by an abstract chain of
reasoning, yet we have good ground to conclude, from analogy, that
the Author of nature has not left our actions to be directed by so
weak a principle as reason: and a weak principle it must be to the
bulk of mankind, who have little capacity to enter into abstract
reasoning; whatever effect it may have upon the learned and contem-
plative. Nature has dealt more kindly to us. We are compelled by
strong and evident feelings, to perform all the different duties of life.26
Kames took a similar position in his Principles of Equity, which
Jefferson read while he was a student of law.27 In that work Kames
spoke specifically of the superiority of the internal moral sense in gaining
access to the law of nature, compared with Lockean epistemology's
reliance on demonstrations made by reason from ideas in the mind
born of sensory perceptions of external objects:
By perception alone, without reasoning, we acquire the knowledge of
right and wrong, of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of
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what we ought to abstain from: and considering that we have thus a
greater certainty of the moral laws than of any proposition discovered
by reasoning, man may well be deemed the favourite of Heaven,
when such wisdom is employ'd in qualifying him to act a right part in
life: the moral sense or conscience may well be held the voice of God
within us, constantly admonishing us of our duty; and requiring on
our part no exercise of our faculties but attention merely. The
celebrated Locke ventured what he thought a bold conjecture, that
the moral duties may be capable of demonstration: how great his
surprise to have been told, that they are capable of much higher
evidence.28
Kames divided human nature into two aspects in his analysis of
what caused moral behavior in man. The first he termed the "prin-
ciples of action," which he defined in a general way as "appetites,
passions and affections." These principles, as their name indicates,
were what made men act. In his specific account of them Kames listed
five main ones. The first was love of life, which gave rise to the desire
to preserve it; he called this "the strongest of all instincts." The second
was the desire for "our own happiness," which he termed "self-love."
The third principle was fidelity, the "performance of promises, ... and
in general the execution of trusts." "Friendship" was categorized un-
der this principle, since it involved a trust relationship, as did "love to
children, who by nature are entrusted to our care." The fourth prin-
ciple was "gratitude," and the fifth was "benevolence."29 The inclu-
sion of both selfishness and altruism among the principles of action
reflects Kames's effort to synthesize the views of Hobbes and Shaftes-
bury, who saw human reality as motivated by these opposites.3D
Kames maintained that these five principles, constituting the first
aspect of human moral behavior, were governed by the second aspect:
the moral sense itself. The purpose and province of the moral sense, he
said, was "to instruct us which of our principles of action we may
indulge and which of them we must restrain."31 Kames stressed his
contention that the moral sense, which he also termed conscience, did
not need the help of rational reflection to inform the individual how
he should behave:
The authority of conscience does not merely consist in an ~ction of
reflection. It proceeds from a direct feeling, which we have upon
presenting the object [of moral actions], without the intervention of
any sort of reflection. And the authority lies in this circumstance, that
we feel and perceive the action to be our duty, and what we are
indispensibly bound to perform. It is in this manner, that the moral
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sense, with regard to some actions, plainly bears upon it the works of
authority over all our appetites and affections [principles of action].32
Although reason was not necessary in making moral determina-
tions, reason could and often did play some role in finding the moral
laws of nature, according to Kames, which he made clear when he
stated: "In searching for these laws, it must be obvious that we may
falsely indulge every principle of action, where the action is not disap-
proved of by the moral sense, and that we ought to perform every
action which the moral sense informs us to be our duty. From this
short proposition, may be readily deduced all the laws of nature which
govern human actions. "33 Since "the laws of nature which govern hu-
man actions" were "readily" or easily "deduced" by reason when it
was guided by the moral sense, the amount of reason required to make
such deductions to qualify for the descriptive term "readily" was mini-
mal. This quantity of reason would require none of the complex, ab-
stract, or scientific deductions of which Kames, echoing Locke, said
that "the bulk of mankind ... have little capacity to enter into. "34 This
much reason the majority of human beings would have, giving the
"bulk of mankind" easy access to the laws of nature. This minimal
reason could provide persons with moral knowledge when used in
conjunction with the moral sense. Thus, the function of the moral
sense in Kames's moral philosophy is similar to that of scripture in
Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, where scripture was deemed
necessary to provide moral knowledge because "human reason unas-
sisted failed" to provide that knowledge. Reason assisted by scripture,
however, did playa role in determining morality in Locke's Reason-
ableness, in that it gave its suffrage to and provided confirmation of
what was contained in God's revealed word.35
As to the enforcement of moral law by the moral sense, Kames
made a distinction between justice and benevolence. Justice consisted
in refraining from "actions directed against others, by which they are
hurt"; benevolence, in performing acts that would benefit others. Ka-
mes called justice a "primary virtue" because it was necessary for soci-
ety, which could not exist if men continually harmed each other, whereas
benevolence, although helpful to others, was not necessary for society
and was therefore a "secondary virtue." Further, benevolence was not
a duty under most circumstances, though Kames believed that "where
the object of benevolence is distress, there it becomes a duty, provided
it is in our power to afford relief without hurting ourselves." There
was a natural inducement in man to perform even those benevolent
acts that were not duties, however, for such acts produced a feeling of
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"approbationary pleasure" in the moral sense that motivated their
performance. Justice, on the other hand, was always a duty, and viola-
tion of this duty resulted in punishment, inflicted by one's moral sense
or conscience, in the form of "remorse of conscience," which "proves
the most severe of all tortures." Kames believed that acts of justice
gave some pleasure but that it was small compared with the higher
satisfaction given by benevolent acts, which he considered more meri-
torious because they were for the most part discretionary and not du-
ties. It was the feeling of the moral sense that one ought to perform
some acts and refrain from others, however, combined with its meting
out reward and punishment, that gave that sense what Kames described
as "the most complete character of a law." His definition of the law of
nature took into consideration that the moral sense not only provided
knowledge of the law but also punished or rewarded individuals as
they breached or obeyed it.36
The human moral sense was capable of improvement. Kames be-
lieved the feelings of the mind that constituted this sense could be
strengthened by exercise in the form of attending plays and reading
good literature. While participating in such exercise, one experienced
an attraction toward characters who performed moral acts and an
aversion to those who committed moral transgressions. This experi-
ence magnified, refined, and intensified the moral sense, according to
Kames, who stated: "Nothing conduces so much to improve the mind
[moral feelings], and confirm it in virtue, as being continually em-
ployed in surveying the actions of others, entering into the concerns of
the virtuous, approving of their conduct, condemning vice, and show-
ing an abhorrence at it; for the mind acquires strength by exercise, as
well as the body. "37 Jefferson's 1771 letter to Robert Skipwith sounded
much like this Kamesean passage. He included several plays and other
works of literature among the books he recommended and specified
their impact on the moral sense:
Every thing is useful which contributes to fix us in the principles and
practice of virtue. When any signal act of charity or of gratitude, for
instance, is presented either to our sight or imagination, we are deeply
impressed with its beauty and feel a strong desire in ourselves of
doing charitable and grateful acts also. On the contrary when we see
or read of any atrocious deed, we are disgusted with it's deformity
and conceive an abhorrence of vice. Now every emotion of this kind
is an exercise of our virtuous dispositions; and dispositions of the
mind, like limbs of the body, acquire strength by exercise. But exercise
produces habit; and in the instance of which we speak, the exercise
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being of the moral feelings, produces a habit of thinking and acting
virtuously. We never reflect whether the story we read be truth or
fiction. 38
Jefferson's belief that God necessarily provided man with a moral
sense because He intended men to be social paralleled Kames's state-
ment that no society could exist "among creatures who prey upon one
another"; therefore a moral sense "was necessary in the first place, to
provide against mutual injuries. "39 Like Kames, Jefferson admired this
moral aspect of the human system and criticized a God who would
make moral knowledge available only to the few who were capable of
complex or scientific reason. Such a God would be incompetent. If
only those few individuals capable of scientific or abstract reason had
knowledge of morality, then the majority in their moral ignorance
would harm one another, and society could not exist. In a statement to
this effect, Jefferson implied that the God of the Bible, who created
mankind morally depraved or with a nature prone to fall into deprav-
ity, was incompetent in this way:
He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made
the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of
science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become
of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to
be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and
wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his
nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation
of morality.... The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of
man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or
weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less
degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb
of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the
guidance of reason; but it is small stock which is required for this:
even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case
to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and
often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by
artificial rules. In this branch, therefore, read good books, because
they will encourage, as well as direct your feelings. 40
This statement, in a letter to Peter Carr dated 10 August 1787, corre-
sponds with jefferson's 1771 comment to Robert Skipwith but more
elaborately expresses Kamesean moral-sense philosophy. It includes
Kames's use of both the moral sense and minimal reason as instru-
ments of obtaining moral knowledge, both of which Jefferson appealed
to in the 1774 Summary View of the Rights ofBritish America and the
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1776 Declaration of Independence, as we shall see. We can conclude,
then, that jefferson held the views expressed in this passage before
and during the drafting of the Declaration of Independence.
What attracted jefferson to Kames's moral philosophy, it is impor-
tant to point out, was that it put moral knowledge within the easy
grasp of virtually everyone. As a result, the concept of man Kames
promulgated was very different from that of orthodox Christianity.
Kamesean man was not the depraved or semidepraved victim of the
fall, dependent upon God's intermediaries in the form of revelation,
church, and clergy and under their authority for trustworthy moral
knowledge. He could find that knowledge independently. Moreover,
Kames's moral-sense concept of man solved the problem caused by
Lockean epistemology's failure to deliver moral knowledge to the "bulk
of mankind," making most men dependent for moral knowledge on the
few who had the capacity for complex, abstract, or scientific reason.
Kamesean man's ability to acquire knowledge of the moral laws of na-
ture easily and independently was exactly what jefferson, as a propo-
nent of Lockean political theory, was looking for: Kames's concept of
man was one that would render Lockean political theory efficacious.41
To some scholars, however, moral-sense philosophies too restricted
men's access to knowledge of morality, especially those that utilized
reason as well as the moral sense as instruments to provide moral
knowledge. Morton White interpreted Jefferson's statements in his letter
to Peter Carr that the moral sense is "the true foundation of morality"
and that this sense is guided by reason and that that degree of guid-
ance is small, "less than what we call Common sense," to mean that
the extraordinary rational capacity of only the most intelligent human
beings-not the moral sense-was the principal means of attaining
moral knowledge. He argued that in writing to Carr that there were
few men of science and therefore God could not have made the moral
behavior of man a matter of scientific reason, jefferson may have meant
that the moral sense gave men "the first glimmerings of moral pre-
cepts," and as a result the final determination of those precepts was
not "a matter of science alone." In White's view, Jefferson was of the
opinion that the few men of science or of extraordinary rational ca-
pacity established moral rules for all mankind through the use of
Lockean reason based on intuitive perceptions born of the senses, since
this type of reason was necessary to substantiate the faint "glimmerings
of moral precepts" first given by the moral sense.42 The rational ca-
pacity of ordinary men could not accomplish this substantiation even
with the aid of the moral sense. Thus, according to White, moral-
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sense philosophies that had a rational element, such as the one adopted
by jefferson, still made human beings dependent for trustworthy moral
knowledge upon the few who had extraordinary rational capacity.
White's interpretation, however, hardly seems fair to the text of
jefferson's letter to Carr, which deprecated the extraordinary reason-
ing ability of professors while simultaneously exalting the rational
capacity of the average "ploughman" in making moral determinations.
jefferson clearly stated that a professor could be morally "led astray
by artificial rules" born of their superior reason, whereas ploughmen
with average reasoning ability would not. The main point of jefferson's
comments to Carr was that even though the moral sense was guided
by reason to some extent, in making moral determinations, reason
was guided by the moral sense to the same extent or perhaps more.
jefferson stressed that only a minimal amount of reason, "even a less
one than what we call common sense," was required for attaining
moral knowledge when used in conjunction with the moral sense. It
did not require a philosopher or a man of science to exercise this mini-
mal quantity of rational capacity; to do so was within the intellectual
scope of the common man.
White is of the opinion it was Lockean intuitive reason that per-
ceived the principles contained in the Declaration. He maintains that
few men have the capacity for such Lockean rational perceptions, which
are self-evident and based on mental impressions derived from the
senses. He also maintains that jefferson, at the time of writing the
Declaration, was under the influence of "Burlamaqui's idea that
[Lockean] intuitive reason can [and would be necessary to] verify the
precepts which the Creator had impressed indelibly on our hearts" or
the moral sense. This of course would give an undemocratic cast to the
Declaration by limiting to the few access to the knowledge of its prin-
ciples as well as to the precepts of morality. Consequently, White inter-
preted jefferson's comments that seem to privilege the moral sense
over reason as an instrument of gaining moral knowledge-most of
which were made after the eighteenth century-to jefferson's "fear"
that democratic "social cohesiveness could not be entrusted to the very
few, who might be able to arrive at the rational principles asserted in
the Declaration." White even went so far as to state that jefferson in
his later years "began to sound like Locke in The Reasonableness of
Christianity," suggesting that jefferson, like Locke, turned to revela-
tion as the source of moral knowledge for all men.43
In fact, there is little evidence to support White's opinion that
jefferson was influenced by j.j. Burlamaqui when he wrote the Decla-
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ration. It is true that Jefferson obtained a copy of Burlamaqui's Le
Droit Natural at the time he received a copy of Locke's Second Trea-
tise in 1769.44 He neither mentioned Burlamaqui's writings in his com-
monplace books, however, nor recommended them in his pre-Decla-
ration letters or book lists-omissions inconsistent with the view that
he wrote the Declaration under Burlamaqui's influence.
Further, in two ways I will show that White's interpretation of
Jefferson and the Declaration is implausible: first, by demonstrating a
thread of consistency that linked Jefferson's ideas on moral philoso-
phy immediately before and during the drafting of the Declaration
with those he held in the remaining years of his life, and the general
consistency of those ideas with Kamesean moral thought; second, by
demonstrating that this thread of consistency culminated in Jefferson's
interpretation of Jesus and his teachings in the light of Kames's moral-
sense philosophy, thereby bringing them into accord with the concept
of man in the theology of the Declaration of Independence.
Kames, the Summary View, the Declaration, and After
In the 1774 Summary View of the Rights ofBritish America, Jefferson
acknowledged both the reason and the moral sense as an individual's
means of knowing right and wrong. He accomplished this, as White
pointed out, when he stated, "Not only the principles of common sense,
but the common feelings of human nature, must be surrendered up,
before his majesty's subjects here can be persuaded to believe that they
hold their political existence at the will of a British parliament. "45 White
believed that Jefferson's "common feelings of human nature" referred
to the moral sense and "principles of common sense" to reason.46 Both,
according to the Summary View, perceived what was right and wrong.
It seems clear, however, that "common sense" as used here was not the
Lockean intuitive reason accessible to the very few, which, according
to White, dominated Jefferson's thinking on the moral sense. Rather,
it meant the minimal reason readily accessible to the vast majority of
mankind. It also seems clear that the moral sense and common sense,
as Jefferson used the terms in the Summary View, were on more or less
equal terms as instruments of obtaining moral knowledge. In this way
the Summary View was generally in accord with Kamesean thought,
which provided for the use of minimal reason along with the moral
sense in attaining moral knowledge.
White also stated that Jefferson did not refer to the moral sense in
the Declaration.47 But Jefferson did appeal to that sense in that docu-
ment and did so in a way that followed the pattern of argument used
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in the Summary View. In the earlier work he had appealed to the moral
sense of the king to judge the rational moral arguments it presented,
yet he knew that the colonial interests of the king would very likely
prevent His Majesty from making an objective moral judgment. Only
if the king's interests were subordinate to his moral sense-a sense
that flowed from the heart or breast, according to Kames,48-would
the king fairly judge the rational moral arguments of the Summary
View: hence, in an effort to induce such a subordination, Jefferson's
exhortation "Open your breast, Sire, to liberal and expanded thought. "49
As I interpret this plea, "liberal and expanded thought" referred to
what Jefferson deemed his rational moral arguments, and "breast" to
the heart-based moral sense. Kames made a similar statement that could
well have been the basis of this exhortation. Arguing for the existence
of the moral sense in man, he said that he could offer no objective
proof of that sense but that each person could find subjective proof of
its existence by looking within himself. Men could not deny an inner
moral sense if they paid heed to it by looking within. If they ignored
their inner moral feelings, however, their "self affections" or selfish
interests would dominate the moral sense and dispose them toward
self-interest and prejudice against that sense, which would obscure its
reality. Therefore, in order to prove the existence of their moral sense,
Kames urged self-interested men to "Lay prejudice aside, and give fair
play to the emotions of the heart. "50
Having witnessed the failure of rational moral argument to impress
the interested parties in England who had allegedly committed wrongs
against the colonists, Jefferson adopted a different approach in the
Declaration. In its preamble he appealed to "the Opinions of Man-
kind,"51 or the moral sense of the people of the world-the first of two
such appeals for judgment of that document's rational moral argu-
ments. Jefferson wrote later that he regarded those appeals as "an
appeal to the tribunal of the world. "52 Apart from political reasons, a
principal one for addressing all "Mankind" was that ordinary people's
moral sense could be relied upon for moral judgments because it was,
for the most part, unobstructed and unobscured by interested or self-
ish designs on the colonies; hence there was no need for an exhorta-
tion-like that made to the interested king in the Summary View-to
open their breasts or hearts. Jefferson's second appeal to the moral
sense in the Declaration, immediately preceding the presentation of its
rational moral arguments, merely stated, "let Facts be submitted to a
candid World"53-referring of course to the people of the world whose
lack of selfish interests made them candid or impartial and thus ren-
76 Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
dered their moral sense effective. The idea that candor was conducive
to the efficacy of the moral sense could well have been the result of
Jefferson's reading of Adam Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments (1759),
which he included on the Skipwith book list of 1771. I offer this work
as a more plausible source of Jefferson's concept of candor than Tho-
mas Reid as suggested by Garry Wills. Wills mentions Reid's Inquiry
into the Human Mind (1764) as contributing to Jefferson's ideas in the
Declaration yet quotes his Essays (1780s) on the meaning of candor.54
Smith, when he wrote on candor, acknowledged its beneficent effect
on the sentiments of an individual making moral judgments and the
adverse impact of self-love, self-interest, and passion:
When we are about to act, the eagerness of passion will seldom allow
us to consider what we are doing with the candour of an indifferent
person. The violent emotions which at that time, agitate us, discolour
our views of things, even when we are endeavouring to place ourselves
in the situation of another, and to regard the objects that interest us, in
the light [in] which they will naturally appear to him. The fury of our
own passions constantly calls us back to our own place, where every
thing appears magnified and misinterpreted by self-love.... When the
action is over indeed, and the passions which prompted it have sub-
sided, we can enter more cooly into the sentiments of the indifferent
spectator. What before interested us, is now become almost as indiffer-
ent to us as it always was to him, and we can now examine our own
conduct with his candour and impartiality.55
In presenting rational moral arguments to the moral sense of the
candid people of the world, Jefferson tried to be straightforward, even
simplistic, in the Declaration. His statement "to place before mankind
the common sense of the subject," in his letter to Henry Lee in 1825,
describes his intent when he was drafting that document.56 As in the
Summary View, he was concerned with commonsense moral arguments
understandable to virtually everyone, not complex Lockean rational
demonstrations comprehensible to only a few.
Wills suggests that Jefferson used "common sense" in his letter to
Lee as Thomas Reid did in his Essays. There Reid made a distinction
between the ability of men to grasp self-evident truths when such truths
were set before them in distinct terms, and the task of setting forth
those terms distinctly. The latter, which only the philosopher could
accomplish, was within the meaning of common sense as Reid defined
it. Therefore, Jefferson was "closer to a boast than self-deprecation"
in the letter to Lee (cited above), according to Wills.57 It does not seem
that Jefferson regarded himself as a philosopher when he drafted the
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Declaration in 1776 or even later, as is indicated by his 1789 state-
ment that he was not used to "abstract reasonings." A more plausible
account of his disposition and intent when he drafted the Declaration's
arguments is found in the letter to Lee, where he wrote that he had
sought to express them "in terms so plain" that the people of the world
to whom they were addressed could not help but "assent."58 In this
statement Jefferson sounded more like a lawyer, which he was, trying
to accommodate his case to the jury of the world, to whom he was
pleading it, rather than a philosopher, which he was not and never
claimed to be. Therefore, the Lee letter's reference to plain terms and
common sense with respect to the Declaration and Jefferson's appeal
in that document to the moral sense show it to be based, like the Sum-
mary View, on a belief in both the moral sense and minimal reason as
means to determine what is morally correct, and demonstrate that
both documents were in accord with Kames's moral philosophy.
Implicit in Jefferson's appeal to the moral sense of mankind in the
Declaration is a common standard of morality subscribed to by the
vast majority of mankind. Such a standard was articulated by Kames
in his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion and
later in his Elements of Criticism; Jefferson was familiar with both of
these works before 1776, since both are on the Skipwith list. Kames
seemed aware that a system in which each individual looked to his
inner moral sense for judgment of right and wrong was too subjective:
even if guided by a minimal amount of reason, it would result in dif-
ferent ideas as to what constitutes morality. This problem was com-
pounded by Kames's contention that the moral sense is subject to im-
provement through the exercise of attending plays and reading good
literature and through education and culture acquired by living in civi-
lization.59 Since different individuals would experience varying degrees
of exercise, culture, and education, their moral sense would be in vari-
ous stages of improvement, which would produce different and even
conflicting ideas on morality.
In his Elements of Criticism, Kames acknowledged the variety of
opinions on morality in the world, pointing to those who had no moral
objections to selling their own children into slavery or murdering their
enemies in cold blood as examples. Nevertheless, he was convinced
that a common standard of morality did exist, one subscribed to by
the vast majority of human beings. That standard was born of and
included in a universal and unvarying ideal that Kames called "the
common nature of man," which could be discerned despite individual
and cultural differences: "With respect to the common nature of man,
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in particular, we have a conviction that it is invariable not less than
universal; that it will be the same hereafter as at present, and as it was
in time past; the same among all nations and in all corners of the
earth. Nor are we deceived; because, giving allowance for the differ-
ence of culture, and gradual refinement of manners, the fact corre-
sponds to our conviction. "60
In explaining the common standard of morality in his Essays, Ka-
mes stated that each living thing was endowed not only with an exter-
nal form unique to its species but also with an "internal constitution,
which manifests itself in a certain uniformity of conduct peculiar to
each species." In human beings, this internal constitution of the com-
mon nature of man was "the foundation of the laws of our nature,"
and before an act performed by a particular member of a particular
species could be "considered regular and good," it had to be "con-
formable" to this aspect of the "common nature of the species." A
man committing nonconforming actions, Kames maintained, was con-
sidered a "monster" by his fellowman and looked upon by them with
feelings "of disgust" as if he had "two heads or four hands."61
In his letter of 13 June 1814 to Thomas Law, Jefferson sounded
much like Kames:
Some men are born without the organs of sight, or of hearing, or
without hands. Yet it would be wrong to say that man is born
without these faculties, and sight, hearing, and hands may with truth
enter into the general definition of man. The want or imperfection of
the moral sense in some men, like the want or imperfection of the
senses of sight and hearing in others, is no proof that it is a general
characteristic of the species.... I sincerely believe with you in the
general existence of a moral instinct. I think it the brightest gem with
which the human character is studded, and the want of it as more
degrading than the most hideous of the bodily deformities.62
In fact, in this letter Jefferson made specific reference to Kames's Es-
says. Even though he said that "fifty years" had passed since he read
that work, his memory of Kames's ideas included a common or gen-
eral standard of morality: "A man owes no duty to which he is not
urged by some impulsive feeling. This is correct, if referred to the stan-
dard of general feeling in the given case, and not the feeling of an
individual. "63
Kames believed that all persons paid homage to the common stan-
dard of morality, even those whose morals were of a lower. standard.
He also believed that the most perfect manifestations of the universal
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moral sense and morals born of that sense were found among people
of old cultures, societies, and civilizations, who had been "long disci-
plined in society." With few exceptions individuals in such societies,
as a result of an extended subjection to culture and education pro-
vided there, would have their moral sense and tastes honed to a re-
fined state. Deviations or exceptions in such societies were few, ac-
cording to Kames, and he regarded them as "aberrations" or remnants
of "men, originally savage and brutal." To find "the rules of moral-
ity" of the common standard, all anyone needed to do was look to the
moral sense "of men in their more perfect [civilized] state" and the
rules or laws born of that sense. Then he narrowed the selection of
such laws to the "most universal and the most lasting among polite
nations." He concluded, "In this very manner, a standard for morals
has been ascertained with a good deal of accuracy, and is daily apply'd
by able judges with general satisfaction." By experience or by paying
heed to "what is most universal and the most lasting among polite
nations," in addition to considering the moral sense of men in such
nations, one could determine the common standard of morality.64
Morton White has pointed out that Jefferson sometimes made state-
ments about human determinations of morality that sounded pro-moral
sense and antirational, both in the nineteenth century and before. A
closer look at these statements, however, reveals that Jefferson was
not antirational as respects Kamesean minimal reason used in con-
junction with the moral sense. For example, in a 12 October 1786
letter to Maria Cosway, in which he conducted a dialogue between his
head and his heart, Jefferson stated that the head or reason was often
in the service of a man's selfish interests rather than his heart or moral
sense; therefore, reason frequently worked against the moral sense when
morality conflicted with selfish interests. To illustrate, Jefferson told
of a "wearied soldier" who wanted a ride on "our [head and heart's]
chariot." On this occasion, head's selfish calculations-such as "The
road was full of soldiers and if all should be taken up, our horses
would fail in their journey"-overuled heart's moral impulse to help
the soldier by giving him a ride. After head's selfish calculations de-
feated heart's moral inclinations, heart said to head, "I do not know
that I ever did a good thing on your suggestion, or a dirty one without
it." Heart therefore concluded that "nature has not organized you
[head] for our moral direction. "65 This repudiation of reason, at least
selfish reason, was matched by a similiar repudiation of scientific rea-
son in matters of moral determination: "Morals were too essential to
the happiness of man, to be risked on the uncertain combinations of
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the head [reason]. She [nature] laid their foundation, therefore, in sen-
timent [heart], not in science [scientific reason]. That [sentiment or
moral sense] she gave to all, as necessary to all: this [scientific reason]
to a few only, as sufficing with a few. "66 Here Jefferson refers to the
extraordinary rational capacity of the scientist, which he maintains is
not commonly found among human beings and gives uncertainty when
it attempts to determine what is moral.
Kames in his Principles ofEquity made the same observation about
the highly complex reasonings that only a few were capable of: "But
reason employ'd in weighing an endless number and variety of cir-
cumstances, seldom affords any solid conviction; and upon the pro-
posed system we would be often left in the dark about our duty, how-
ever upright our intentions might be." Kames went on to state that
such complex reasonings, by obscuring "our duty" in matters of mo-
rality, caused the servitude of individual reason to self-interest or self-
partiality. Once moral duty was obscured, this servitude manifested
itself through the rationalization of moral transgressions that served
self-interest. As Kames put it, "Our duty would vanish from our sight
in [a] maze of subtilties; and self-partiality would always suggest plau-
sible reasons, for slight [moral] transgressions at first, and afterward
for the very boldest. "67 Jefferson's letter to Cosway, criticizing selfish
and scientific reason, was in accord with these statements.
In a letter to James Fishbach of September 1809, Jefferson again
echoed Kamesean statements, especially Kames's "maze of subtilties"
that is the result of complex moral reasonings: "The practice of mo-
rality being necessary for the well-being of society, he [God] has taken
care to impress its precepts so indelibly on our hearts that they shall
not be effaced by the subtleties of the brain. "68 Jefferson here criticized
as effacing moral knowledge the subtle reasoning that is beyond the
scope of most human beings, as he had criticized reason in the service
of self-interest, in the Cosway letter. In neither letter, however, did the
criticism apply to minimal or commonsense reasoning-reason within
the rational capacity of virtually anyone-working in conjunction with
the moral sense in making moral determinations. Jefferson's statements
in both letters are therefore in accord with the views of Kames and
those of the Summary View and the Declaration, both of which in-
voked the moral sense and minimal reason to make moral determina-
tions.
In a letter to Thomas Law, 13 June 1814,Jefferson once again seemed
to privilege the moral sense to the exclusion of reason. After reflecting
on the variety of moral philosophies born of complex reasonings, he
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said, "It shows how necessary was the care of the Creator in making
the moral principle so much a part of our constitution as that no er-
rors of reasoning or of speculation might lead us astray from its obser-
vance in practice." Conflicting moral philosophies would bring con-
fusion about right and wrong, and confusion born of such moral
intellectualization would give selfish human interests the opportunity
to assert themselves and reason the opportunity to rationalize immoral
actions that served those interests, as Kames had said. jefferson's state-
ment in the same letter, "Take from man his selfish propensities, and
he can have nothing to seduce him from the practice of virtue," is
consistent with these Kamesean ideas, since "selfish propensities" thrive
in an atmosphere of moral confusion brought about by complex moral
reasonings.69 The seductive combination of selfish interests and the
rationalization of immoral actions that serve those interests brought
about by moral confusion was, according to jefferson, an ever present
potential in highly intellectual persons. The greater the intelligence,
the greater the capacity for both intellectually induced moral confu-
sion and rationalization of immoral selfish acts. Both Kames and
jefferson, however, argued that reason could be useful in moral deter-
minations as long as it was minimal reason, like that of common sense,
which was within the rational capacity of the vast majority of human
beings, and as long as that minimal reason was used in the service of
or in conjunction with the heart or moral sense.
The Influence of Kames on
Jefferson's Interpretation of Jesus
jefferson stressed the heart, or principle of love, in the moral sense in
his letter to Thomas Law. Moral actions, he said, give pleasure to any
individual who performs them "because nature hath implanted in our
breast a love of others, a sense of moral duty to them, a moral instinct,
in short, which prompts us irresistibly to feel and to succor their dis-
tresses. "70 To put it another way, an individual derives pleasure from
moral actions because the love principle or moral sense in that indi-
vidual is fulfilled by those actions. It was heart or the principle of love,
the basis of the moral sense in Kamesean man, that jefferson used as
the basis of his interpretation of jesus' teachings. As a result, jesus
emerged as a human, Kamesean-like moral-sense philosopher promul-
gating a religion in accordance with the theology of the Declaration of
Independence, rather than the son of God who revealed God's truth to
depraved sinners and died to atone for their sins.
Under Bolingbroke's influence (see chapter 2), jefferson had rejected
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the idea that Jesus was the son of God before writing the Declaration
of Independence, and he maintained this view in his later years. He
wrote in 1820 that "Jesus did not mean to impose himself on mankind
as the Son of God" and further that Jesus was not inspired by God,
even though he might have suffered from this delusion.71 Since Jesus
was a man and not God incarnate as the second person of the Trinity,
and since he was not even inspired by God, Jefferson considered his
teachings devoid of divine authority. In other words they were not the
word or revelation of God but the perceptions and conceptions of a
man, a man named Jesus. Therefore, human beings could disagree
with them, whereas they could not disagree with God or His revealed
word.
Jefferson himself regarded Jesus' teachings critically with "a mix-
ture of approbation and dissent," just as he would those of any other
teacher or philosopher.72 "This first of human sages," he said, taught
not theology or metaphysics but morality exclusively.73 The theology
and metaphysics that orthodoxy claimed as part of the Christian reli-
gion were imposture-an idea instilled in Jefferson's mind by Boling-
broke and strengthened after 1793 by his reading of Joseph Priestley's
History of the Corruptions of Christianity, plus his friendship with
Priestley.74 A letter to John Adams of October 1813 reveals his matured
views on imposture:
In extracting the pure [moral] principles which he Uesus] taught, we
should have to strip off the artificial vestments in which they have
been muffled by priests, who have travestied them into various forms,
as instruments of riches and power to themselves. We must dismiss
the Platonists and Plotinists, the Stagyrites, and Gamalielites the
Eclectics, the Gnostics and Scholastics, their essences and emanations,
their Logos and Demiurgos, Aeons and Daemons, male and female,
with a long train of etc., etc., etc., or, shall I say at once, of nonsense.
We must reduce our volume to the simple evangelists, select, even
from them, the very words only of Jesus, paring off the
amphiboligisms into which they have been led, by forgetting often, or
not understanding, what had fallen from him, by giving their own
misconceptions as his dicta, and expressing unintelligibly for others
what they had not understood themselves. There will be found
remaining the most sublime and benevolent code of morals which has
ever been offered to man [emphasis added]. I have performed this
operation for my own use, by cutting verse by verse out of the printed
book, and arranging the matter which is evidently his, and which is as
easily distinguishable as diamonds in a dunghill. 75
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In this passage Jefferson described what he considered when he edited
out what he deemed imposture from the four Gospels. He did this
twice. The first effort, done hurriedly in 1804 while he was president,
he called "The Philosophy of Jesus"; the second, done with more care
in 1819-20, he titled "The Life and Morals of Jesus. "76 That Jefferson's
interpretation of Jesus and his teachings had been in his mind for some
time before he first edited the Gospels is evidenced by an 1800 letter to
Benjamin Rush in which he stated that his perception of Jesus was in
accord with rational Christianity and deism: "I have a view of the
subject which ought to displease neither the rational Christian nor
Deists, and would reconcile many to a character they have too hastily
rejected. "77
Jefferson maintained that the original moral teachings of Jesus were
"within the comprehension of a child" and that their very simplicity
posed a threat to the selfish interests of the priests and close followers
of Jesus.78 If virtually all men could understand Jesus' simple teach-
ings, there would be no need for theologians and clergy to explain
them. Only if they superimposed on Jesus' simple moral philosophy a
complex set of theological doctrines that ordinary people found diffi-
cult or impossible to understand would the clergy be needed to ex-
plain those doctrines. According to Jefferson, this was why those who
were allegedly the most devoted followers of Jesus became "dupes and
impostors." The first of these was Paul, whom Jefferson described as
"the great Coryphaeous, and the first corrupter of the doctrines of
Jesus. "79 The close followers of Jesus and then the priests thereby made
the people dependent upon them for the interpretation of the doc-
trines they imposed, and as a result of that dependency the priesthood
could extract support and even wealth from the people. Jefferson de-
scribed these causes of the corruption of Jesus' teachings when he said,
"The mild and simple principles of Christian philosophy would pro-
duce too much calm, too much regularity of good, to extract from its
disciples a support from a numerous priesthood, were they not to so-
phisticate it, ramify it, split it into hairs, and twist its texts till they
cover the divine morality of its author with mysteries, and require a
priesthood to explain them. "80
The basis of Jesus' simple moral teachings was, according to
Jefferson, the love principle in man-the same basis of the moral sense
as in Kames's philosophy. Yet Jesus, as Jefferson interpreted him, ex-
alted and stressed this love principle in an unprecedented manner. In
Jesus' moral system the love principle purified human reason of any
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bias in favor of selfish interests, thereby preventing reason from ratio-
nalizing immoral actions that served selfish human interests. Pure love
was devoid of any self-interest, and reason purified by love would
serve the love-based moral sense in man rather than his selfish inter-
ests. The love principle was the divine spark in the heart of man, and
Jesus' teachings as Jefferson perceived them probed the heart, thereby
stimulating that spark so it would purify the head or reason. Jefferson
expressed this view when he said, "He Uesus] pushed his scrutinies
into the heart of man erected his tribunal in the region of his thoughts,
and purified the waters at the fountain head. "81
Reason's function in determining morality in Jesus' moral philoso-
phy was minimal and therefore within the scope of virtually every
human being. From Jesus' principle "Love your neighbor as yourself"
it was a simple matter to deduce a duty not to harm your neighbor and
thence such basic precepts of justice as "Thou shalt do no murder,
Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not
bear false witness." 82 Benevolence too could be easily deduced from
the "Love your neighbor" principle. This process of moral determina-
tion, based on love and minimal reason in "The Philosophy of Jesus,"
as Jefferson called Jesus' moral teachings, is similar to the Kamesean
approach to finding not only the laws of nature but criminal laws,
which Kames believed were based on the laws of nature. 83 In his His-
torical Law Tracts~ Kames referred to both rational reflection and the
breast or love principle in man:
Of the human system no part, external or internal, is more remark-
able than a class of principles intended obviously to promote society,
by restraining men from harming each other. These principles, as the
Source of the criminal Law, must be attentively examined; and, to
form a just notion of them, we need but reflect upon what we feel
when we commit a Crime, or witness it. The first reflection will
unfold Divine justice carried to execution with the most penetrating
wisdom. Upon certain Actions, hurtful to others, the stamp of
impropriety and wrong is impressed in legible characters, visible to
all, not excepting even the Delinquent. Passing from the action to its
Author, we feel that he is guilty; and we also feel that he ought to be
punished for his guilt. He himself, having the same feeling, is filled
with remorse; and, which is extremely remarkable, his remorse is
accompanied with an anxious dread that punishment will be inflicted,
unless it be prevented by his making reparation or atonement. Thus in
the breast of man a tribunal is erected for Conscience; sentence
passeth against him for every Delinquency.84
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It is doubtful that Jefferson ever believed like Kames that all the
laws of nature governing human actions were capable of being de-
duced by minimal reason from the feelings of the moral sense. He did
seem to believe, however, that a sufficient number could be determined
in this way to enable humans to govern their relationships in most
circumstances. 85 Certainly, Jefferson never claimed that his edited ver-
sion of the Gospels included a complete set of moral laws. He de-
scribed Jesus' precepts as "more pure and perfect than those of the
most correct philosophers, and greatly more so than those of the Jews,"
yet he simultaneously maintained that they were mere "fragments"-
albeit "rich fragments"-of morality.86
It was Jefferson's opinion that his interpretation of Jesus' moral
teachings made them consistent with the morality determined by the
moral sense, a sense that included the use of minimal reason. In a
letter to John Adams he equated Jesus' moral system, which he ac-
knowledged as a common standard of morality, with morality deter-
mined by the moral sense, simultaneously maintaining that religion
consisted of morality rather than theological dogma:
If by religion, we are to understand sectarian dogmas, in which no
two of them agree, then your exclamation on that hypothesis is just,
"that this would be the best of all possible worlds, if there were no
religion in it." But if the moral precepts, innate in man, and made
part of his physical constitution, as necessary for a social being, if the
sublime doctrines of philanthropism and deism taught by Jesus of
Nazareth, in which all agree, constitute true religion, then, without it,
this would be, as you say, "something not fit to be named even,
indeed a hell. "87
This statement has deistic overtones since, as John Marshall has pointed
out, a number of deists saw "Christ's mission solely in terms of repub-
lishing natural law,"88 and Jefferson saw the innate moral sense as
providing knowledge of that law.
Contrary to what Morton White suggests, then, Jefferson in the
nineteenth century was not concerned with using revelation to pro-
vide the masses of humanity with access to moral knowledge, as Locke
was in the seventeenth century. Kames's moral-sense concept of man,
which Jefferson adopted before writing the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and continued to hold, provided that access. Further, Jefferson
had rejected revelation from the time of his Bolingbroke extracts and
maintained that position in his later years. What Jefferson did do in
the nineteenth century was to adapt Christianity and Jesus to his early
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Bolingbrokean natural theology and deism, as well as to Kamesean
moral philosophy. When he edited the Gospels, he stripped them of
the Virgin Birth, the resurrection, and all miracles contrary to the laws
of nature that govern the material universe.89 He thereby brought Chris-
tianity into accord with empiricism and the "Nature's God" of the
Declaration. (In his rejection of miracles he adhered to Bolingbroke
rather than Priestley, who acknowledged some Christian miracles that
went against the laws of nature.)90 In describing the effects of eliminat-
ing imposture (which he believed included miracles) from Christian-
ity, Jefferson stated, "The Christian religion, when divested of the rags
in which they [the clergy] have enveloped it, and brought to the origi-
nal purity and simplicity of its benevolent institutor, is a religion of all
others most friendly to liberty, science, and the freest expression of the
human mind."91 Among the passages Jefferson omitted as "rags" or
imposture from the Gospels were the anti-Semitic statements of Jesus
in John 8:42-47 where Jews were labeled liars, murderers, and chil-
dren of the devil because they did not accept Jesus and his teachings.92
He also omitted John 14:6 where Jesus claimed supreme authority in
religion by stating, "I am the way, the truth and the life: no man cometh
unto the Father, but by me." Consistent with this, he omitted Mat-
thew 16:18-19 where Jesus gave his church and his apostle Peter ex-
clusive control over who attains salvation and thereby supreme au-
thority in religion by giving them "the keys of the kingdom of heaven."
Jefferson did not believe the sweet morality of Jesus, the "benevolent
institutor" of Christianity, would allow him to make the hateful and
bigoted remarks against Jews that were in John. Nor did he believe
Jesus, the friend of "liberty" and freedom of "the human mind," would
utter statements in John and Matthew that claimed and granted su-
preme religious authority in Christianity and thereby opposed the free
use of reason by individuals as a means of obtaining religious truth.
When he referred to "liberty, science, and the freest expression of the
human mind," Jefferson mentioned three themes that were dear to him
from his student days on. All three were linked to his idea that human
reason was a gift from God, a gift that God intended human beings to
use to find truth in religion and science and, in conjunction with the
moral sense, to make moral determinations and judgments of humanity's
social and political well-being. This use of reason necessitated freedom
of reason. Jefferson's valuation of such freedom put him on a collision
course with what he deemed obstacles to that freedom.
5
~.(!)
Obstacles to Reason
Trust in man was a vital part of the heterodox theology of the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence. That trust was antithetical to the
Christian orthodox trust in God, not man. The basis of the Declaration's
trust in man was due to the moral capacity given him by "Nature's
God" and also the rational capacity or reason given him by this God
of natural theology. Jefferson had great trust in human reason born of
two factors. The first was his conviction that the human rational fac-
ulty was capable of providing knowledge of truth. The second was his
conviction that reason was capable of putting that knowledge to use
in a way that would generally improve the human condition, thus
making reason the instrument of progress. Even reason itself was ca-
pable of improvement or progress, according to Jefferson, who was
convinced that an ascending order of knowledge and progress awaited
humanity when it improved its reason. 1
Although there was no doubt in Jefferson's mind that reason and
progress would eventually prevail, he was aware that inauspicious fac-
tors were working against reason and reason-based progress. Those
factors were obstructions that repressed and oppressed the human ra-
tional faculty and thereby caused its suspension. Jefferson believed
that the delay in progress caused by those obstacles to reason was
especially manifest in the fields of science, government, and religion.
Before the rational faculty could become an effective instrument of
progress, therefore, it was necessary to remove those obstacles.
Francis Bacon was one thinker who had written of such obstacles.
Many ofJefferson's early ideas on reason came from Bacon, who made
a profound and lasting influence on his thinking and whom, along
with John Locke and Isaac Newton, he exalted as an intellectual hero.2
As a student Jefferson read Bacon's writings, and even though there is
no record of which of Bacon's works he read, it would seem the Novum
Organon was among them.3 There Bacon presented a new method of
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arriving at truth in natural philosophy or science while he criticized
the existing methods, especially those of speculative philosophy. He
believed that because philosophers jumped to conclusions not based
on a comprehensive gathering of facts observed by the senses, their
conclusions were often erroneous. According to Bacon, numerous facts
had to be gathered on a specific subject and then analyzed with reason
in order to find the truth of that subject. The test of truth discovered in
this way was correspondence to the facts observed. This approach to
truth was not easy because of the severe limitations of the senses and
reason that Bacon acknowledged: "Neither the bare hand nor the in-
tellect left to itself have much power." He then concluded that "results
are produced by instruments and helps."4
The purpose of Bacon's new method was to lead mankind via these
"instruments and helps" to "a better and more perfect use of Reason
in discovery of things" and thereby enable human reason "to scale the
steep and dark ascents of Nature." "Helps" were especially needed as
respects gathered facts since they could not be analyzed by reason
unless they were organized. Therefore his method prescribed that the
facts of a particular subject be presented in organized tables, or "Tables
of Discovery." These "tables," as "instruments and helps" to the senses
and reason, would enable thinkers to analyze facts obtained with the
senses and thereby gain access to the truth of the material world. Ba-
con expressed these ideas when he wrote: "When there is so great a
number and host of particulars, and these too so scattered and dif-
fused as to disconnect and confuse the Intellect; no good Hopes can be
entertained from the skirmishings, light movements, and transitions
of the Intellect; unless there be an arrangement and marshalling of
those things which pertain to the subject on which we are making
inquiry, by means of fit, well arranged, and, as it were, living Tables of
Discovery; and unless the mind be applied to the prepared and di-
gested assistance afforded by these Tables." Bacon believed that the
knowledge thus attained should be used to benefit and bring progress
to mankind: "The true and legitimate goal of the Sciences is none but
this: that human life be enriched with new discoveries and wealth."5
Examples of Baconian influence on Jefferson can be found in the
data-recording methods of his Garden Book (beginning in 1766) and
his Farm Book (from 1774). Jefferson was persistent in keeping these
records; the last entries in the Garden Book were made in 1824, just
two years before his death. Among other facts, he recorded what was
planted and when and the period of blooming and fruiting. As Edwin
Betts pointed out, these data provided "the time the different articles
came to the table, and their disappearance," facts that would be useful
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to any gardener or farmer. 6 Another example of the Novum Organon's
influence is found in jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia. Bacon's
impact on Notes is such that Robert Ferguson described it as "the
primal vision of order" within that work.7 Many of the materials and
facts contained in Notes were collected by jefferson before the time of
the Declaration of Independence, although he did not actually write
the book until 1780-81.8 The subject matter was, for the most part,
the geography of North America, especially the state ofVirginia. One
Baconian feature of this work is its criticism of the Count de Buffon's
hypothesis that the environment of the Old World was more condu-
cive to animal life than that of the New World. According to jefferson,
Buffon jumped to an erroneous conclusion not based on facts with
this hypothesis in the fashion of the philosophers criticized by Bacon.
Notes condemned this approach by stating that truth is "inscrutable
to us by reasonings a priori." It then promulgated Bacon's method of
finding knowledge by maintaining, "Nature has hidden from us her
modus agendi. Our only appeal on such questions is to experience....
But when we appeal to experience, we are not to rest satisfied with a
single fact."9 Numerous charts and tables in Notes affirm the Baconian
idea that knowledge is attained by continuous gathering and careful
organization and analysis of facts. Among these were a comparison of
animals found in Europe and America; birds of Virginia; monthly rain-
fall, temperature, and wind variations; population growth; aboriginal
tribes in each county of Virginia; aboriginal tribes located within the
United States and northward and westward of the United States; crimes
punishable by death, by dismemberment, and by labor; and exports.10
Philosophical Skepticism as an Obstacle
In the Novum Organon, Bacon described obstacles to scientific reason
as "Phantoms which lay siege to human minds." Of particular con-
cern to jefferson among these "Phantoms" was philosophical skepti-
cism, a subject on which he did considerable reading. His concern
stemmed from the fact that skepticism undermined the very founda-
tion of the human rational faculty. In discussing this obstacle, Bacon
said he was against the extremes of, on the one hand, granting assent
to truth based on too few facts, which was the practice of the dog-
matic philosophers such as Aristotle, and, on the other hand, unduly
withholding assent to factually based truth, which was the practice of
the skeptical philosophers: "The excess is of two kinds; the one that of
those who dogmatise readily, and render the Sciences positive and dic-
tatorial; the other, that of those who have introduced Acatalepsy ("In-
comprehensibility") and vague inquiry without limit. The former of
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these depresses the Intellect, the latter enfeebles it." The enfeebling of
the intellect by "vague inquiry without limit" was Bacon's reference to
philosophical skepticism, which maintained that man could not per-
ceive or rationally determine the truth. The Novum Organon elabo-
rated on skepticism's origin and effects:
Plato's school introduced Acatalepsy: first as in jest and irony,
through hatred of the ancient Sophists, Protagoras, Hippias, and the
rest, who feared nothing so much as appearing to doubt upon any
subject. But the new Academy made a dogmatism of its Acatalepsy,
and held it as their tenet. And although this is more honest than the
license of dogmatising, since they say for themselves that they do not
at all confound inquiry, like Pyrrho and the Sceptics, but have
something which they can follow as Probability, though not what they
can hold as Truth; nevertheless after the human mind has once
despaired of the discovery of truth, all things in all ways become more
languid, and therefore men prefer to turn aside to pleasant disputa-
tions and discourses, and sundry wanderings through the fields of
knowledge, rather than sustain any severity of inquiry.ll
The philosophers of the Academic school of skepticism used reason
to make it known that man could not rely on the perceptions of the
senses and that even reason itself was unreliable. The result was a long
shadow of doubt cast on the veracity of any judgment based either on
the senses or on reason. The Pyrrhonian school of skepticism, founded
by Pyrrho of Elis, which came into being shortly after the Academic
school, rejected what it deemed the extreme claims of both the Dog-
matist philosophers and the Academic skeptics, who respectively stated
that "Something can be known" and "Nothing can be known." The
Pyrrhonists did not want to commit themselves either way and there-
fore avoided making any judgment on anything that was not evident.
In addition, they opposed all evidence, either pro or con, on any ques-
tion in order to maintain a suspension of judgment. These efforts led
to mental ataraxia, an indifferent, serene, or detached state wherein
an individual lived by customs and appearances within his sphere of
experience without making any judgments concerning them. Sextus
Empiricus was one of the principal Pyrrhonists during the time this
movement was at its zenith in about 200 A.D.12
Among the authors Jefferson read on skepticism was Kames, who
touched on the subject in his Essays on the Principles ofMorality and
Natural Religion. 13 Two other works on the 1771 Skipwith book list
indicate Jefferson's concern with skepticism as an obstacle to the use
of the human senses and reason in finding truth: one was Pierre Bayle's
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Dictionary, and the other was Thomas Reid's Inquiry into the Human
Mind. 14 Bayle's Dictionary would have given jefferson a general knowl-
edge of skepticism, since, according to Richard Popkin, Bayle's "criti-
cal technique" in that work when "pursued long enough exhibits the
sad fact that rational effort is always its own undoing." That "high
road to scepticism" would soon cause reason to appear "perplexing"
even though it "at first looks like a way to explain something. "15 Evi-
dence of jefferson's familiarity with the contents of the Dictionary
may be seen in his noting the cost of each item on the list of books he
recommended to Skipwith: by far the most expensive was the five-
volume English translation of the Dictionary, listed at £7.1 (by way of
comparison, the five-volume set of Bolingbroke's works was listed at
£1.5). jefferson's recommendation that his friend make such a sizable
expenditure indicates the importance he attributed to the Dictionary,
an importance he could scarcely have determined without being famil-
iar with its content.
Of Pyrrho of Elis, one of the subjects of the Dictionary, Bayle stated
that this great skeptic was "a disciple of Anaxarchus, and accompa-
nied him as far as India" in his travels and "then followed Alexander
the Great." During his journeys Pyrrho "went to see the Magi of Per-
sia, and the Gymnosophists of India." Bayle recounted how Pyrrho
and the Pyrrhonians questioned the capacity of the senses to deliver
accurate impressions of objects to man by stating, "Everyone of us
may say, I feel heat before a fire, but not I know that fire is such in
itselfas it appears to me. Such was the style of the ancient Pyrrhonists. "
When it came to Pyrrho's use of reason to find truth, Bayle wrote that
Pyrrho "suspended his assent after he had well examined the argu-
ments pro and con" on any subject and that this suspension was per-
manent, born of Pyrrho's having "reduced all his conclusions to a non
liquet, let the matter be further enquired into." As a result of this
commitment to endless inquiry on a given subject, Bayle added, Pyrrho
"sought truth as long as he lived, but he so contrived the matter, as
never to grant that he had found it. "16
Bayle went on the describe the perplexing effect of this Pyrronian
suspension of judgment, as elaborated on by Sextus Empericus:
When a man is able to apprehend all the ways of suspending his
judgement, which have been laid open by Sextus Empericus, he may
then perceive that that Logic is the greatest effort of subtilty that the
mind of man is capable of; but he will see at the very same time, that
such a subtilty will afford him no satisfaction: it confounds itself; for
if it were solid, it would prove that it is certain that we must
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doubt.... But you need not fear that things would come to that: the
reasons for doubting are doubtful themselves: one must therefore
doubt whether he ought to doubt. What chaos! what torment for
the mind! it seems therefore, that this unhappy state is the fittest of
all to convince us, that our reason is the way to wander, since when
it displays itself with the greatest subtilty, it throws us into such an
abyss.I?
Since reason had such an abysmal effect, Bayle stated that men should
renounce it as a guide to truth and "beseech the cause of all things to
give us a better." God did indeed provide a better guide in faith or
revelation, according to Bayle, who put reason under the authority of
faith when he said, "We should captivate our understanding to the
obedience of faith." He maintained, however, that skepticism could be
valuable in leading to faith. The man who saw that the senses and
reason could not find truth and would therefore lead him nowhere
would be more inclined to turn to God or faith for "the persuasion of
the truths which he ought to believe, than if he should flatter himself
with a good success in reasoning and disputing. "18
These arguments posed a fundamental threat to the importance
jefferson placed on the human sensory and intellectual faculties as
instruments of finding truth. If the senses and reason could not lead to
truth, then empiricism and science, which were based on the senses
and reason, were exercises in futility. As Kames summed up the im-
pact of skepticism in his Essays: "If the testimony they [the senses]
give to the real existence of a material world, be a mere illusion, as
some have held, all belief founded on our own feelings is at an end....
[For] no reasoning, no experience, can discover the power or energy
of what we term a cause, when we attempt to trace its source. "19 In
addition to their adverse impact on science, if the claims of the skep-
tics were not defeated, Bayle's offering of faith would be a favorable
alternative to reason as the guide to truth. Placing faith over reason,
however, would have been anathema to jefferson as a disciple of rea-
son. Therefore he looked for champions to defend the honor of the
human senses and intellect against skepticism. He found them in Ka-
mes (see chapter 6) and especially in Thomas Reid, the Scottish phi-
losopher of common sense.20
The Defeat of Philosophical Skepticism
Reid was a graduate of Marichal College in Aberdeen, which was also
the college of William Small, jefferson's teacher at William and Mary.
Small, Reid's younger contemporary, was probably the one who intro-
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duced Jefferson to Reid's writings.21 He was also very likely the one
who gave Jefferson an interest in the theory of knowledge, which Reid
wrote on extensively, since epistemology was a standard subject in
Scottish higher education in the eighteenth century.22 Reid's work, An
Inquiry into the Human Mind, as has been stated, was on the 1771 list
of books Jefferson sent to Skipwith. In that work Reid called Pyrrho
the father of skeptical philosophy, which arose out of discrediting the
senses. Pyrrho was so dedicated to the concept that the senses gave
illusory perceptions, Reid explained, that he would "not stir a foot to
avoid the danger" of confrontation with a vicious dog or a precipice.23
It was not the senses themselves, however, so much as ideas-men-
tal images or representations of objects perceived by the senses-that
Reid deemed the foundation of modern skepticism. "Ideas," he said,
"seem to have something in their nature unfriendly to other exist-
ences" or objects.24 Once ideas mediated in one's mind between one's
self and the worldly objects they represented, one was effectively cut
off from the world: that is, unable to know whether or not one's per-
ceptions of worldly objects were accurate. To put it another way, if
ideas mediated between one's self and the world, one had no way of
knowing whether those mediators were true representations of the
world. Skepticism, therefore, was the logical result of the concept that
ideas, as representations of the worldly objects perceived by the senses,
mediated between one's self and the world.
John Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, according
to Reid, gave a huge impetus to the view of sense-derived mediating
ideas as a basis of skepticism. Locke defined an idea as "the Object of
the Understanding when a Man thinks." He also stated that "the Mind
knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the
Ideas it has of them. "25 Added to these views was Locke's insistence
that the secondary qualities of matter such as color, sound, and taste
were not part of the objects that appeared to have those qualities.
Something in the primary qualities of the object, such as bulk, figure,
and texture, merely stimulated the mind via the senses to perceive those
secondary qualities as if they were part of the object.26 To Locke, for
example, a red ball was not itself red; redness was an appearance born
of the senses and the mind. Redness was posited on the ball by the
senses and the mind. If Locke was right, according to Reid, this effec-
tively prevented man from perceiving the world as it actually is.27 In
short, it was impossible to have an accurate view of the objective world,
since one could perceive it not directly but only through the medium
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of ideas, ideas that were distortions of reality, distortions that were
caused by the human sensory apparatus and mind.
Reid attributed to Locke's concept of ideas what he deemed the
absurd philosophy of George Berkeley and the skeptical one of Hume.28
S.A. Grave presents a simple diagram that "crudely" illustrates Reid's
perception of how Hume's ideas derived from Locke's via Berkeley's.
Locke's views are represented in this diagram by three concentric circles,
the outermost symbolizing the material objects of the world; the in-
nermost, one's self; and the one between, ideas.29 Berkeley's philosophi-
cal system nullified the reality represented by the outer circle; Hume's
nullified those represented by both the inner and outer circles. It was
Berkeley's view that reality consists of perceiving entities or spirits (such
as men) and ideas that are perceived. Ideas, however, had no need to
be based on any material objects separate from those ideas; hence, the
material world was superfluous and even nonexistent. 3D Spirits, ideas,
and God were all that was necessary to account for reality, according
to Berkeley.
Hume took Locke's ideas one step further than Berkeley, which re-
sulted in complete skepticism, according to Reid: "The triumph of
ideas was completed in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature," since it
"discards spirits also, and leaves ideas and impressions as the sole
existences in the universe." Reid believed Hume discarded"spirits" or
men as perceivers by denying any substratum to the mind or self of
man. As Reid put it, Hume believed that the "mind is only a succes-
sion of ideas and impressions, without any subject" and that ideas in
the mind "came together, and arranged themselves by certain associa-
tions and attractions. "31 This rendered man incapable of perceiving or
making any cause-based scientific conclusions about the world founded
on sense perceptions and rational determinations. The conclusion, for
example, that the sun will rise in the morning is born of human psy-
chology and custom, not the causal determinations of reason, accord-
ing to Hume.32
Reid railed against these ideas of Berkeley and especially those of
Hume:
The little I know of the planetary system; of the earth which we
inhabit; of minerals, vegetables, and animals; of my own body, and of
the laws which [we] obtain in these parts of nature, opens to my mind
grand and beautiful scenes, and contributes equally to my happiness
and power. But when I look within, and consider the mind itself,
which makes me capable of all these prospects and enjoyments; if it is
indeed what the Treatise of Human Nature makes it, I find I have
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been only in an inchanted castle, imposed upon by spectres and
apparitions. I blush inwardly to think how I have been deluded; I am -
ashamed of my frame, and can hardly forbear expostulating with my
destiney: Is this thy pastime, 0 Nature, to put such tricks upon a silly
creature, and then to take off the mask, and shew him how he hath
been befooled? If this is the philosophy of human nature, my soul
enter thou not into her secrets. It is surely the forbidden tree of
knowledge; I no sooner taste of it, than I perceive my self naked, and
stript of all things, yea even of my very self. I see myself, and the
whole frame of nature, shrink into fleeting ideas, which, like
Epicurus's atoms dance about in emptiness.33
Reid's approach to defeating skepticism born of ideas was three-
fold. First, he attacked the validity of the Lockean concept of ideas as
representations and mediators of objects in the world and the belief
that these mediators were necessary to a knowledge of objects. Sec-
ond, he explained sensory perception as a direct encounter with ob-
jects of the world without the mediation of ideas, an encounter suffi-
cient to give knowledge of worldly objects. Third, he relied on what
he called first principles of human nature, an inherent and inexpli-
cable part of man that accounted for the phenomenon of human per-
ception and conceptual understanding of the objective material world.
Reid used Bacon's new method of science in the first approach. He
praised Bacon as the one who "first delineated the strict and severe
method of induction," which had been applied "with very happy suc-
cess" but was limited in its application to only "some parts of natural
philosophy ... and hardly in any thing else." Baconian induction was
not the source of knowledge of the mind of man and ideas, according
to Reid. He believed that the concept of the mind as the seat of ideas
conveyed to it by the senses, with those ideas being mediators neces-
sary to conceptions, thoughts, and conclusions about the world, was
unproven "hypothesis" and even "invention" on the part of philoso-
phers such as Locke. Such "invention" went beyond a "just induction
from facts," and facts were for Reid the measure of truth. He was
critical in a Baconian way of any philosophers or philosopher, no matter
"how great soever his genius and abilities may be," who gave us "a
system of human nature" when many parts of that nature "never came
under their observation." Systems invented or hypothesized by such
philosophers, under such circumstances, often caused them to stretch
and distort their ensuing observations of the world in order "to fill up
blanks and complete the system" they had invented. Reid expressed
his disgust for this inventive approach of philosophers when he said,
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"Christopher Columbus or Sebastian Cabot, might almost as reason-
ably have undertaken to give us a complete map of America. "34
Reid's second approach to the defeat of skepticism centered on coun-
tering John Locke's definition of knowledge as the result of recogniz-
ing the connection between the ideas of things and comparing those
connected ideas. Stated Locke: "Knowledge then seems to me to be
nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or dis-
agreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it con-
sists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not,
there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come
short of knowledge. "35
Reid, by contrast, attempted to account for knowledge from the
perception of things by the senses and conclusions drawn from those
perceptions without any mediation by and comparison of ideas: "Ev-
ery operation of the senses, in its very nature implies judgement or
belief, as well as simple apprehension. Thus, when I feel the pain of
the gout in my toe, I have not only a notion of pain, but a belief of its
existence, and a belief of some disorder in my toe which occasions it;
and this belief is not produced by comparing ideas, and perceiving
their agreements or disagreements; it is included in the very nature of
the sensation." Reid did not confine this observation to sensations of
bodily pleasure and pain but extended it to sensations which gave the
perception of objects external to the individual: "When I perceive a
tree before me, my faculty of seeing gives me not only a notion or simple
apprehension of the tree, but a belief of its existence and of its figure,
distance, and magnitude; and this judgement or belief is not got by com-
paring ideas, it is included in the very nature of the perception."36
In his third approach to the defeat of skepticism, Reid stated that
the "original and natural judgements" that accompany sensations born
of the senses were "a part of our constitution." They were, he said,
part of that constitution "no less than the power of thinking." These
sensations and the original judgments arising from them made up what
Reid called "the common sense of mankind." Another name Reid ap-
plied to these constituents of human nature was "first principles," on
which "all the discoveries of our reason are grounded." He believed
that mankind could not rationally understand or explain these "first
principles"; they were truths that reason could "neither make nor de-
stroy." Moreover, man could not help but abide by the first principles
of common sense: "By the constitution of our nature, we are under a
necessity of assenting to them." It was God who provided man with
these first principles of common sense, according to Reid. Therefore,
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belief in them and what they delivered to man in the form of knowl-
edge was something man should not throw off because if human be-
ings were deceived by these first principles of the human constitution,
then "we are deceived by him that made us and there is no remedy. "37
Reid, however, did not believe that God deceived man. It was, the view
of commonsense philosophy that the first principles of common sense
"are principles by which our cognition is conformed to its objects, to
things as they really are in themselves. "38
The principles of common sense are often the strongest "in those
who are not acute in reasoning," according to Reid. Those who devi-
ated from such principles suffered from what he politely described as
"a disorder in the constitution" and not so politely as "lunacy." There-
fore, Reid believed philosophers who deviated from the principles of
common sense by presenting arguments in favor of skepticism were
either fools (as a result of their lunacy) or, if not fools, sophists, and
one should not listen to fools or sophists. As he put it, "He must be
either a fool, or want to make a fool of me, that would reason me out of
my reason and senses. I confess I know not what a sceptic can answer to
this, nor by what good argument he can plead even for a hearing; for
either his reasoning or his sophistry, and so deserves contempt."39
Jefferson's interest in arguments against philosophical skepticism
did not wane when he ceased to be a student, and that interest was
linked to Reid. In Paris as minister plenipotentiary to France-between
the American Revolutionary War and George Washington's presi-
dency-Jefferson developed a friendship with Dugald Stewart, who
had studied under Reid, became a teacher of mathematics at Edinburgh,
and later succeeded Adam Ferguson as a professor of moral philoso-
phy. According to S.A. Grave, Stewart "always saw his work as an
extension of Reid's. "40 Jefferson found Stewart an able successor to
the antiskepticism philosophy of Reid. He also placed the Frenchman
Destutt de Tracy beside Stewart as a scourge of skepticism. Writing to
Robert Walsh in 1818, Jefferson said of Tracy's Principes logiques: "It
is an examination into the certainty of our knowledge, and the most
complete demolition of the Skeptical doctrines which I have ever met
with. You know his character and peculiar strength in Ideological en-
quiries. I place him and Dugald Stewart so much in a line, that I can
decide no more than that they are the two greatest men in that line at
present known to the world. "41
Although written in 1818, this reference to Tracy and Stewart as
the two best critics of skepticism "at present known to the world" is
significant. It left room to include Thomas Reid, who influenced
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Jefferson early in his life, in the exalted category of Tracy and Stewart
since Reid's presence was no longer known to the world. He had died
in 1796. The continuing impact on jefferson of Reid's antiskepticism
and that of his followers is clear in a statement he made to john Adams
in 1820: "Rejecting all organs of information, therefore, but my senses,
I rid myself of the pyrrhonisms with which an indulgence in specula-
tions hyperphysical and antiphysical, so uselessly occupy and disquiet
the mind. A single sense may indeed be sometimes deceived, but rarely;
and never all our senses together, with their faculty of reasoning. They
evidence realities. "42 This commonsense approach that established the
efficacy of the senses and reason removed skepticism as an obstacle to
reason-especially scientific reason-in Jefferson's mind.
Faith as an Obstacle
Another obstacle to science and scientific reason discussed in the Novum
Organon was faith or religion. Religion, according to Bacon, fostered
blind unquestioning faith or belief in superstition. Such belief was an-
tithetical to natural philosophy or science based on Bacon's method of
observed sensory facts analyzed by reason. As Bacon put it, "Natural
Philosophy has in all ages had a troublesome and stubborn adversary
in Superstition, and a blind and immoderate zeal for religion." Bacon
was particularly critical of what he called the "Deification of Error"
by faith and religion in the sciences, which he regarded as "the worst
of all things" and "the plague of the Intellect." He cited the accounts
of the origin and development of the world in Genesis and Job as
examples of this "Deification" and excoriated those who attempted to
reconcile scripture with natural philosophy or science: "Some of the
moderns have indulged in this vanity with the greatest carelessness:
and have endeavoured to found a natural Philosophy on ... Scrip-
tures, so 'seeking the dead among the living.'''43
jefferson, like Bacon, expressed his distaste for the deification of
error in science by faith, especially when it was backed by govern-
ment: "Galileo was sent to the inquisition for affirming that the earth
was a sphere: the government had declared it to be as flat as a tren-
cher, and Galileo was obliged to abjure his error. This error however
at length prevailed, the earth became a globe." Here jefferson was
pointing out the absurdity of making erroneous science "an article of
faith" enforced by church or government. He also specifically ridi-
culed the enforcers of scientific errors in the name of faith by pointing
out that such errors were corrected despite their enforcement as soon
as free reason based on induction took place. As he put it, errors "fled"
as soon as "Reason and experiment have been indulged. "44
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Bacon implicitly offered a method of removing faith or religion as
an obstacle to science and scientific reason when he said, "Those things
only be rendered to Faith, which are Faith's." What he implied was
the converse of this statement: "Those things only be rendered to natural
philosophy that are natural philosophy's." This statement, along with
its explicit counterpart, suggests that two kinds of truth-truth result-
ing from faith or blind unquestioning belief in scripture or religious
tradition, and truth resulting from determinations made by sensory
observations combined with rational analysis-should be confined to
their own separate jurisdictions: salvation and the material world, re-
spectively. Jefferson followed this pattern by separating religion or
church from education when he founded the University of Virginia,
thus marking, as Gilbert Chinard stated, "to a large extent . . . the
beginning of the secularisation of scientific research in America. "45
Jefferson saw faith in the sense of blind, unquestioning acceptance
of, belief in, and obedience to the doctrine and authority of institu-
tionalized religions as an obstacle to the use of reason not only in
science but also in government. He believed that institutionalized reli-
gions based on faith, via the priestcraft of those religions, had such a
hold over the reason of the people that they could and often did make
political judgments for them. Because of faith the people often fol-
lowed the political dictates or suggestions of their clergy without ques-
tion. This nullified the exercise of even that minimal amount of reason
which, along with the aid of the moral sense, enabled individuals to
make moral determinations and judgments applicable to their govern-
ment. Jefferson lamented this impact of faith and described people in
religions of faith who did not exercise their individual reason as the
"willing dupes and druges" of institutionalized religions and their
clergy.46 The suspension of individual reason among the members of
the populace, allowing their clergy to think for them in political mat-
ters, rendered a democracy a de facto aristocracy, an aristocracy of the
priests or clergy. Jefferson stated this view when he spoke of the people
as the victims of "slumber under the pupilage of an interested aristoc-
racy of priests and lawyers, persuading them to distrust themselves,
and to let them think for them. "47 As his reference to lawyers as well
as priests here indicates, Jefferson was opposed to any group that
usurped or attempted to usurp the rational judgment-making capacity
of the individuals who constituted the masses. He was especially op-
posed to the clergy's usurpations in this respect in politics, since the
Lockean political theory reflected in the Declaration of Independence
was based on the free reason of the individual or the judgment-mak-
ing capacity of that reason. Institutionalized religious and priestly
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authority born of faith vitiated the Second Treatise's theory because it
obstructed that free reason without which individuals in the state of
nature, if institutionalized religions were to exist there, would not be
able to make the judgments of consent necessary to form a government.
The idea that the authority of faith and the religions of faith were
antithetical to Lockean political systems based on the free reason of
the individual would seem to have been infused in Jefferson's mind by
the writings of Bolingbroke that he read before drafting the Declara-
tion of Independence. Consider this Bolingbroke comment:
The principles and duties of natural religion arise from the nature of
things, and are discovered by the reason of man, according to that
order which the author of all nature, and the giver of all reason, has
established in the human system. From hence too would arise the
institutions of civil government, in a natural state; if the minds of
legislators were not corrupted previously by superstition. In these
cases, religion and civil government, arising from the same spring,
their waters would be intermixed, they would run in one stream, and
they might be easily confined to the same channel; if revelation did
not introduce mysterious doctrines and rites, which it becomes soon a
trade to teach and celebrate.48
From reason would arise "the institutions of civil government, in a
natural state" only if "the minds of legislators were not corrupted by
superstition." Since superstition is faith or belief in the unproved or
unverified claims of religion, Bolingbroke was referring to the reli-
gions of faith in his reference to superstition. His message in the fore-
going statement made it clear that faith religions founded on revela-
tion and tradition were not in accord with-and indeed were opposed
to-political systems founded on the free reason of man. This view
gave Jefferson a political motivation to reject and oppose faith-based
religions, since he was an advocate of the reason-based Lockean po-
litical theory. Bolingbroke also pointed out that natural religion and
political systems that arose in a state of nature, such as those Locke
described, were both based on reason and were therefore complemen-
tary. This idea gave Jefferson political grounds for preferring and sub-
scribing to natural religion and natural theology.
He also adhered to Bolingbroke's idea put forth in the foregoing
statement that one cannot reconcile politics based on free reason and
religion based on faith. To put it another way, the people could not be
half slave and half free: that is, accept the authority of the religions of
faith with their scriptures, their institutions, and their clergy and yet
claim to be politically free under the authority of their own free rea-
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son. As Jefferson commented to this effect: "History, I believe, fur-
nishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil
government," and "In every country and in every age, the priest has
been hostile to liberty. "49 That he used "priests" in the broadest sense
of the term, meaning the clergy of all denominations and religions, is
evidenced by the phrase "in every country and in every age." Clearly,
Jefferson viewed the priesthood as striving for or possessing control
over the reason of individuals, a control that he deemed an obstruc-
tion to the use of individual reason in politics.
Just as faith obstructed the exercise of free individual reason in poli-
tics, so it obstructed the search for religious truth, according to Jefferson.
He maintained that the priesthood's preaching of the efficacy of faith
as the vehicle of salvation and the people's acceptance of such preach-
ing destroyed the mind and critical reason of individuals in religion.
He made this clear when he said: "Man, once surrendering his reason,
has no remaining guard against absurdities the most monstrous, and
like a ship without a rudder, is the sport of every wind. With such
persons, gullibility, which they call faith, takes the helm from the hand
of reason, and the mind becomes a wreck. "50 This statement, although
made in 1820, is similar to a passage on faith promulgated by priests
from act 5 of Thomas Otway's Venice Preserved, which Jefferson cop-
ied during his student years:
You want to lead
My Reason blindfold, like a Hamper'd Lion,
Check'd of its nobler Vigour; then when bated
Down to obedient Tameness, make it couch,
And shew strange tricks, which you call signs of Faith
So silly souls are gull'd, & you get Money.
Away; no more.51
Jefferson was of the opinion that faith or blind unquestioning belief
in doctrinal, scriptural, and priestly authority perpetuated error and
imposture in religion, and the corruption that resulted from error and
imposture. This was because the faithful believer was gullible, as he
made clear in the aforementioned statement, and therefore would not
think of critically questioning his faith with his reason. Further, to
think critically of one's faith would bring that faith, which was contin-
gent upon blind unquestioning belief, to an abrupt conclusion, and no
person of faith would want to do this. Even if one was inclined to
criticize faith, if one lived in a society dominated by a particular faith
and persisted in critically questioning it with reason and concluded
that it was not true, one would be branded a heretic. Thus, faith and
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religions based on faith were opposed to the use of critical reason in
matters of religion. Only scholastic reason or reason that, under the
authority of scripture and church, confirmed the conclusions of those
authorities was permitted by religions based on faith. Jefferson, con-
trary to religions based on faith, believed the exercise of the critical
reason of each individual without any restraints was the great friend
of religion, since it could redeem religion of the errors, impostures,
and corruptions perpetrated by scriptural and ecclesiastical authority.
He stated this in Notes on the State of Virginia, written in 1781, and
the basis of his comments was no doubt his earlier advocacy of
Bolingbroke's strict empirical tests to determine the veracity of the
truth claims of religion (see chapter 2):
Reason and free enquiry are the only effectual agents against error.
Give a loose to them, they will support the true religion, by bringing
every false one to their tribunal, to the test of their investigation. They
are the natural enemies of error, and of error only. Had not the
Roman government permitted free inquiry, Christianity could never
have been introduced. Had not free inquiry been indulged, at the aera
of the Reformation, the corruptions of Christianity could not have
been purged away. Ifit be restrained now, the present corruptions will
be protected, and new ones encouraged.52
One of the effects, when each individual regarded and used his own
reason as the authority for himself in determining religious and theo-
logical truth, was religious pluralism. This was due to the very nature
of the human mind or rational faculty, according to Jefferson. He be-
lieved that the mind, as well as the body, of each individual was struc-
tured differently from others and that differences in mental structure
would cause each mind to function differently. These differences in
function would then lead individuals to different conclusions about
God, who as a result of His nonobjective nature was not subject to
objective verification. Jefferson believed that the differences in human
mental structure and the resultant differences in thinking on God were
caused by God, who had created humans with different mental struc-
tures. Therefore, the different opinions of individuals on God should
be respected; they were of divine origin, as Jefferson wrote to James
Fishbach in 1809: "The varieties in the structure and action of the
human mind as in those of the body, are the work of our Creator,
against which it cannot be a religious duty to erect a standard of uni-
formity. "53 This line of thought dated back to Jefferson's student days,
when he had copied a passage from act 3 of Nicholas Rowe's play
Tamerlane that stated that it was the nature of the thinking faculty-
Obstacles to Reason 103
often referred to as the soul in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries-to think differently because of individual variations:
... to subdue th'unconquerable Mind,
To 'make one Reason have the same Effect
Upon all Apprehensions; to force this,
Or this Man, just to think, as thou & I do;
Impossible! unless Souls were alike
in all, which differ now like human Faces.54
Clearly, jefferson saw faith, the institutionalized religions that were
based on faith, and especially the clergy of those religions as obstacles
to the free use of reason in science, politics, and religion. It is therefore
understandable why he reacted with indignation to a comment made
by Benjamin Rush shortly before he was elected president. Rush, un-
like jefferson, believed that Christianity was conducive to republican-
ism and, concerned about jefferson's lack of commitment to Chris-
tianity, made an effort to alter the views of the man who would soon
hold the young country's highest office. On 22 August 1800 he wrote
to jefferson, "It is only necessary for Republicanism to ally itself to the
Christian Religion, to overturn all the corrupted political and religious
institutions in the world. "55 jefferson took Rush's comment to be ad-
vocacy of an established national church supported by the govern-
ment. Given his long-standing opinions on that subject-including his
opposition to the established church in Virginia in the 1770s,56-his
response to Rush was what one might expect:
The clergy [had] a very favorite hope of obtaining an establishment of
a particular form of Christianity through the United States; and as
every sect believes its own form the true one, everyone perhaps
hoped for his own, but especially the Episcopalians and Congrega-
tionalists. The returning good sense of our country threatens abortion
to their hopes, and they believe that any portion of power confided to
me, will be erected in opposition to their schemes. And they believe
rightly: for I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility
against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.57
Jefferson made it clear in this statement that he regarded the faiths of
institutionalized Christianity as obstacles to reason in that they tyran-
nized "the mind of man," and that he had taken an oath to oppose
such tyranny. It would seem he took that oath when he was a student
as a result of his extensive reading and study of those who opposed
any authority-including scriptural or ecclesiastical authority-over
the reason of each individual. Jefferson suggested as much to Thomas
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Cooper in describing his student days as those when he never feared
"to follow truth and reason to whatever results they led, and bearding
every authority which stood in their way. "58
The Removal of Faith as an Obstacle
Jefferson prescribed education, "the diffusion of instruction" among
the people, as the long-term or "remote remedy" for the removal of
faith, which he described as the "fever of fanaticism" that constituted
a tyrannizing obstacle to human reason.59 The education he recom-
mended was public or government-funded secular education, not in
any way controlled by the clergy of religious institutions. Jefferson
was of the opinion that when the clergy, who preached the doctrines
of faith, determined what was to be taught in educational institutions,
free reason and truth were compromised to accommodate those doc-
trines. This compromise would result in obscurantism and regressive,
not progressive, education, like the pattern of education in the Middle
Ages, a pattern that some clergy preferred, according to Jefferson. He
expressed these ideas in a letter to Joseph Priestley: "What an effort,
my dear Sir, of bigotry in politics and religion have we gone through!
The barbarians really flattered themselves they should be able to bring
back the times of Vandalism, when ignorance put everything into the
hands of power and priestcraft. All advances in science were proscribed
as innovations. They pretended to praise and encourage education,
but it was to be the education of our ancestors. "60
In 1779 Jefferson drafted a bill to establish public education in Vir-
ginia. The bill spelled out his basic ideas for education and prescribed
three levels: elementary, grammar, and university.61 The clergy would
have no authority whatsoever at any level. Indeed, Jefferson wrote in
1820 in connection with his original plan, that he preferred election
methods that would tend to "keep elementary education out of the
hands of fanaticising preachers" if his plan was ever actualized on that
leve1.62 Although that bill did not pass, part of his plan was actualized
subsequent to his presidency, after the Virginia legislature finally ap-
proved the establishment of the University of Virginia (1819). It was
Jefferson who aroused interest in that project, Jefferson who became
the architect not only of that institution's buildings but also of its cur-
riculum and format. 63 Gilbert Chinard wrote that the University of
Virginia "was his in every sense of the word. "64 Jefferson summed up
the new university's policy on academic freedom, which reflected his
own views on reason, when he wrote, "This institution will be based
on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not
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afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error
so long as reason is left free to combat it. "65
Jefferson paid tribute to the people of Virginia when he wrote of his
new university, "The liberality of this State will support this institu-
tion, and give fair play to the cultivation of reason." He believed that
"the priests of the different religious sects" were "serious enemies" of
such cultivation, that they put "spells on the human mind" that would
cast an "ominous" cloud over the efforts to improve it.66 The clergy of
various sects confirmed his belief by complaining about the allegedly
unorthodox religious views of Dr. Thomas Cooper. Cooper had been
chosen to be a member of the faculty of the new university, but the
clergy's complaints forced his resignation before classes ever began.
Jefferson, smoldering at this priestly interference, sarcastically criti-
cized his fellow Visitors of the university for yielding to the clergy's
pressure by accepting Cooper's resignation. "For myself," he stated,
"I was not disposed to regard the denunciations of these satellites of
religious inquisition. "67
That the mind and reason could be improved and cultivated by
education in the context of freedom, especially freedom from religious
restraints, was an idea Jefferson found in Locke's Of the Conduct of
the Understanding, which he would have been familiar with since he
had recommended it to Skipwith in 1771:
He that will inquire out the best books in every science, and inform
himself of the most material authors of the several sects of philosophy
and religion, will not find it an infinite work to acquaint himself with
the sentiments of mankind concerning the most weighty and compre-
hensive subjects. Let him exercise the freedom of his reason and
understanding in such a latitude as this, and his mind will be strength-
ened, his capacity enlarged, his faculties improved; and the light
which the remote and scattered parts of truth will give to one another
will so assist his judgement, that he will seldom be widely out, or miss
giving proof of a clear head and a comprehensive knowledge. At least,
this is the only way I know to give the understanding its due improve-
ment to the full extent of its capacity, and to distinguish the two most
different things I know in the world, a logical chicaner from a man of
reason.68
Locke's "man of reason," although a reader of the ideas of others, was
not a mere follower but an independent thinker who made his own
determinations of truth. This rational independence was actualized by
Locke's method of education, as he made clear in Some Thoughts con-
cerning Education. Jefferson would also have been familiar with this
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work, since it, along with Conduct, was on the list of books he sent to
Skipwith in 1771. Quoting and recommending the ideas of a "judi-
cious author," Locke stated in Thoughts:
The study of the original text can never be sufficiently recommended.
'Tis the shortest, surest, and most agreeable way to all sorts of
learning. Draw from the spring-head, and take not things at second
hand. Let the writings of the great masters be never laid aside, dwell
upon them, settle them in your mind, and cite them upon occasion;
make it your business thoroughly to understand them in their full
extent and all their circumstances; acquaint yourself fully with the
principles of original authors; bring them to a consistency, and then
do you yourself make your deductions.... [Yet] content not yourself
with those borrowed lights, nor guide yourself by their views but
where your own fails you and leaves you in the dark. Their explica-
tions are not yours, and will give you the slip. On the contrary, your
own observations are the product of your own mind, where they will
abide and be ready at hand upon all occasions in converse, consulta-
tion, and dispute.69
This Lockean approach-developing reason through reading the
"original" texts of "great masters" while maintaining the freedom and
independence of the rational faculty-seems to have shaped jefferson's
own early education and reading, which liberated him from faith. 70
Therefore, he believed that once individuals became imbued with the
idea of pursuing truth with reason in the context of freedom-as a
result of improving their own reason through reading at the lower
levels of his system of education-they too would emerge as indepen-
dent thinkers. Consistent with this independence, they would no longer
uncritically follow religious doctrines or blindly accept the authority
of the clergy. People followed doctrines and priests with blind, uncriti-
cal faith as a result of ignorance, which, jefferson said, "would seem
impossible" in "an intelligent people, with the faculty of reading and
the right of thinking" actualized by education.71 Significantly, jefferson
proscribed Bible reading at the lowest level of his system, claiming
that the "judgements" of children at that level "are not sufficiently
matured for religious enquiries. "72
It was science in particular that jefferson believed would ultimately
tame the tyranny of faith and superstition over the human mind. People
who became accustomed to Baconian questioning and testing of knowl-
edge in order to confirm its correspondence to observed facts, which
was the method of science, would eventually subject their own faith to
such tests, tests similar to the empirical religious tests of Bolingbroke.
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This is not to say that Jefferson thought one needed to become a scien-
tist to adopt this approach; he did not believe that everyone had the
rational capacity to do so.73 Familiarity with and appreciation of sci-
entific method would suffice for individuals to apply the method to
their own faith and reject aspects of it that could not be objectively
verified. Jefferson believed that the clergy, who made their living from
what he deemed the superstitions of faith, anticipated this impact of
science with a great deal of apprehension: "The priests of the different
religious sects ... dread the advance of science as witches do the ap-
proach of day-light; and scowl on the fatal harbinger announcing the
subdivision of the duperies on which they live. "74
Jefferson made perhaps his most complete statement of what he
deemed the progressive method of science and regressive method of
faith in a letter to Elbridge Gerry in 1799. There he said Christianity's
use of the crucifixion, which conjures up images of the agonizing death
Jesus suffered on the cross to atone for the effects of original sin, is
responsible for "awing" men to distrust their reason and rely on that
of others:
And I am for encouraging the progress of science in all its branches;
and not for raising a hue and cry against the sacred name of philoso-
phy; for awing the human mind by stories of raw-head and bloody
bones to a distrust of its own vision, and to repose implicitly on that
of others; to go backwards instead of forwards to look for improve-
ment; to believe that government, religion, morality, and every other
science were in the highest perfection in ages of the darkest ignorance,
and that nothing can ever be ,devised more perfect than what was
established by our forefathers. 75
Jefferson believed that general progress could be made in the hu-
man condition, especially in government and religion, and that reason
would be the instrument of progress once the general education of the
people removed the obstructions to reason:
Enlighten the people generally, the tyranny and oppressions of body
and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day. Although I
do not, with some enthusiasts, believe that the human condition will
ever advance to such a state of perfection as that there shall no longer
be pain or vice in the world, yet I believe it susceptible of much
improvement, and most of all, in matters of government and religion;
and that the diffusion of knowledge among the people is to be the
instrument by which it is to be effected. 76
Without general public education of a kind that would produce men
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of independent reason, as described by Locke in Some Thoughts con-
cerning Education, Jefferson feared that the minds of the people would
be defenseless against eventual domination by authoritarians in reli-
gion and government. This domination would result in the collapse of
democracy, which he believed was born of and nurtured by the free
and independent reason of the individuals who made up the populace.
He stated this to George Wythe, a friend and former teacher who had
supported his bill for public education in Virginia: "Preach, my dear
Sir, a crusade against ignorance; establish and improve the law for
educating the common people. Let our countrymen know, that the
people alone can protect us against these evils, and that the tax which
will be paid for this purpose, is not more than the thousandth part of
what will be paid to kings, priests and nobles, who will rise up among
us if we leave the people in ignorance."77
"Educating the common people," the principal objective of
Jefferson's bill for public education in Virginia, despite the fact that it
was actualized only on its highest or university level, would enable the
people to read and think for themselves and not fall prey to "kings,
priests and nobles." Jefferson believed that reading history on the first
level of education prescribed by his bill was the foundation that would
enable the people to think for themselves. 78 Therefore his educational
program was not elitist as respects its application to the "common
people" in politics, who he believed were the foundation of demo-
cratic government, even though his educational ideas were elitist in
other respects, as were those of Locke.79 The statement to Wythe indi-
cates his trust in the rational capacity of the populace in politics, as
well as their moral capacity. As a result of this trust, Jefferson exalted
human nature, especially that of the common man. His greatest and
most universal exaltation of human nature, however, is found in his
ideas on natural rights, which, according to his concept of man con-
tained in the theology of the Declaration of Independence, he believed
to be an inherent and sacred part of each individual.
6
&.~
Self-Evident Truths
The Lockean idea that "all Men by Nature are equal"1 and that God
created them that way was echoed by Jefferson in the ideological pas-
sages of the Declaration of Independence where he wrote, "We hold
these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal."2 He
went on to state how men were created equal by "Nature's God," or
the God of natural theology, when he said, "They are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."3 This ideology of God-
given equal rights was used in the Declaration as a leveler: by exalting
the status of each man to one equal to that of any other, it tamed those
who, as a result of deeming themselves superior beings, claimed au-
thority over the common man. This gave the common man a basis to
reject and resist anyone who claimed authority over him without his
consent, since equals have no authority over equals. Such an ideology
of equality, especially equal natural freedom, was of course funda-
mental to Locke's consent theory of government,4 which Jefferson used
in the Declaration when he stated, "Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed."5
The idea that individuals have God-given equal rights is a vital ele-
ment of Jefferson's concept of man as contained in the theology of the
Declaration of Independence. To him, the "unalienable Rights" speci-
fied there were no mere postulates but realities, described as "Truths."
What led him to believe that those rights were "Truths"? The answer
to this question lies in Jefferson's ideas on the epistemology of rights,
or how he believed that people come to know the "Truths" of their
natural "unalienable Rights." Significantly, Jefferson stated the means
by which men gain access to knowledge of the truths about themselves
and their rights in the Declaration's ideological passages when he wrote,
"We hold these Truths to be self-evident."6 The question then is what
Jefferson meant by "self-evident," since this term is key to understand-
ing his epistemology of rights.
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I want to emphasize that "self-evident" was Jefferson's own termi-
nology, inserted in place of "sacred and undeniable" when he amended
his original rough draft. Carl Becker believed that the handwriting of
"self-evident" in the amendment to the rough draft was more like
Franklin's than Jefferson's.? Julian Boyd disagreed, pointing out that
the s's and t's resemble the unusual way Jefferson wrote these letters. 8
I agree with Boyd, especially since the t in words ending with that
letter has a very distinctive A-like structure. The t in "self-evident"
and those in the words "respect" and "government," which are found
in the third line preceding and the fifth line succeeding the line in which
"self-evident" appears in the rough draft, have this unusual feature in
common.9 In addition to this evidence, John Adams claimed that nei-
ther he nor Franklin nor the other two members of the Declaration's
drafting committee altered jefferson's rough draft before it went to
the Continental Congress for final approval, at which time it con-
tained the word "self-evident. "10 Proceeding on the basis that "self-
evident" was indeed Jefferson's language, then, let us come back to the
consideration of what he meant by this term.
Morton White believed that Jefferson used "self-evident" in the
Declaration as Locke did in An Essay concerning Human Understand-
ing~ where the philosopher specified exactly what he meant by this
term. White pointed out that, according to Locke, a "self-evident prin-
ciple must be certified by a man's intuitive reason," which consisted in
seeing "the truth of the principle immediately upon understanding its
terms."11 As Locke put it:
If we will reflect on our own ways of Thinking, we shall find, that
sometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two
Ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any
other: And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this,
the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the
Truth, as the Eye doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus
the Mind perceives, that White is not Black, That a Circle is not a
Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal to One and Two.
Such kind of Truths, the Mind perceives at the first sight of the Ideas
together, by bare Intuition, without the intervention of any other
Idea; and this kind of Knowledge is the clearest, and most certain,
that humane Frailty is capable of. This part of Knowledge is irresist-
ible, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be
perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and
leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind
is presently filled with the clear Light of it. 'Tis on this Intuition, that
depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge, which
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Certainty everyone finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and
therefore not require a greater.12
This intuitive reason is related to Locke's demonstrative reason,
which is used to find the truth of something beyond the scope of intu-
ition such as "the Agreement or Disagreement in bigness, between the
three Angles of a Triangle, and two right ones," to use Locke's own
example. The mind, as Locke stated, "cannot by an immediate view
and comparing them" determine which of these combinations of angles
is larger; there must be intervening steps or "Proofs" whereby "the
Mind does at last perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas
it considers." But in each of the intermediate steps or "Connections"
leading to a final conclusion or "truth," self-evident intuition born of
intuitive reason is necessary to perceive the agreement or disagree-
ment of the ideas considered at each intermediate step.13 Both Locke
and Jefferson, however, considered that gaining moral knowledge by
Lockean demonstrative reason was beyond the capacity of most per-
sons (see chapter 4).
Despite Locke's assertion that all men can have intuitive or self-
evident perceptions, there is a potentially undemocratic element in this
intuitive reason (anticipated by Thomas Aquinas) as White pointed
out. What is self-evident to a highly educated and intelligent individual,
seen clearly like "bright Sun-shine," would often appear as darkness
to an uneducated and unintelligent person. The latter, if he "did not
have certain ideas" or "know the meanings of certain words," simply
cccould not see that certain propositions were self-evident." Therefore,
Jefferson's Lockean use of "self-evident" in the Declaration, accord-
ing to White, rendered the "truths" or principles or rights of man
specified there knowable to only a few highly intelligent and educated
men. As a result, White argued, "the doctrine of self-evident truth ...
could have been easily turned into ... a tool of haughty dictators of
Principles." An advocate of the doctrine of self-evident truth who
claimed to see the self-evident principles of the Declaration "could
claim that those who did not agree with him on the self-evidence of
some proposition were biased" and "incapable of using their reason. "14
To put it another way, Lockean "self-evident" epistemology established
possibilities for an intellectual elite to exercise normative control over
a democracy just as demonstrative reason did (see chapter 4). This
elite would then give a democracy its normative direction, even though
that democracy was established by the people with the intent that they
themselves would supply its moral direction.
I agree with White's analysis of Locke's epistemology and its impli-
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cations for the Declaration, but I disagree that it was the Lockean
meaning of "self-evident" that Jefferson used in that document. I ar-
gue that Jefferson's meaning entailed a different epistemology, one that
he believed gave virtually all persons easy access to knowledge of their
natural "unalienable Rights." I also argue that that epistemology, like
the one he believed provided knowledge of morals, came from Lord
Kames. Indeed, they were similar epistemologies. The one in connec-
tion with rights, however, was linked to Kamesean ideas promulgated
to defeat David Hume's skepticism as respects the self of man.
In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume argued that man has no
personal identity or self in the sense of an idea of himself that has
"identity and simplicity." By "identity," Hume meant an "idea of self"
that would "continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of
our lives; since the self is suppos'd to exist after that manner." By
"simplicity," he meant an idea of self born of "one impression," which,
he said, was what "gives rise to every real idea." The impressions that
gave rise to the real ideas Hume referrred to were, like the ideas of
Locke, born of contact by the senses with objects external to the self.
The problem with such impressions and the ideas they produced in the
mind, however, was that they were not "constant and invariable,"
according to Hume. On the contrary they were successive and short-
lived and could therefore not give a single continuous idea of one's self
that would endure throughout one's entire life. Hume expressed this
view when he said: "Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and
sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It
cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other,
that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea."
Hume went on to emphasize that ideas based on sense impressions
were scattered. He then challenged the concept that they could be in
any way related to or connected with the self: "All these are different,
and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be sepa-
rately consider'd, and may exist separately, and have no need of any
thing to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they
belong to the self; and how are they connected with it?"15
Hume was responding to "some philosophers" (including Locke)
who argued, according to Hume, that the experience of "pain or plea-
sure" or the "strongest sensation" or "most violent passion," even
though fleeting, was enough evidence of the self to enable men to "feel
its existence and its continuance in existence. "16 Locke had maintained
in Human Understanding that an individual's personal identity or con-
tinuous unchanging self was his thinking faculty or consciousness. He
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did not claim to have an idea of that self or consciousness but main-
tained that one could intuit knowledge of one's self. He stated that it
was "impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he
does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will
any thing, we know that we do so [with our consciousness]." Memory
was crucial in gaining knowledge of the self as a continuous entity,
according to Locke: "As far as this consciousness can be extended back-
wards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that
Person; it is the same selfnow it was then; and 'tis by the same selfwith
this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done."1?
This knowledge of one's continuous self, which Locke described as
intuitive, was not the same, however, as what he described as intuitive
or self-evident knowledge, where two ideas were, without the "pains
of proving or examining," immediately perceived to agree or disagree
("White is not Black, ... Three are more than Two," and so on).
Hence, Locke's proof of the self did not leave David Hume without
"Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination," as Locke had said intuitive or
self-evident knowledge would. There was no idea of self in the sense
of consciousness or mind, Hume pointed out, as there was of white,
black, one, two, and three. In what is perhaps the most quoted state-
ment from his Treatise, Hume described what happened when he tried
to gain knowledge of his own self or mind: "For my part, when I enter
most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or
hatred, pain or pleasure, I never can catch myself at any time without
a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."
Hume went on to compare the mind or self to an unknowable theater
where the performers are impressions, perceptions, or ideas born of
the senses:
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively
make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an
infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no
simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural
propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The
comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the succes-
sive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most
distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of
the materials, of which it is compos'd.t8
Like Thomas Reid, Kames was appalled by Hume's skepticism, es-
pecially as respects the self.19 In his Essays on the Principles of Moral-
ity and Natural Religion, he wrote:
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Had we no original impressions but those of the external senses,
according to the author of the treatise of human nature, we never
could have any consciousness of self; because such consciousness
cannot arise from any external sense. Mankind would be in a per-
petual reverie; ideas would be constantly floating in the mind; and no
man would be able to connect his ideas with himself Neither could
there be an idea of personal identity. For a man, cannot consider
himself to be the same person, in different circumstances, when he has
no idea or consciousness of himself at all.20
What Kames offered as counterpoint to Hume's points about ideas
born of the external senses was the internal sense that provided each
individual with an idea of the self or, as Kames put it, with "an un-
doubted truth, that he has an original feeling, or consciousness of him-
self, and of his existence." This feeling or consciousness was of a con-
tinuous self that "for the most part, accompanies everyone of his
impressions and ideas, and every action of his mind and body." Kames's
qualifying phrase "for the most part" allowed for the occasions when
persons were without this feeling and consciousness of self: in deep
sleep they had no ideas at all; in some dreams and even some waking
hours there were moments of "reverie," which Kames defined as a
"wandering of the mind through its ideas without carrying along the
perception of self." What Kames perceived via the internal sense was
an idea "of the liveliest kind" that, even though sometimes inter-
rupted, was dominant and persistent in an individual's life. That idea
was "self preservation," an idea that an individual "carried through
all the different stages of life, and all the variety of action, which is
the foundation of personal identity." The idea of self-preservation,
therefore, substantially met Hume's criterion of continuity through
time, or "identity." Being one idea, it also met Hume's criterion of
"simplicity." The idea of self-preservation, which had both identity
and simplicity, was thus used by Kames as proof of the self in re-
sponse to Hume's skepticism. It was an idea he observed in himself
via "the internal sense, which is the cause of this particular percep-
tion." Kames wrote of this proof: "It is not by any argument or rea-
soning, I conclude myself to be the same person, I was ten years ago.
This conclusion rests entirely upon the feeling of identity, which ac-
companies me through all my changes, and which is the only connect-
ing principle, that binds together, all the various thoughts and actions
of my life. Far less is it by any argument, or chain of reasoning, that I
discover my own existence. "21
Moreover, Kames not only relied on feelings born of the inner sense
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to give self-knowledge but simultaneously denied reason as a means to
attain such knowledge. In the foregoing statement he renounced any
"chain of reasoning" of a Lockean demonstrative type as a method of
gaining self-knowledge. In addition, Kames criticized Descartes's ra-
tional argument cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am") to defeat
doubt or skepticism as respects the self. "For surely," he said, "I am
not more conscious of thinking, than of existing. "22 Kames preferred a
sometimes interrupted but ever persistent inner feeling or conscious-
ness of self-preservation, perceived by the inner sense, to thinking or
reason as proof of the truth of his existence.
According to Arthur McGuinness, one characteristic of several En-
lightenment thinkers was that they made observations of their own
consciousness and then drew conclusions that they applied to all man-
kind; Kames was in this category.23 So was Descartes with his "I think
therefore I am." Even David Hume fit this pattern: his arguments in
support of the lack of simplicity and identity of ideas of the self came
from examining his own consciousness.24 Thomas Hobbes, whom both
Kames and Jefferson read (see chapter 4), gave perhaps the best de-
scription of this method of gaining knowledge of human nature:
"Wisdome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men." Hobbes
went on to offer "Nosce teipsum, Read thy self," as a specific way in
which men "might learn truly to read one another. "25 This approach
of these authors fits generally into what Arthur E. Lovejoy described
as "Uniformitarianism" practiced by Enlightenment thinkers.26
Jefferson was familiar with writings from all of the foregoing authors
when he wrote the Declaration (with the possible exception of Descartes,
although he was aware of the famous cogito ergo sum via Kames). He
was especially familiar, of course, with the ideas of Kames; therefore, it
was quite natural for him to look to his own inner sense for the truth
of his own existence or self, as Kames did. The fact that he did so can
be seen in his letters to John Adams and John Manners. To comments
on skepticism in an Adams letter, Jefferson responded, "Its crowd of
scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down; read it, and
laid it down, again and again; and to give rest to my mind, I was
obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, 'I feel, therefore I
exist."'27 This letter was written in 1820. But given the similarity of
Jefferson's "anodyne" phrase "I feel, therefore I exist" to Kames's proof
of the self from "an undoubted truth" in the form of "an original
feeling" of his "existence" from his internal sense,28 plus the fact that
Jefferson read Kames in his student days, it would not seem unreason-
able to conclude that Jefferson's "anodyne" had been "habitual" since
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those days and that he could well have adopted it as a result of reading
Kames.
It can be argued that Jefferson did not specify whether the feeling
that confirmed his existence or self was derived from his external or
internal sense. When explaining to John Manners the source of his
ideas on rights, however, he specified they were born of sense in a way
that meant the internal sense and in a way related to his proof of his
self "I feel, therefore I exist." The right of expatriation, emphasized in
his 1774 Summary View, was what Jefferson discussed in his 1817
letter to Manners by explaining the method by which individuals gained
knowledge of their right to move as well as all the "unalienable Rights"
stated in the approved copy of the Declaration:
My opinion on the right of Expatriation has been, so long ago as the
year 1776, consigned to record in the act of the Virginia code, drawn
by myself, recognizing the right expressly, and prescribing the mode
of exercising it. The evidence of this natural right, like that of our
right to life, liberty, the use of our faculties, the pursuit of happiness,
is not left to the feeble and sophistical investigations of reason, but is
impressed on the sense of every man. We do not claim these under the
charters of kings or legislators, but under the King of kings. If he has
made it a law in [emphasis added] the nature of man to pursue his
own happiness, he has left him free in the choice of place as well as
mode.29
Here Jefferson not only stated that the evidence of natural rights was
"impressed on the sense of every man" by God but that rights were
"law in the nature of man" as a result. Much like Kames, when he
wrote of the knowledge of self and self-preservation, Jefferson empha-
sized that because God made impressions in individuals, there was no
need for them to look to the "feeble and sophistical investigations of
reason" for knowledge of their rights. This was especially true of Lockean
reason, born of conclusions drawn from ideas derived from impressions
made by objects external to the self via the external senses, or senses
that put man in contact with external objects. External perceptions had
nothing to do with the knowledge of rights that were "impressed on the
sense of every man" or placed "in" every man by God.
In effect Jefferson was saying to Manners that an individual's con-
sciousness or knowledge of his rights welled up or emoted from within
as an impulsion or inner feeling born of the impressions God made on
his inner sense. In the Declaration Jefferson in effect said the same
thing when he wrote of "the causes which impel" or inwardly direct
the people of the colonies to "Separation"30 just before the descriptive
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phraseology on rights. "Impel" in this context connotes a manifesta-
tion of the feeling or consciousness of natural rights that emerges within
an individual via the inner sense, whereby individuals gain knowledge
of their rights, especially when those rights are violated or transgressed
in the ways alleged by the Declaration. This emergent manifestation is
a central point made in the Declaration. jefferson's original draft de-
scription of the rights stated there as within or "inherent and inalien-
able" in individuals supports this interpretation of "impel." Signifi-
cantly, it was the Continental Congress, not Jefferson, that deleted
"inherent" in the final approved copy.31 This interpretation of the
Manners letter and the Declaration is consistent with Jefferson's com-
ment that the colonists "felt their rights before they had thought of
their explanation" which he made in a letter written in 1812 discuss-
ing how the colonists knew their rights prior to and at the time of the
Declaration.32
In 1824 Jefferson's views on the source of the knowledge of natural
rights had not changed. As he said at that time, "Nothing then is un-
changeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man. "33 Here he
not only called rights "inherent and unalienable," as in the draft lan-
guage of the Declaration, but also described them as persistent or "un-
changeable." According to this description, which echoed Kames's
views on the persistence of the idea of self-preservation in an individual's
life, rights were stable "truths" or ideas in the constantly changing
human mind. Other ideas in the mind might come and go, but during
all periods of life one had persistent or "unchangeable" feelings and
consciousness of the right to "Life," the right to "Liberty," and the
right to "the Pursuit of Happiness."
It is significant that in the original draft of the Declaration's list of
rights, "Life" appeared as "the preservation of life. "34 I maintain that
Jefferson used these terms interchangeably. He probably finally settled
on "Life" because it was the more succinct expression of "the preser-
vation of life." A precedent for this interchangeable use is found in Sir
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, which
Jefferson read as a law student and recommended to Skipwith. Black-
stone referred to the absolute right of "personal security" (or preser-
vation of life) and then immediately stated that "LIFE is the immedi-
ate gift of God, a right [emphasis added] inherent by nature in every
individual. "35 Jefferson's view that "Life" or "the preservation of life"
was an "unchangeable" reality in man, made known by an inner feel-
ing or inner sense, when combined with his habitual anodyne "I feel,
therefore I exist," was the equivalent of Kames's view that the inner
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feelings and consciousness of self-preservation in man were the stable
connecting links, in the ever changing kaleidoscope of his mind, that
gave him evidence of self.
It seems, then, that when Jefferson said in the Declaration, "We
hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, "36 he
used "self-evident" in the sense of evidence born of feelings or con-
sciousness within the individual self, provided by the individual's in-
ner sense for the truth of the rights mentioned and not evidence born
of ideas derived from sense impressions made by things external to the
self, as Locke used the term. Therefore, all that individual persons had
to do to find evidence for their unalienable natural rights, according
to Jefferson, was to look to their inner sense. The effect of this episte-
mology was that none were dependent on a philosopher or on some-
one highly intelligent or highly educated for knowledge of their rights.
Jefferson's letter to John Manners in effect stated that he subscribed
to this individual method of gaining knowledge of unalienable rights.
For despite his statement in that letter that rights were impressed by
God on the inner being or sense of "every man," he had no way of
knowing the inner reality or sense of another human being. He could
only have known that he found rights impressed on his own inner
being and sense, and then concluded that other men were similarly
impressed. Kames's expression of this meaning of "self-evident," which
I believe Jefferson borrowed from the Scottish jurist, is found in his
Essays on the Principles ofMorality and Natural Religion: "If natural
feelings, whether from internal or external senses, are not admitted as
evidence of truth, I can not see, that we can be certain of any fact
whatever." Those "natural feelings" derived from the "internal or ex-
ternal senses" provided individuals with "self-evident" truths, both of
one's self and the world external to one's self, respectively, according
to Kames. Consistent with this line of thought, Kames went on to
state, in a way applicable to the truths of ourselves obtained with our
internal sense that we then attribute to others, "We know little about
the nature of things, but what we learn from a strict attention to our
own nature. "37
Given the foregoing interpretation of "self-evident," when Jefferson
substituted this term for "sacred and undeniable" in his rough draft,
he apparently believed that he benefited the text in two ways. First, he
clarified the Declaration's epistemology of "unalienable Rights"-not
realizing, in my opinion, that "self-evident" would be mistaken for a
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term from Lockean epistemology. Second, he avoided repetitious lan-
guage in a document meant to be a succinct expression of the colonies'
position. The term "sacred" would have been a redundancy if used to
mean that rights were God-given; the statement that all men are equally
"endowed by their Creator" with "unalienable Rights" carries this
meaning of the word. Or, if it meant that God-given rights were "sa-
cred" in the sense of being inviolable, the word could have been con-
strued as contradictory to one of the main purposes of the Declara-
tion, which was to call attention to the king's violations of rights.
Consistent with this line of thought, the removal of "undeniable" was
necessary to avoid contradicting the Declaration's allegations that the
king through certain actions had denied the colonists' rights.
It would seem that what jefferson had meant by "undeniable" as
respects rights was that no man could deny his inner feelings and con-
sciousness of his rights if he paid heed to his inner sense or being.
jefferson had a Kamesean precedent for this meaning of "undeniable,"
since the Scottish jurist used it as proof of the moral sense (see chapter
4). But again, given this meaning, "undeniable" would have created a
redundancy in the Declaration if it had not been deleted and replaced
by "self-evident," since "unalienable" carries a similar connotation.
The 1774 Summary View implies the similar meaning of the two words:
"The god who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time: the hand
of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them. "38 Here jefferson ac-
knowledged that force might in fact take away or destroy outward
manifestations of an individual's freedom, but it could not inwardly
alienate or make him inwardly deny the feeling derived from the core
of his being of his right to freedom as long as he was alive. It was in
this sense that rights were "unalienable" and "undeniable."
Apart from equal unalienable rights, three other self-evident "Truths"
are spelled out in the Declaration, as Michael Zuckert has pointed
out. 39 First, to secure those rights, "Governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just Powers from the consent of the Governed."
Second, "whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it." Third,
the people may then institute "new Government, laying its Founda-
tion on such Principles and and organizing its Powers in such Form, as
to Them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. "40
(For the original version of this passage and the subsequent changes
made, see chapter 3, note 84.) Unlike "unalienable rights," however,
these self-evident "Truths" were not impressed by the Creator on the
internal sense; they have nothing to do with the perception by indi-
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viduals of their inherent rights. Rather they have to do with govern-
ment, which is external to and separate from the individual. Thus
Jefferson shifted in the Declaration from the "Truths" of internal real-
ity perceived by the internal sense to those of external reality perceived
by the external senses. Yet he applied "self-evident" to both kinds of
"Truths." This seems puzzling until one looks at these internal and
external "Truths" in the light of Kames's philosophy. Kamesean thought
foreshadowed the commonsense philosophy of Thomas Reid and con-
tains a great deal of commonsense philosophy of its own.41 In the con-
text of Kames's commonsense meaning of "self-evident," which could
be born of both the internal sense and the external senses, since Kames
specified that both gave self-evident perceptions of truth, Jefferson's
leap from internal to external truths becomes understandable. Indeed,
it supports the view that Jefferson used Kames's idea of "self-evident."
Property Rights
In the context of its Lockean content, one peculiarity of the Declara-
tion is its omission of property rights, which Locke. includes in his
Second Treatise along with the right to the preservation of life and the
right to liberty as fundamental rights of man.42 He especially empha-
sized property rights, and yet the Declaration, with its specified rights
of "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness," accords with only
two of Locke's trinity of rights. The questions then arise, what was
Jefferson's disposition toward Lockean property rights, and why did
he substitute the "Pursuit of Happiness" for them in the Declaration?43
Answering the first of these questions necessitates briefly describing
what Locke meant by property rights in movable things and land. The
right of self-preservation, he maintained, was the source of these prop-
erty rights. He stated this in the Second Treatise, chapter 5, "Of Prop-
erty," when he said, "Men ... have a right to their Preservation, and
consequently to Meat and Drink, and such other things, as Nature
affords for their Subsistence." Locke developed his ideas on the origin
of property rights from this right to the things in nature required for
sustenance. He argued that although in the state of nature the "things"
of nature belonged to mankind in common, each man had a right to
take what he needed and could therefore separate a portion of those
things from the common ownership. Such things became the private
property of an individual. This separation was accomplished by means
of each individual's labor. Locke believed that each man had a right to
the fruits of his labor, a right born of a basic property right each per-
son had in himself. If a man's self was his property, that property ex-
Self-Evident Truths 121
tended to his labor, which was part of himself, and thence to things
external to himself upon which he exerted his labor. These ideas were
expressed by Locke when he said:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men,
yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has
any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of
his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes
out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own,
and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the
common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men.44
Jefferson subscribed to Locke's ideas on the labor theory of prop-
erty, which is seen in his 1801 inaugural address, where he spoke of "a
due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties" and "to
the acquisitions of our industry. "45 In addition, jefferson subscribed to
Locke's idea that "the great and chief end . .. of Mens uniting into
Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the
Preservation of their Property," which included the "Lives, Liberties
and Estates" of individuals.46 Once a government was formed, laws
passed by the legislative and enforced by the executive became the
instruments of protecting property in Locke's system of government.47
Evidence that jefferson accepted Locke's "chief end" and methods of
accomplishing it may be seen in his proposed revisions to the laws of
the state of Virginia, begun in 1776. In the preamble of his Bill for
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments (which was never passed by
the legislature), he wrote:
Whereas it frequently happens that wicked and dissolute men,
resigning themselves to the dominion of inordinate passions, commit
violations on the lives, liberties and property, of others, and, the
secure enjoyment of these having principally induced men to enter
into society, government would be defective in its principal purpose
were it not to restrain such criminal acts, by inflicting due punish-
ments on those who perpetrate them ... it becomes a duty of the
legislature to arrange in a proper scale the crimes which it may be
necessary for them to repress, and to adjust thereto a corresponding
gradation of punishments.48
Given jefferson's acceptance of many of Locke's ideas on property,
why did he not list the right to property in the Declaration? His con-
cept of unalienable rights provides the answer to this question. Jefferson
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believed that each man had a right to the preservation of his person or
life and a right to his liberty and that these rights were an inherent part
of his own nature or being. Such rights could not be inwardly alien-
ated or renounced even though external coercion or duress could cause
an individual to renounce these rights externally or to lose the physi-
cal manifestations of them. The right to one's life and liberty were in
this sense unalienable. To put it another way, one could not inwardly
alienate or separate one's self from something that was part of one's
self. Property in the form of movable goods and land, however, was
not part of one's self; hence, one could alienate such property and the
right to it from one's self. Therefore, Jefferson could not list the right
to property as an unalienable right. Kames was again the likely source
of this element in Jefferson's thinking. In his Historical Law Tracts
(passages from which Jefferson commonplaced as a law student),49
Kames wrote that it was not only possible for men to alienate property
in the form of movable goods and land but that they had the right to
do so in law:
Cattle are killed every day for the sustenance of the proprietor and his
family. From this power, the transition is easy to that of alienation;
for what doubt can there be of my power to alien what I can destroy?
The right or power of alienation must therefore have been early
recognized as a quality of moveable property.... We have reason,
before-hand, to conjecture, that a power of alienating land ... was
not early introduced; because land admits not, like moveables, a
ready delivery from hand to hand. And this conjecture will be verified
in the following part of our history. Land, at the same time, is a
desirable object; and a power to alien, after it came to be established
in moveable property, could not long be separated from the property
of land.50
God and Property Rights
Although Locke maintained that men had property and rights in their
lives and liberties in relation to one another, his theology put men and
God in a very different relationship. God, according to Locke, owned
men; they were "all the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the
World by his order and about his business, they are his Property. "51
Although in the theology of the Declaration Jefferson adopted Locke's
idea of a God who treated all men equally at the time they were cre-
ated, he rejected the view of God as a "Sovereign Master" who owned
men, which reduced men to the status of God's slaves. Evidence of this
rejection is manifest in his statement to the Republicans of Georgetown
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in 1809 about the Declaration and the behavior of the colonists when
it was made: "The principles on which we engaged, of which the char-
ter of our independence is the record, were sanctioned by the laws of
our being, and we but obeyed them in pursuing undeviatingly the course
they called for. It issued finally in that inestimable state of freedom
which alone can ensure to man the enjoyment of his equal rights. "52
Here Jefferson mentioned that the "principles" on which the colonists
acted in 1776 were in accord with the "laws" of the "being" of man,
and as the Declaration stated, it was "Nature's God" who placed these
laws in human nature. They were "law in the nature of man," as
Jefferson wrote to John Manners. Yet "laws" was a descriptive term,
as Jefferson used it in this statement to the Georgetown Republicans,
one that described human nature, which included the "unalienable
Rights" in each individual's being, not precepts or rules to be obeyed.
Therefore, in saying that "we but obeyed" the "laws of our being in
pursuing undeviatingly the course they called for," Jefferson was say-
ing that men were acting in accordance with their human nature in
1776 when they asserted their rights .. They were acting in accordance
with the "unalienable Rights" that were part of their God-given hu-
man nature. Since it was "Nature's God" who created man with his
nature and rights, including the right of "Liberty" or freedom, He
would not, as Locke had stated about his God, regard Himself as Master
and man as His servant and property.
"Nature's God," in contrast to Locke's God, was Bolingbroke's de-
istic God of natural theology (see chapter 2). Therefore, He would not
interfere with or go against His creation by going against the laws He
established in nature or the universe at the time of creation; to do so
would be to go against Himself. Since man was part of God's created
nature, God would not go against the laws he placed in man. Once
"Nature's God" made man with a certain nature or being of which
laws or rights were an inherent part, He would not go against Himself
and man by going against the laws or rights He had established in
man. "Nature's God," therefore, made man his own man, who went
about his own business, not God's. "Nature's God" made man a free
being not only in relation to other men but also in relation to Himself.
To put it another way, God made each individual sovereign as re-
spects his natural rights, no matter how much more intelligence or
power another being-divine or human-might have. Jefferson ex-
pressed this view to Henri Gregoire: "Because Sir Isaac Newton was
superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the
person or property of others. "53 Despite Jefferson's concept of God-
124 Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
given equal rights, he acknowledged that there were unequal capaci-
ties in intelligence and power among men. In Notes of the State of
Virginia, for example, he wondered whether blacks might have less
intelligence than whites.54 But he did not believe that these unequal
capacities justified the usurpation of or infringement upon an individ-
ual's sacred natural rights, as he stated to Gregoire. Jefferson also ac-
knowledged that men had unequal moral capacity, and he praised that
capacity in blacks.55 Because of this praise and because he believed
that morality was more important to being a good citizen than intelli-
gence, blacks as citizens would be in the same category as Jefferson's
"ploughman," whose morality made him a good citizen even though
only moderately intelligent.56 (Noteworthy too is jefferson's admis-
sion in the Gregoire letter that his doubts about the intelligence of
blacks could well be erroneous and that he would be pleased to have
them refuted. )57
In the Declaration itself, Jefferson stated clearly that "Nature's God"
put the "laws of nature" or "unalienable Rights" in "all men," includ-
ing black men. He stated this in the rough draft's allegation (deleted
by the Continental Congress in the approved copy) that the king was
responsible for the initiation and continuance of slavery in the colo-
nies. That allegation referred to the king's violation of human nature's
"sacred rights of life & liberty" by carrying "a distant people" into
slavery and by his "crimes committed against the liberties" of those
who were enslaved in the colonies.58 In Notes on the State of Virginia
(1781), where Jefferson stated many of his early views, he wrote of
God's objection to any violation of the God-given right of liberty
through the practice of slavery by citizens of the United States: "Can
the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their
only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these
liberties are of the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but
with his wrath?"59 In short, the God of the Declaration did not own
men or believe that other men should own men.
Women too were equally endowed with rights by the God of the
Declaration. Jefferson wrote in his rough draft passage deleted by the
Continental Congress that in violating the "sacred rights of life and
liberty" of blacks, the king "waged cruel war against human nature
itself" (emphasis added). He referred to blacks as "a distant people"
because they came from Africa (emphasis added). "Human nature"
and "a people," general terms inclusive of both men and women, sug-
gest that when Jefferson wrote "All Men are created equal," he used
"Men" in reference to the entire human species. This is exactly the
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way he used "Men" in the passage deleted by the Continental Con-
gress, where he accused the king of being "determined to keep open a
market where MEN are bought and sold" (emphasis added). It seems
clear that jefferson used "MEN" here to mean the entire human spe-
cies, since both sexes were traded as slaves in the "market." It seems
equally clear that jefferson included women as well as men when he
wrote that "all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights" in the light of a specific ref-
erence to his belief in women's natural equality and rights in Notes on
the State of Virginia, a work, as has been mentioned, that expresses
many of his views formulated before 1776: "It is civilization alone
which replaces women in the enjoyment of their natural equality. That
[civilization] first teaches us to subdue the selfish passions and to re-
spect those rights in others, which we value in ourselves. "60
The view of jefferson and the Declaration that "Nature's God" en-
dowed women with "natural equality" and "rights" differs sharply
from the concept of male superiority and legitimate subjection of wives
to the rule of their husbands contained in Christian theology, as stated
in the writings of Paul and the words of Genesis. Their husbands'
"rule" and "sorrow" in childbirth were punishments to which women
were sentenced by the God of the Bible because of Eve's role in the fall
of man (Genesis 3:16). The rule of her husband made a wife's right of
"Liberty" nonexistent, as well as her right to the "Pursuit of Happi-
ness," which necessitates "Liberty" or freedom, as jefferson stated in
his letter to john Manners. Though he was not immune to the cultural
disposition of his time against women serving in government,61 jefferson
went far beyond Locke, who in the First Treatise on Government
maintained that God had cursed women in Genesis 3:16 and foretold
"what should be the Womans Lot, how by his Providence he would
order it so, that she should be subject to her husband, as we see that
generally the Laws of Mankind and customs of Nations have ordered
it so; and there is, I grant, a foundation in Nature for it. "62 Not only
scripture but "a foundation in Nature" made women subject to their
husbands, according to Locke.
Paul made matters even worse for women in Christianity by assert-
ing their inferiority to men. Following the implications of the Adam's
rib view of the creation of women (Genesis 2:21-22), he explained
why women should and men should not cover their heads during wor-
ship: "But I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ;
and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is
God.... For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as
126 Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
he is [created in] the image and glory of God: but the woman is the
glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of
the man. Neither was the man created for the woman; but the woman
for the man" (1 Corinthians 11:3, 7-9). Paul's view that men are supe-
rior, Godlike beings relative to women, who were created "for the
man," combined with the injunction of God in Genesis that a husband
was to be lord and master over his wife, made women virtual slaves to
men. The antithesis of this view is found in the concept of equal rights
given at creation to all human beings, regardless of race or gender, by
the "Nature's God" of the Declaration of Independence.
Rights, Duties, Resistance, and Jesus
jefferson believed that the specific right of "Liberty" was restricted by
a duty to respect the rights of others. A letter to Isaac Tiffany in which
he quoted or paraphrased an unknown author in defining "Liberty"
reveals much about his ideas on the nature of unalienable rights: "Lib-
erty is 'unobstructed action according to our will; but rightful Liberty
is the unobstructed action according to our will, within the limits drawn
around us by the equal rights of others."'63 This definition is reminis-
cent of Locke's reference in the Second Treatise to "a Liberty to follow
my own will in all things where the rule [law of nature] prescribes not. "64
The fact that Jefferson subscribed to the Kamesean moral philoso-
phy that men had the moral duty of justice, not to harm others, sheds
light on the definition of liberty in the letter to Tiffany. Kames main-
tained that the duty of justice was born of the moral sense within each
human being. Since violating the rights of others harmed those whose
rights were violated, the restriction imposed on liberty by respect for
the rights of others in the letter to Tiffany was moral in nature. What
men were left with after fulfulling their moral duty of justice, accord-
ing to this concept of the right of "Liberty" or "rightful Liberty," was
an "active right," which, as Richard Tuck states, is one that could be
exercised by its possessor even if not recognized by others. The idea
that such recognition was not needed enabled the possessor of an ac-
tive right to control that right.65 The Declaration of Independence was
an exercise of active rights since the colonies actively asserted their
rights, despite the absence of recognition. In this respect, jefferson's
ideas on rights paralleled those in Locke's Second Treatise that men
should actively assert their rights to one another in the state of nature
and to their government, after one was formed, if those rights were
not recognized.66
Unlike Locke, however, jefferson adopted a deistic approach to
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rights, and this approach precludes any possibility that Burlamaqui's
ideas on rights (as Morton White believes) influenced him in writing
the Declaration. Burlamaqui, according to White, saw rights as duties
rationally derived from considering the nature of man and God. If an
individual had a certain God-given nature with certain observable at-
tributes, then God-since He was wise, good, and powerful-would
will that man to attain ends consistent with the nature God gave him.
Burlamaqui believed that God did nothing in vain and wanted the best
for us because of His wise and good nature. Therefore, since God gave
us life, it could be inferred that God "proposed" or willed "the preser-
vation of our life" for us, and because God gave us a desire for happi-
ness, he proposed or willed "the pursuit of that happiness" for us as
ends of life. It then became each individual's duty to try to attain the
ends that God proposed or willed for him.67 Since duties and rights
could not be separated, from each other, according to Burlamaqui,
duties entailed rights and vice versa: "Right therefore and obligation
are two correlative terms: one of these ideas necessarily supposes the
other. "68 But according to Jefferson, rights that were part of man's
inner nature or being, even though God created that nature or being,
did not need to be rationally derived from considering the nature of
man and God and God's will; they emerged as feelings from man's
inner nature or being once God put them there.
Men endowed by God with active rights behaved and valued be-
havior diametrically opposed to certain teachings of Jesus. Nonvio-
lent, passive endurance of the moral transgressions of others was a
part of Jesus' instruction to the victims of such transgressions. Indeed,
Jesus went beyond teaching mere passiveness. He instructed a victim
of moral transgressions to do three things: to perform actions that
would encourage a transgressor who had inflicted pain to inflict more
physical pain; to perform actions that would encourage a transgressor
who had attained part of a victim's property to seek more of his prop-
erty; and to perform actions that would encourage a transgressor who
forced a victim to perform labor to seek more of his labor. Jesus' spe-
cific instruction to this effect is in Matthew 5:39-41: "Resist not evil:
but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the
other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy
coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to
go a mile, go with him twain."
This Christian ideal was not conducive to preventing or overthrow-
ing would-be or actual despots or tyrants, however, and possessors of
active rights would not behave this way. If anyone transgressed against
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their "Life," "Liberty," or "Pursuit of Happiness," they would resist
these moral transgressions in defense of their rights and with violence
if necessary. Such resistance was encouraged in the Declaration: "But
when a Long Train of Abuses and Usurpations ... evinces a Design to
reduce them [the people] under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it
is their Duty, to throw off such a Government, and to provide new
Guards for their future Security. "69
The idea that the people had a "Right" and "Duty" to resist and
oppose those who transgressed against them was very Lockean. In the
Second Treatise Locke said of the state of nature that "all Men may be
restrained from invading other's Rights, and from doing hurt to one
another" if individuals themselves would punish those who transgressed
the "Law of Nature." The term "may" implies a right to do this and,
Locke added, punishment was a necessity to "restrain offenders,"
thereby making individual resistance to and punishment of violators
of rights not only a right but a duty. After a government was formed,
this idea of punishment extended to any magistrate who exceeded his
authority under the law or transgressed it to "another's harm." In
such instances, according to Locke, "a Magistrate" was "acting with-
out Authority" and therefore could be "opposed, as any other Man,"
since he "by force invaderd] the Right of another. "70 Jefferson believed
that those who opposed or resisted violators of rights manifested their
humanity. In the Declaration he spoke of "opposing with manly Firm-
ness" the king's "Invasions on the Rights of the People. "71 This aspect
of human nature, as found in Jeffersonian thought, gave rise to resis-
tance against those who violated rights, which Daniel Boorstin de-
scribed as the "largely unreflective answer of healthy men to the threat
of tyranny. "72 There is no doubt, however, that both Locke and Jefferson
were diametrically opposed to Jesus' teaching of "resist not evil." Both
encouraged resistance to evil, which became an ideal of how man should
behave, according to the concept of man contained in the theology. of
the Declaration of Independence.
The Pursuit of Happiness
Having explained why Jefferson eliminated property from the Second
Treatise's trinity of rights when he drafted the Declaration, I turn to
the question of where he got the ideas on the "Pursuit of Happiness"
that he specified there as an unalienable right. Among the authors he
read before 1776 who dealt with this subject were John Locke, Lord
Bolingbroke, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Lord Kames, William
Blackstone, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Thomas Hobbes, and Cesare
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Beccaria.73 Of these, the one who seems to have had the greatest im-
pact on jefferson's ideas was Locke, who not only used the exact phrase
"pursuit of happiness" but also discussed at length what he meant by
it. It was not in the Second Treatise, however, that Locke discussed
"the pursuit of happiness." It was in An Essay concerning Human
Understanding.
In book 2, chapter 20, "Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain," Locke
used "Good and Evil" not merely to describe moral relationships or
actions but, rather, in a hedonistic way to describe anything that causes
"Pleasure or Pain": "That we call Good" is that "which is apt to cause
or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us. And on the contrary, we
name that Evil, which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or di-
minish any Pleasure in us." Whatever causes pleasure and pain gives
rise to passions, with love and hate being principal among them. We
love what gives us pleasure and hate what gives us pain. A man "loves
Grapes," wrote Locke, because "the taste of Grapes delights him."
On the other hand, "the Thought of the Pain, which any thing present
or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call Hatred." Yet an
object that once caused pleasure and was therefore an object of love,
could, with a change of circumstance, cause pain and become an ob-
ject of hatred. For example, a man would" love grapes no longer" and
even come to hate them if "an alteration of Health or Constitution
destroy the delight of their Taste. "74 Locke showed in this way that
human pleasure and pain are phenomenal or short-lived feelings, since
the conditions that determine which objects give pleasure or pain, and
are therefore loved or hated, are subject to change.
In book 2, chapter 21, "Of Power," Locke defined happiness and
misery in terms of pleasure and pain enjoyed or suffered by body and
mind. His definition included maximal and minimal happiness along
with the good and evil causes of happiness and misery:
Happiness then in its full extent is the utmost Pleasure we are capable
of, and Misery the utmost Pain: And the lowest degree of what can be
called Happiness, is so much ease from all Pain, and so much present
Pleasure, as without which anyone cannot be content. Now because
Pleasure and Pain are produced in us, by the operation of certain
Objects, either on our Minds or our Bodies; and in different degrees:
therefore what has an aptness to produce Pleasure in us, is what we
call Good, and what is apt to produce Pain in us, we call Evil, for no
other reason, but for its aptness to produce Pleasure and Pain in us,
wherein consists our Happiness and Misery. 75
Locke believed that "all Men desire Happiness"; it was the "great
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end" of every human being. Therefore, men were devoted to the "pur-
suit of happiness. "76
Locke saw an element of determinism in this pursuit, however, de-
riving from his concept of will. He defined will as the "Power which
the mind has ... to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its
rest, and vice versa in any particular instance." This preference or will
was a motivating force: it motivated action that was in accord with
the will or actualized the will's preferences. Locke went on to distin-
guish between the will and "Volition or Willing, " which he defined as
"the actual exercise of that power [will], by directing any particular
action, or its forbearance." The will's preference of an act or its for-
bearance implies Locke's conclusion that the will was not free, not an
indifferent faculty that could make its own determinations or choose
its preferences. Rather, those preferences were determined by some-
thing separate from the will, something Locke called "uneasiness."
The nature of uneasiness, which was a variety of pain, and its impact
on the will he described by stating: "This is that which successively
determines the Will, and sets us upon those Actions, we perform. This
Uneasiness we may call, as it is, Desire; which is an uneasiness of the
Mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body of what sort
soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness: And with this is always
join'd Desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness felt." Uneasiness caused
the will to prefer acts that would lead to happiness by ridding an indi-
vidual of a particular uneasiness, whether they be acts for the allevia-
tion of physical pain or for the acquisition of "some absent good."
Locke expressed this idea when he pointed out that "the present un-
easiness . .. does naturally determine the will, in order to that happi-
ness which all aim at in our actions. "77
This concept of the will as an unfree, determined faculty would
seemingly leave man with no freedom or liberty. But Locke believed
that liberty was a faculty separate from will or volition. It was "not an
Idea belonging to Volition, or preferring"; rather, liberty belonged "to
the Person having the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according
as the Mind shall chuse or direct." With respect to the movement of
an individual's hand, Locke believed, for example, that a man had
liberty as long as he had the power to move or not move his hand. If
no external impediment or bodily incapacity prevented this power over
the hand, liberty, as respects its movement, was a reality.78 It was the
will or volition, however, that directed the power of liberty; the prefer-
ences of the will and volition determined whether that power to move
the hand or keep it still would be exercised. In stating the relationship
of the will and volition to liberty, Locke said that volition,
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'tis plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it
takes it self to have over any part of the Man, by employing it in, or
withholding it from any particular Action. And what is the Will, but
the Faculty to do this? And is that Faculty any thing more in effect,
than a Power, the power of the Mind to determine its thought, to the
producing, continuing, or stopping any Action, as far as it depends on
us? ... Will then is nothing but such a power. Liberty, on the other
side, is the power a Man has to do or forbear doing any particular
Action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual prefer-
ence in the Mind, which is the same thing as to say, according as he
himself wills it.79
Now it can be seen that when Jeffersoq. wrote to Isaac Tiffany, "Lib-
erty is 'unobstructed action according to our will,'" he was using the
terms liberty, will, and obstruction the way Locke used them in dis-
cussing the "pursuit of happiness." Since Jefferson read Human Un-
derstanding before he wrote the Declaration, he probably formulated
his own views on the third unalienable right stated there at that time.
Jefferson's use of "Pursuit of Happiness" was basically Lockean be-
cause "Happiness," or that "which we all aim at" in actions deter-
mined by the will, was elusive in Locke's analysis. This elusiveness was
largely due to what Locke described as multiple uneasinesses in man.
The determination of the will in regard to a present action in the con-
text of these manifold uneasinesses was, according to Locke, made by
one uneasiness. The degree of intensity placed present uneasinesses in
hierarchical order, the one with the greatest intensity having the great-
est and most immediate impact on the will and the action it preferred.
Thus, the most intense uneasiness was what determined the present
action of an individual, an action intended to satisfy the most intense
uneasiness among those "which are present to us." Once satisfaction
of that intense uneasiness was attained through action, another un-
easiness would "be ready at hand to give the will its next determina-
tion." A succession of determinations of the will was thereby made by
multiple uneasinesses.8o
Locke did not believe anyone would ever be free from multiple
uneasinesses in this world, given "the multitude of wants, and desires,
we are beset with in this imperfect State." Thus, it was impossible to
rid one's self completely of the pain caused by uneasiness, even though
one acted to attain this end. This impossibility no doubt had much to
do with Locke's choice of the word "pursuit": an individual could
pursue happiness but never quite attain as much of it as he would like
because some uneasiness would always be gnawing at him and pre-
vent him from attaining complete happiness. In addition it was not
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only multiple uneasinesses that contributed to the elusive nature of
happiness but also the changing circumstances that altered objects of
pleasure and love to those of pain and hate. Because of changing cir-
cumstances, what gave people happiness and what they wanted to
make them happy were in a state of flux, causing them to be in a
constant outreach for different objects or goods in their "pursuit of
Happiness. "81
The elusive aspect of Lockean happiness was not taken into consid-
eration in George Mason's Virginia Declaration of Rights, a document
Jefferson was no doubt familiar with in 1776; some think it influenced
him when he wrote the Declaration (see chapter 3). Mason listed "pur-
suing and obtaining happiness" among his "inherent natural rights. "82
The right of "obtaining happiness," however, was inconsistent with
Locke's idea of the elusive nature of happiness. There were so many
contingencies involved in obtaining happiness, according to Locke,
that no man could realistically claim a right to obtain it; he could only
claim a right to pursue it. Therefore when Jefferson specified the "Pur-
suit of Happiness"-not obtaining it-as a right in the Declaration, he
was more Lockean than Mason had been. Indeed, the fact that he did
not include "obtaining happiness" as a right indicates that he was not
influenced by Mason's Virginia Declaration of Rights when drafting
the Declaration of Independence.
Arthur M. Schlesinger argues that Jefferson must have meant ob-
taining happiness, not its mere pursuit. To support his view, he cites
the language following "the Pursuit of Happiness" in the Declaration,
which states that governments by consent of the people are "to effect
their Safety and Happiness."83 What he fails to mention is the preced-
ing qualification that such government is chosen by the people "as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. "84
The tentativeness of the words "most likely" in relation to effecting
happiness is not consistent with the right of obtaining happiness but is
consistent with the elusive nature of happiness put forth by Locke and
Jefferson via the word "pursuit."
Jefferson also shared Locke's belief that the efforts of individuals to
satisfy an immediate "uneasiness" prevented them from attaining
maximal happiness. "Pursuing trifles" or frivolous immediate plea-
sures, Locke said, often dominated the will and caused persons to ne-
glect some greater "remote Good" or happiness that might be enjoyed
in the future. One remote good often neglected was the "State of Bliss"
or salvation after death, which could be attained by observing moral
norms. According to Locke, however, men could overcome the domi-
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nation of immediate "trifles," and he prescribed a method for doing
so. An individual could alter his will by first suspending it and then,
while it was suspended, discover and cultivate a desire for a remote
good that would lead to greater happiness than the pursuit of trifles.
The absence of that greater or remote good would give rise to a new
uneasiness in the mind, which would determine the will to prefer new
actions conducive to attaining the greater remote good. Every indi-
vidual, Locke said of this method, "may suspend the act of his choice
from being determined for or against the thing proposed." During
such a suspension, "since the will supposes knowledge to guide· its
choice," an individual would have time to scrutinize "each successive
desire" with reason in order to determine where each desire might
lead, relative to his greatest long-term happiness if he acted on it. Then
he could judge with reason in favor of a greater remote good over
some immediate good or trifle.85 As Locke summarized this view:
The forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the
moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings
may be free to examine, and reason unbiased give its judgement,
being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true Happi-
ness depends; 'tis in this we should employ our chief care and
endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our
Minds to the true intrinsick good or ill, that is in things; and not
permit an allow'd or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip
out of thoughts, without leaving any relish, any desire of it self there,
till, by a due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appe-
tites in our Minds suitable to it, and made our selves uneasie in the
want of it, or in the fear of losing it. 86
Although the will was a determined faculty, Locke made clear here
that human reason and knowledge born of education could shape the
will. With education and contemplative reason an individual could
perceive a good not perceived previously as a source of greater long-
term happiness; in addition, education with reason could motivate his
will to act upon such a good that it might not have been previously
motivated to act upon.
Evidence that Jefferson was aware of and subscribed to Locke's ra-
tionally determined hedonistic approach to maximizing happiness be-
fore writing the Declaration is seen in a 1770 letter to John Page.
Describing a friend who was "the happiest man in the universe,"
Jefferson mentioned that he lived "in a very small house, with a table"
and "half a dozen chairs," manifesting "an utter neglect of the costly
apparatus of Life." Yet the man was not an ascetic; he was committed
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to pleasure and had the ability to attain it because "every incident in
life he so takes as to render it a source of pleasure." The principal
object of the friend's pleasure, however, was his child; he "speaks,
thinks, and dreams of nothing but his young son. "87 The thrust of
Jefferson's comments was that although his friend could have lived in
better material surroundings, he had made a rational decision to forgo
some immediate materialistic or frivolous pleasures in favor of lavish-
ing attention on a greater long-term good or pleasure: the well-being
and future of his child. Clearly, Jefferson admired a man who had
rationally determined what would give him the greatest happiness in
life and lived according that determination.
A similar expression of Jefferson's commitment to the Lockean pur-
suit of maximal happiness is found in Notes on the State of Virginia,
where he commented on the curriculum for children in the public edu-
cation system he proposed in 1779:
The first stage of this education ... wherein the great mass of the
people will receive their instruction, the principal foundations of
future order will be laid here.... Their memories may here be stored
with the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and
American history. The first elements of morality too may be instilled
into their minds; such as, when further developed as their judgements
advance in strength, may teach them how to work out their own
greatest happiness, by shewing that it does not depend on the condi-
tion of life in which chance has placed them, but is always the result
of a good conscience, good health, occupation, and freedom in all just
pursuits. 88
Now, in saying that the "first elements of morality" acquired in the
early stage of education would assist individuals later when they were
"further developed" by the "advance in strength" of their judgments,
Jefferson seemed to be saying that morality was derived from rea-
son-a view contradictory to his ideas on the moral sense in man. But
in fact the thoughts Jefferson expressed here were Kamesean and not
at all opposed to the moral-sense basis of morality.
The Scottish jurist was of the opinion that if an individual had the
capacity for rational judgment and used it in connection with his self-
interest born of "self love," which seeks happiness independent of moral
considerations or motivation, that capacity would help an individual
to be moral. This rational capacity would not in any way increase the
capacity of the moral sense, but it would help persons regulate their
selfish desires and passions in a way that would best help them attain
happiness. Rational capacity could provide restraint and direction for
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the selfish interests born of self-love in the pursuit of happiness. Ac-
cording to Kames's ideas on morality, this capacity gave the moral
sense a context in which it could function effectively.89 If a man had
rational control over himself and his passions in his selfish pursuit of
happiness, he would have more capacity to abide by the dictates and
restraints of the moral sense. Hence, when Jefferson stated that moral-
ity becomes "further developed" as rational "judgements advance in
strength," he was promulgating the Kamesean idea that morality, born
of the moral sense, becomes more effective with increasing rational
capacity. Kames's application of rational judgment to the attainment
of happiness born of self-love was strikingly similar to the way Locke
used it in "Of Power" as respects men pursuing their own pleasure or
happiness. Therefore, "judgement," as Jefferson used the word in the
foregoing statement, could be either a Kamesean or a Lockean term.
Manifest in this passage from Notes is what Charles Maurice Wiltse
described as Jefferson's belief that a hedonistic "pursuit of happiness"
was not inconsistent with an "innate moral sense. "90 This belief would
seem to be due to Kames's reconciliation of hedonism and the moral
sense in his system of morality (see chapter 4). Despite its Kamesean
flavor, however, the passage also has an element of the Lockean view
of long-term or remote good. It demonstrates a conviction on Jefferson's
part that individuals, by using their matured and strengthened ratio-
nal judgment along with the moral sense or "conscience," would be
able "to work out their own greatest happiness" (emphasis added), by
which he meant happiness born of attaining long-term goods. This is
evidenced by his allusion to the "remote goods" that would be chosen
as a result of rational "judgements" made by an individual in pursuit
of his long-term or "greatest happiness." The specific "remote goods"
mentioned by Jefferson-"good conscience, good health, occupation,
and freedom in all just pursuits"-implied that through the use of
reason individuals would restrain their desires and passions for "trifles"
or frivolous immediate goods and, as Locke said, would make rea-
soned "judgements" that the aforementioned "remote goods" were
more conducive to their greatest happiness than "trifles." They would
then sacrifice or restrain the latter in favor of the former.
I would point out that by defining freedom as "freedom in all just
pursuits" in Notes~ Jefferson was emphasizing that freedom was li-
cense to do not anything at all in order to attain one's "greatest happi-
ness" but only what was consistent with the moral sense of justice.
This approach to freedom was identical to his idea that "Liberty" had
to be bound by moral constraints, which made it "rightful Liberty," as
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he wrote to Isaac Tiffany. This emphasis on freedom in the context of
morality in the pursuit of greatest happiness demonstrates that moral-
ity was an essential ingredient in jefferson's idea of happiness. Moral-
ity or moral behavior fulfilled the moral nature of man, and jefferson
maintained that a man could be happy only if he lived according to
that nature. Therefore, it was prudent to be moral. jefferson expressed
this idea when he said, "And if the Wise be the happy man, as these
sages say, he must be virtuous too; for, without virtue, happiness can-
not be. "91 Further, jefferson maintained that right vocation or "occu-
pation," mentioned in the passage from Notes as a long-term good,
enabled men to be both virtuous and happy, and this also demon-
strates his concern for morality as a vital element in attaining happi-
ness. Hence his advocacy of husbandry as an "occupation": he be-
lieved that Americans would "be more virtuous, more free, and more
happy, employed in agriculture, than as carriers or manufacturers. "92
jefferson also maintained that morality was conducive to general hap-
piness in that if most persons were moral in their behavior toward
others, few would suffer the miseries of having their natural rights
transgressed, and most would thereby be able to enjoy happiness de-
rived from exercising those rights unimpeded by the moral transgres-
sions of others. "All the tranquillity, the happiness and security of
mankind," stated Jefferson on this subject, "rest on justice or the ob-
ligation to respect the rights of others. "93
Jefferson's confidence in the capacity of each individual's reason or
rational judgments, which he stated in Notes would "teach" people
"how to work out their own greatest happiness" (emphasis added),
stressed an individualistic approach to happiness. Implicit here is the
idea that each person must use reason to find his or her own unique
path to happiness. This idea is consistent with Locke's belief that indi-
viduals must travel different paths to find happiness because they have
different tastes. As Locke stated:
For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their
agreeableness to this or that particular Palate, wherein there is great
variety: So the greatest Happiness consists, in the having those things,
which produce the greatest Pleasure; and in the absence of those,
which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different Men,
are very different things ... this, I think, may serve to shew us the
Reason, why, though all Man's desires tend to Happiness, they are
not moved by the same Object. Men may chuse different things, and
yet all chuse right, supposing them only like a company of poor
Insects, whereof some are Bees, delighted with Flowers, and their
sweetness; others, Beetles, delighted with other kind of viands.94
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Confidence in the individual's rational capacity to find his own
unique way to happiness was a facet of Jefferson's optimistic view of
human nature. This confidence, combined with his overall concept of
man as a being to whom his heterodox "Nature's God" of natural
theology had given a moral sense, a rational faculty, and un.alienable
rights, gave Jefferson an extraordinarily optimistic, even exalted, view
of human nature that became part of the theology of the Declaration
of Independence. It was this exalted concept of man, Jefferson main-
tained, that resulted in and justified a political system of minimal gov-
ernment with limited powers over the people and the right of the people,
not kings or aristocrats or priests, to supply rational and moral guid-
ance to that government. Indeed he asserted that this exalted view of
human nature justified and resulted in a Lockean political structure in
which the people would control and judge their government.
That these were in fact the ideas of man in relation to government
held by Jefferson and the many others in the Continental Congress
who approved the Declaration is specified in a letter he wrote to Judge
William Johnson in 1823 about that Congress: "We believed ... that
man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with
an innate sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong
and protected in right, by moderate powers, confided to persons of his
own choice, and held to their duties by dependence on his own will. "95
This view was in stark contrast to the European concept of human
nature, which, as Jefferson perceived it, included an implicit depravity
due to belief in the fall. According to that view, the people were inca-
pable of supplying rational and moral direction to government; they
were instead dependent upon powers temporal and spiritual apart from
themselves to direct society. Jefferson found this concept of man anti-
thetical to democracy and conducive to authoritarian political and
religious structures, as he stated in his letter to Judge johnson: "The
doctrines of Europe were, that men in numerous associations cannot
be restrained within the limits of order and justice, but by forces physical
and moral, wielded over them by authorities independent of their will.
Hence their organization of kings, hereditary nobles and priests. "96
Such an organization was odious to Jefferson. Theoretically, the
priests would supply the moral force necessary for civilization, and
the kings and hereditary nobles the physical force, but in practice,
according to Jefferson, this alliance of church and state was respon-
sible for transgressions against the rights of man. It manifested itself in
an unchecked caste system of priests and rulers who assisted each other
in their transgressions of rights. As Jefferson put it, "The priest. .. is
always in alliance with the despot, abetting his abuses in return for
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protection to his own. "97 The priests benefited in this alliance by en-
listing the temporal power of government in support of their particu-
lar doctrines. With that power they could exert varying degrees of
compulsion on the people to accept those doctrines. This or any sort
of compulsion in religion, Jefferson believed, violated a fundamental
human right, the right of "freedom of religion," which he regarded as
"the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights. "98 Protection of
this right, he believed, would uphold not only religious but political
freedom.
7
e1.0
Religious Freedom
The right of religious freedom was given to each individual by the
deistic God of natural theology, in Jefferson's view. "Nature's God,"
who created the universe with law to govern it and then left it alone,
did not intervene in the affairs of a people or a nation or the lives of
individual human beings by choosing them or granting them grace
over others. He left all peoples, nations, and individuals free to work
out their own destiny, including their spiritual destiny or salvation.
When it came to salvation, individuals did not need divine interven-
tion or grace to attain that state because "Nature's God" gave them
the capacity to earn it through moral actions. That capacity was born
of the ability to know and abide by the moral laws of nature, which
was itself born of the moral sense and reason given to each individual
by "Nature's God." It was because individuals had God-given moral
capacity that "Nature's God" gave them the freedom, as well as re-
sponsibility, to attain their own salvation without His intervention or
grace. Further, having endowed each individual with the faculty of
reason, "Nature's God," the God of reason, left individuals alone to
find religious truth and God with that faculty.
Very often, however, men and their religions did not respect the
right of religious freedom. They did not leave one another alone to
attain their own salvation and find religious truth; in fact, they often
persecuted one another. As a result, religious tyranny was often prac-
ticed by individuals, their religions, and their political institutions.
The root cause of religious tyranny and persecution, according to
Jefferson, was theological exclusivism, manifested in the authoritar-
ian truth claims of orthodox institutionalized religions and sects. These
claims resulted in sectarian bigotry or intolerance, which gave rise to
repression, oppression, and persecution. Each religion and sect claimed
that its prophet or incarnation or scripture was the principal if not the
only source of religious truth. Each maintained further that only its
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interpretation of its prophet or incarnation or scripture was true,
thereby claiming a monopoly on religious truth and in effect, if not
explicitly, denying the truth claims of all others. John Locke, in a state-
ment from his Letter concerning Toleration that Jefferson paraphrased
in 1776, summed up the effect of theological exclusivism on each
church: "For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous
or heretical. Whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true;
and the contrary thereunto it pronounces to be error." 1
Since each sect or sectarian religion denied all truth claims but its
own, its claims were an offense, even an insult, to all others. This bred
bitterness, hatred, and enmity that all too often led to war. Moreover,
convinced of their own truth and equally convinced that other reli-
gions and sects were erroneous, many felt justified in using force to
compel those with other religious views to accept theirs. Those who
had this sectarian perspective did not consider the use of force in reli-
gion evil. On the contrary they considered it charitable; since the doc-
trines of other sects and religions were false, those who followed them
would never enjoy the bliss of heaven after death unless they were
converted. The use of force in religion demonstrated love for those
with erroneous beliefs and an earnest desire to put them on the one
true religious path leading to salvation so that they would not roast in
hell-even if this meant, as it sometimes did, that they were roasted or
tortured here on earth.
The third Earl of Shaftesbury mentioned this sectarian disposition
of religion in his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times.
Jefferson read this work in late 1776 and paraphrased Shaftesbury by
stating that contemporary religion, instead of practicing toleration
toward different and conflicting religious ideas, as the Greeks had,
adopted "a new sort of policy, which considers the future lives & hap-
piness of men rather than the present," a policy that "has taught [us]
to distress one another."2 John Locke attacked this policy of Chris-
tianity in A Letter concerning Toleration, which Jefferson read care-
fully, as is evidenced by his 1776 notes on that work. Jefferson's para-
phrase of Locke's attack queried, "Why persecute for diffce. in religs.
opinion?" and answered sarcastically, "for love to the person."3 Locke,
however, did not believe that such persecution was born of love. He
maintained that it was caused by a desire to increase the followers of a
particular religion or sect, because those who persecuted were not con-
cerned with the moral behavior of their victims. Locke argued that if
one tries "to convert those that are erroneous unto the faith, by forc-
ing them to profess things that they do not believe" and yet allows
them to commit moral transgressions that "the Gospel does not per-
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mit," then that person "is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined
in the same profession with himself."4 Jefferson paraphrased a similar
Lockean passage:
When I see them persecute their nearest connection & acquaintance
for gross vices, I shall believe it may proceed from love. till they do
this, I appeal to their own consciences if they will examine, why they
do nt.... why not then level persecution at the crimes you fear will
be introduced? burn or hang the adulterer, cheat &c. or exclude them
from offices. strange should be so zealous against things which tend
to produce immorality & yet so indulgent to the immorality when
produced. these moral vices all men acknolege to be diametrically
against Xty. [Christianity] & obstructive of salvation of souls, but the
fantastical points for which we generally persecute are often very
questionable as we may be assured by the very different conclusions
of people.5
Jefferson abhorred the monopolistic truth claims of sectarian Chris-
tianity and their resultant intolerance and tyrannical persecution. His
early reading of thinkers such as Bolingbroke and Locke had much to
do with this abhorrence, as did his general reading of history. His
knowledge of historical events-the Crusades, the Inquisition, the
French wars of religion, and the Thirty Years' War-during which
millions were slaughtered in the name of Christianity and God no
doubt prompted his response when asked what he thought of a par-
ticular sectarian creed: "You ask my opinion on the items of doctrine
in your catechism. I have never permitted myself to meditate a speci-
fied creed. These formulas have been the bane and ruin of the Chris-
tian church, its own fatal invention, which, through so many ages,
made of Christendom a slaughter-house, and at this day divides it into
castes of inextinguishable hatred to one another."6 Even though
Jefferson made this statement in 1822, the words "I have never" in
reference to accepting or contemplating accepting any specific creed,
indicate his rejection of the sectarian approach to religion early in life.
It was to combat that approach and to protect the right of religious
freedom that Jefferson wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Free-
dom soon after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Pro-
tection provided by that statute extended to all persons regardless of
their religious, irreligious, or nonreligious opinions, and to all reli-
gions regardless of the content of their beliefs. Many of Jefferson's
ideas on religious freedom are contained in the statute and in papers
that document his research for and participation in the legislative pro-
cess that led to its passage.
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Legal Persecution and Law Reform
Jefferson objected to all forms of religious persecution. Governmental
power taking sides in the conflicting truth claims of different religions
and sects by aiding one through the persecution of others via the in-
strumentation of its laws was especially offensive to him, as it was to
Locke. In 1776, just after the signing of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the governmental power of the state of Virginia was a great
offense to Jefferson as a result of its persecutory laws. At that time
Virginia was replete with law that enforced the doctrine of the Angli-
can Church, which was the established or government-supported
church in that state. There were three sources of that law: the common
law of England, statutes made by Parliament, and statutes made by
the Virginia legislature. Laws pertaining to religion from all three
sources were extraordinarily repressive and formed a legal basis for
intolerance and persecution of all dissenters from the Anglican Church,
even though most of them were not strictly enforced.
One exception was a law that forced dissenters to contribute to the
financial support of the Anglican clergy. Dissenters perceived this law,
wrote Jefferson, as "unrighteous compulsion to maintain teachers of
what they deemed religious errors."7 By mid-1776, however, dissent-
ers who had migrated to Virginia in the preceding decades had re-
placed Anglicans as the majority there. 8 Immediately after the signing
of the Declaration, this dissenting majority clamored for relief from
their legal obligation to support Anglicanism financially. As a result,
Jefferson drafted resolutions not only to repeal that law but to dis-
establish the Anglican Church and nullify all law pertaining to its doc-
trinal support-thereby providing a foundation for religious freedom
in Virginia. Although he did this to accommodate the majority, Jefferson
had a personal interest in this legislation. If the religious laws of Vir-
ginia were ever enforced, he would suffer as a result of his own dis-
senting religious views, which were heterodox and heretical, accord-
ing to those laws.
His arguments to the Virginia assembly in favor of his resolutions
indicate his personal concern over the legal implications of his "her-
esy." He mentioned in his 1776 outline of those arguments that "Mos[t]
men imag[i]ne [that] persec[utio]n [is] unkn[ow]n t[o] our l[and]s,"
where the "leg[e]l sta[tus of] Relig[io]n [is] little und[er]st[oo]d." In
order to enlighten the assembly on the persecution prescribed by law
in Virginia, he described some of the parliamentary religious statutes
that were applicable there. Among them was one that called for pun-
Religious Freedom 143
ishment of recusancy, or failure to worship in the Anglican Church
and submit to its authority. Others called for prison terms for indi-
viduals who did not subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles, the Atha-
nasian Creed, and commination. A specific statute against heresy made
heretics of Arians, since the church and state had adopted the trinitarian
Athanasian creed, whereas Arians believed in the unity of God. 9
Jefferson mentioned that Arians had been "burnt" under that statute,
which must have given him cause for personal concern, since he too
believed in the unity of God and rejected the Trinity.lO
That he was in fact concerned is evidenced by his research on her-
esy in relation to the Trinity and the unity of God. His notes refer to
and quote Daniel Waterland's theological tracts; William Chillings-
worth's Religion of the Protestants, a Safe Way to Salvation; the Vita
Constantini and Historia Ecclesiastica of Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea
in Palestine; Conyers Middleton's Miscellaneous Works; the historical
works of Joannes Zonaras, whom he cited from a French translation
by Louis Cousin; and Thomas Broughton's Dictionary of All Reli-
gions. 11 He used the materials gathered in his research as arguments to
defend his belief in the unity of God against the charge of heresy. Those
materials and arguments had little or nothing to do with the irratio-
nality of the concept that three are one and one is three, as he argued
on other occasions. 12 Rather, they challenged the authority used by
law to determine heresy. Jefferson described that authority as state-
ments made by "the canonical scriptures, or by one of the four first
general councils, or by other council having for the grounds of their
declaration the express and plain words of the scriptures. "13
He began his arguments in his 1776 research notes on heresy by
defining a heretic as "an impugner of fundamentals. "14 He then dismis-
sively left to others the task of determining whether or not the Trinity
was clearly mentioned in the scriptures and thereby a "fundamental."
His dismissiveness seemed an invitation on the part of a trial lawyer
who, knowledgeable of scripture, knew that such a determination
would be difficult to make and relished the opportunity to ridicule
any attempts to make it during a trial with his own witnesses and
cross examination. Next, he argued that the earliest Christians did not
profess or teach the Trinity. The absence of trinitarian theology among
them implied that the unity of God rather than the Trinity was funda-
mental to Christianity. He then focused on the authority of councils as
a principal legal criterion for determining heresy, especially the Coun-
cil of Nicea, held in the first half of the fourth century during Constan-
tine's regime. There the dispute between trinitarian and Arian unitar-
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ian theologians was settled by vote in favor of the Trinity, which thereby
became doctrine in orthodox Christianity. IS Jefferson concluded that
the determinations of councils were not to be relied upon as sources of
religious fundamentals, since the Council of Antioch, for example,
affirmed that the Son was not of one substance with the Father, in
diametric opposition to the conclusions of the Council of Nicea. 16 In
short, since there was little or no agreement among legally recognized
authorities on the fundamentals of doctrine, it was impossible to iden-
tify a heretic. Jefferson's research arguments in effect put on trial the
authorities who judged heresy and the Trinity as a fundamental doc-
trine in orthodox Christianity. As he state.d those arguments:
A heretic is an impugner of fundamentals. what are fundamentals?
the protestants will say those doctrines which are clearly & precisely
delivered in the holy scriptures. Dr. Waterland would say the Trinity.
but how far this character [of being clearly delivered?] will suit the
doctrine of the Trinity I leave others to determine. it is no where
expressly declared by any of the earliest fathers, & was never af-
firmed or taught by the church before the council of Nice [Chillingw.
Pref. 18.33.] Irenaeus says "who are the clean? those who go on
firmly, believing in the father & in the son." the fundamental doctrine
or the firmness of the Xn. faith in this early age then was to believe in
the father & san.-Constantine wrote to Arius & Alexr. treating the
question "as vain foolish & impertinent as a dispute of words
without sense which none could explane nor any comprehend &c."
this Ire is commended by Eusebius [Vito Constant. Ib.2.c. 64 &c.] and
Socrates [Hist. Eccles. l.l.c.?] as excellent admirable & full of
wisdom. 2.Middleton.115. remarks on the story of St. John & [....]
... the second council meant by Zonaras was that of Constantinople
ann 381. D hist. Prim. Xty. pref. XXXVIII. 2d. app. to pref. 49. the
Council of Antioch [ann] expressly affirmed of our saviour ... that
he was not Consubstantial to the father. the Council of Nice affirmed
the direct contrary. D hist. Prim. Xty. Pref. CXXV.17
That Jefferson did not present these research arguments to the Vir-
ginia assembly is evidenced by his notes on the arguments he did make
to that legislative body. Perhaps he thought they would cause the as-
sembly to suspect him of heretical beliefs. He did, however, include a
general argument against the legal punishment of heresy in a way cal-
culated to appeal to the orthodox of Virginia. After pointing out that
the "Spir[i]t of [the] times [was] in fav[o]r. of [the] r[igh]ts of
Consc[ien]ce" or freedom of belief, he continued: "Let gentlemen who
happen [to be] of [the] Religion of [the] state make [a] case of other
[religion] than their own [i. e., assume that some other religion than
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theirs is the established one]. What would be their Sensations [in such
a case] if [there were] no Security [for] civil rights but [the] Modera-
tion of [the spirit of the] times. [They] would be uneasy till [such were]
fixed on [a] legal basis. Rights of Conscience [are] much more tender
[even than our civil rights]. "18 In effect, what jefferson suggested here
was that Anglicans should put themselves in his uneasy position as a
heretic under the law.
His arguments were of no avail, for his resolutions were not passed.
The assembly did pass a measure that rectified the injustice of forcing
those in dissenting sects to contribute financially to the Anglican
Church; instead, it made the financial support of every religion or sect
compulsory. It also repealed parliamentary laws that supported Angli-
can doctrine, but it left intact the establishment of the Anglican church
as well as the Virginia statutes and common law that supported its
doctrines. 19 It was in an effort to disestablish Anglicanism, repeal all
law that supported it, and to make financial support of religion volun-
tary that jefferson drafted the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom
in 1777.20
In his Notes on the State of Virginia, jefferson described the condi-
tion of Virginia's religious law between the passage of the foregoing
partial measure and the passage of the Statute for Religious Freedom.
As his 1776 arguments to the assembly indicated a personal interest in
his legislative efforts, so did the Notes account of the legal penalties of
the religious laws.21 For example, under Virginia common law, heresy
was a capital offense. Further, an assembly statute "made it penal in
parents to refuse to have their children baptised" and provided harsh
penalties, including death, for Quakers who persisted in coming to
Virginia. According to another statute, a person raised as a Christian
who denied the existence of God or the Trinity or believed in multiple
gods, or denied "the Christian religion to be true, or the scriptures to
be of divine authority" was subject to an "incapacity to hold any of-
fice" on the first offense and a "disability to sue, to take any gift or
legacy, to be guardian, executor, or administrator" as well as "three
years' imprisonment, without bail" on the second offense. jefferson
pointed out that a father's right "to the custody of his own children"
was "founded in law on his right of guardianship," and with this right
removed as a result of violating the law he cited, a father's children
could "be severed from him, and put by the authority of a court into
more orthodox hands." Certainly the enforcement of this law in
jefferson's case would have deprived him of his children, and this must
have made him uneasy. Finally, he pointed to the irony that men who
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condoned such laws had pledged their "Lives" and "Fortunes" for
political freedom in the Declaration of Independence when he said,
"This is a summary view of that religious slavery, under which a people
have been willing to remain, who have lavished their lives and for-
tunes for the establishment of their civil freedom. "22
Considering the status of religious law in Virginia, Jefferson's belief
that alliances between church and state resulted in tyrannical rights
violations (see chapter 6) is not surprising. Locke, it would seem, con-
tributed to this belief. His Letter concerning Toleration stated that the
church often sought government support for its aspirations to estab-
lish tyranny and reciprocated by supporting the tyrannical aspirations
of those who had political power. Locke emphasized the clergy's role
in this arrangement: "For who does not see that these good men are
indeed more ministers of the government than ministers of the Gospel,
and that by flattering the ambition and favouring the dominion of
princes and men in authority, they endeavour with all their might to
promote that tyranny in commonwealth which otherwise they should
not be able to establish in the church? This is the unhappy agreement
that we see between the church and state."23
The establishment of tyranny or help in its establishment was, of
course, a great offense, according to Locke in his Second Treatise.
Since an alliance between church and state augmented tyranny, he sug-
gested in A Letter concerning Toleration that these institutions be sepa-
rated. Locke saw this separation as logical because church and state
had separate interests and functions. The church's interest was sacred,
involving "the salvation of souls. "24 Its function was to provide a sys-
tem of beliefs or faith and a form of worship conducive to salvation.
Locke's definition of church, which Jefferson paraphrased in 1776,
depicts this function and reveals Locke's latitudinarian disposition25
toward religion:
No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but
everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes
he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to
God. The hope of salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance
into that communion, so it can be the only reason of his stay there.
For if afterwards he discover anything either erroneous in the doctrine
or incongruous in the worship of that society to which he has joined
himself, why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to
enter? No member of a religious society can be tied with any other
bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life. A
church, then, is a society of members voluntarily uniting to this end.26
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The interest of the state, on the other hand, was secular, having to do
with the "life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the posses-
sion of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and
the like." The state or magistrate's function was "to secure unto all the
people in general, and to everyone of his subjects in particular, the just
possession of these things belonging to this life. "27
Locke maintained that force was necessary for the magistrate to
perform his function, which included "the punishment of those that
violated any other man's rights." Force, however, was alien to the per-
formance of a church's function, according to Locke. This is evidenced
by his emphasis on voluntary participation in the beliefs and worship
of a church or religion in his definition of a church quoted above.
Locke believed that force used to compel such participation was inap-
propriate because "True religion consists in the inward and full per-
suasion of the mind" as respects profession of beliefs and what we are
"fully satisfied in our mind ... is well pleasing unto God" as respects
worship (emphasis added). He maintained that if men were forced to
profess outwardly what they were not persuaded in their minds was
true, and to worship in a form they deemed unacceptable to God, they
were adding to their "other sins those also of hypocrisy," which pre-
cluded the attainment of salvation. Only faith would lead to salvation,
not hypocrisy, or as Locke put it, "Faith only, and inward sincerity,
are the things that procure acceptance with God." Jefferson's agree-
ment that a hypocritical profession of faith and practice of worship
were ineffectual in attaining salvation is found in his 1776 notes on
religion, where he paraphrased this statement from Locke: "I may grow
rich by an art that 1take not delight in, 1may be cured of some disease
by remedies that 1have not faith in; but I cannot be saved by a religion
that 1 distrust, and by a worship that I abhor. "28
Locke was also of the opinion that in matters of religion, individu-
als could not help but believe in their minds what conformed to the
evidence as they perceived that evidence with their own reason. There-
fore he stated, "Only light [reason] and evidence can work a change in
men's opinions." Force, Locke maintained, was incapable of changing
religious views. This is seen in his statement that "no man can, if he
would, conform his faith to the dictates of another.... Confiscation of
estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any
such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgement that they
have framed of things" (emphasis added).29
Compulsion in religion was not only an ineffective way to change
persons' minds and help them attain salvation; it was also a corrupt-
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ing influence, according to Locke. It corrupted individuals by making
them hypocritically profess what they did not inwardly believe. It cor-
rupted true religion or the true church, which was "not instituted" for
"the exercising of compulsive force," by making men profess what it
deemed to be truth but which they did not believe. Finally, it corrupted
government. When government used force in religion, it involved it-
self in a realm where it did not belong, since government "relates only
to men's civil interests," which are "confined to the care of the things
of this world" and have "nothing to do with the world to come."30
Therefore, preventing state power from being used as compulsion in
religion benefited not only religious freedom but also the integrity of
the individual, the integrity of the church, and the integrity of the state.
Jefferson utilized these ideas contained in Locke's Letter concern-
ing Toleration in his Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and stressed
there the Letter's view that it was each individual's responsibility to
find a true religion or way to salvation according to his own percep-
tion. Jefferson paraphrased the Letter's statement on this responsibil-
ity, "The care ... of every man's soul belongs unto himself," in his
notes on religion made in 1776 prior to his legislative efforts on reli-
gious freedom. 31 Locke was convinced there was no alternative to this
"care" on the part of the individual, given the unreliability of both
magistrates and ecclesiastical authorities for this care. In his 1776 notes
Jefferson paraphrased Locke's statement that the magistrate "may prob-
ably be as ignorant of the way [to salvation] as myself."32 The church
was similarly unreliable, according to Locke: "Who sees not how fre-
quently the name of the church, which was venerable in the time of the
apostles, has been made use of to throw dust in people's eyes, in fol-
lowing ages?" Although he was speaking here of the Roman Catholic
Church, he maintained that unreliability and obscurantism extended
to the doctrine and worship of Protestantism as well. He stated this
when he said he was "doubtful concerning the doctrines of the
Socinians" and "suspicious of the way of worship practiced by the ..
. Lutherans. "33 Jefferson, consistent with these Lockean views, was
critical not only of Catholicism's but also of Protestantism's errors and
departure from the original teachings of Christianity, since he main-
tained that ideas common to both-that Jesus was God and scripture
the revealed word of God-were imposture (see chapter 4).
Religious Freedom, Nature's God, and Reason
Jefferson's indebtedness to A Letter concerning Toleration for the ideas
found in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom is seen throughout
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that statute. The preamble began by stating Locke's view that men's
minds could not help but believe what was in accordance with the
evidence born of their perceptions: "Well aware that the opinions and
belief of men depend not on their own will, but follow involuntarily
the evidence proposed to their minds. "34 The statute then went on to
say that the mind was created free. This was not a contradiction to the
mind's involuntary following of the evidence it perceived. jefferson
was merely emphasizing that external authoritarian compulsions and
restraints could not alter the inner judgments of the mind on religious
truth that were based on the evidence it perceived. jefferson's language
in the preamble to this effect was "Almighty God hath created the
mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by
making it altogether insusceptible of restraint. "35 In other words, the
mind was created free to make its own inner judgments on religious
truth on the basis of the evidence it perceived, but it was not free to
alienate those inner judgments in the sense of going against or altering
them, even though force could make an individual hypocritically pro-
fess something different from what his mind inwardly judged to be
true. This would seem to be the reason jefferson described the right of
religious freedom as an "inalienable" right, an interpretation in ac-
cord with jefferson's use of "inalienable" in his rough draft of the
Declaration (see chapter 6).36 Consistent with this meaning of the in-
alienable right of religious freedom, jefferson's preamble then reca-
pitulated Locke's view that force and violence made men hypocriti-
cally profess views different from what they really believed in their
minds. He did this by stating, "All attempts to influence it [the mind]
by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend
only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness. "37
In the succeeding passage jefferson stated that such force in religion
was "a departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion,
who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it
by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do, but to
extend it by its influence on reason alone. "38 Garry Wills interprets the
phrase "our religion" as a reference to Protestantism apart from not
only Catholicism but also Anglicanism. Indeed, Wills seems to believe
that jefferson suffered from an anti-Catholic and anti-Anglican bias
but was willing to aid certain Protestant denominations such as Pres-
byterian and Quaker.39 But this does not seem to have been jefferson's
disposition toward religion when he drafted the Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom or the Declaration of Independence. His bias against
institutionalized Christianity at that time extended to all Protestant-
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ism, especially Presbyterianism, as well as Catholicism and Anglicanism.
This is evident in his criticism of the Presbyterians for being power-
oriented. In his notes for arguments to the Virginia assembly in 1776,
he specifically stated that Presbyterians did not want freedom of reli-
gion for all sects; they merely wanted toleration under the law of Vir-
ginia opened "just wide enough" for themselves.40 The Presbyterians
and their clergy were therefore alien to Jefferson's ideal of religious
freedom for all as well as to his heretical heterodox theology, which
denied the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus, the divine inspiration of the
Christian scriptures, predestination, grace, and the fall of man. In ad-
dition, Presbyterians, like Catholics, subscribed to a catechism and
were controlled doctrinally by a central authority (see chapter 1).41 A
minister of that denomination and his congregation were under that
control, which was alien to the freedom of individual reason in reli-
gion championed by Jefferson.
In fact, most of the predominating Protestant denominations in
America-or the world, for that matter-were under some doctrinal
authority and thus no more free to express what their minds believed
according to the evidence they perceived than were Catholics. Thus
the "tyranny over the mind of man" that Jefferson decried in his letter
to Benjamin Rush, and against which he swore an oath of hostility
early in life (see chapter 5), was as much a part of Protestantism as of
Catholicism. Jefferson's letter to Rush specifically referred to the tyr-
anny of Episcopalianism and Congregationalism, and Congregation-
alism was a cousin of Presbyterianism in subscribing to a similar doc-
trinal authority.42 Further, in his letter to Rush, Jefferson significantly
stated he was opposed to "every form of tyranny over the mind of
man" (emphasis added) and thus in effect condemned all institutional-
ized Christian denominations that claimed authority in matters of truth
over the reason of man, Catholic or Protestant.43 Jefferson thereby
subscribed fully to Locke's contention in A Letter concerning Tolera-
tion that "ecclesiastical authority, whether it be administered by the
hands of a single person or many, is everywhere the same. "44
Therefore, when Jefferson wrote of the "holy author of our reli-
gion" (emphasis added) in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom,
he was referring not to the Protestant religion or God, as Wills sug-
gests, but to Bolingbroke's deistic God of natural theology and His
natural religion discovered through reason. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the statement in Jefferson's statute that the "holy author of
our religion" did not use His power to propagate the religion He
authored but rather "chose" to "extend it by its influence on reason
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alone" (emphasis added). Certainly Jefferson's denial of the Trinity
precluded the inspiration of reason by the Holy Spirit as God's method
of disseminating His religion through reason. Therefore, it seems safe
to conclude that by saying God used "reason alone" to extend the
influence of His religion, Jefferson meant that the "holy author" re-
ferred to in his statute appealed to the reason of each individual as the
authority in religion and let that reason decide what the "holy author's"
religion was, based on the evidence perceived by that individual. The
fact that Jefferson argued in favor of individual reason in religion in
his 1776 notes-"b[u]t wh[at] m[an's] reas[o]n [can] step int[o the]
j[u]d[g]m[en]t seat of yours? "45-supports this conclusion.
This God of the Virginia statute, who used not force but reason in
religion, is consistent with the concept (mentioned in the Declaration)
of a deistic God who would not interfere with the freedom or liberty
He gave to each individual at the time of his creation (see chapter 6).
In addition, the "reason alone" method of the Virginia statute's God
to extend the influence of His religion excluded both the Protestant
authority of scripture and the Catholic authority of tradition as means
to extend that influence. There seems little doubt, therefore, that in his
statute Jefferson was referring to the deistic "Nature's God" and the
natural religion reflected in the Declaration, and that he was using the
statute to promote that God and the theology of the Declaration of
Independence.
By making individual reason the sole means of determining reli-
gious truth with his "Nature's God" of the Declaration and the Vir-
ginia Statute for Religious Freedom, Jefferson eliminated all interme-
diate authorities between God and man as the source of religious truth,
such as exclusive revelation or scripture, church or tradition, and most
of all, the clergy. To Jefferson, the elimination of such intermediaries
was a blessing, because he maintained that they caused theological
exclusivism and sectarian bigotry. He expressed his ideas on unmedi-
ated religion when he said, "I have ever thought religion a concern
purely between our God and our consciences, for which we are ac-
countable to Him, and not to the priests."46 This comment was made
in 1816, but the phrase "I have ever thought" or held the view ex-
pressed in this comment indicates that it was a view he had held from
his early years. It would seem that Jefferson's "reason alone" approach
to religion in his Statute for Religious Freedom must have sounded
too natural theological or deistic to the Virginia assemblymen. When
they finally passed his statute in 1786, they kept the phrase "the holy
author of our religion" but edited away the idea that He chose to
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extend His religion's influence exclusively with reason by deleting the
phrase "but to extend it by its influence on reason alone. "47
In the preamble of the statute Jefferson also mentioned the corrup-
tion of religion and religious truth by men in church and state who
claimed infallibility in matters of religion and who used force rather
than reason to make others accept their views. Such men, he believed,
were suffering from delusions and illusions. They were deluded in think-
ing they were infallible, and they were living in illusion as a result of
thinking their views on religion were true when in fact they were false.48
They were also impious because they went against God, who was pro-
reason and anti-force in religion. In addition they imposed false reli-
gions on mankind by their use of force. As Jefferson put it, "The impi-
ous presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical,
who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed
dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and
modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeav-
oring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false
religions over the greatest part of the world and through all time. "49
Wills believes that Jefferson tailored the argument in this passage to
appeal to a Protestant audience because established religion that was
enforced and therefore false in the Christian world was for the most
part Catholic.50 But surely Jefferson's argument would more likely in-
sult and inflame rather than appeal to a Protestant audience, espe-
cially the one to which it was addressed. Jefferson's language stated
that all those who successfully used force in religion establish and
maintain false religions. Presbyterians were one of the largest sects in
Virginia when Jefferson drafted the statute, and the Scotch Irish Pres-
byterians of that state were certainly aware that Presbyterianism was
the established or government-enforced religion of Scotland.51 Like-
wise, Anglicanism was still the enforced religion of Virginia. There-
fore Jefferson, via the language presented to the Presbyterians and
Anglicans of Virginia and its assembly, blatantly branded both reli-
gions false. The fact that this passage did not target any specific reli-
gion or sect but pronounced all that used force as false, plus the reli-
gious liberalism of some members of the Virginia assembly, seem to be
the reasons that jefferson's affront to the principal churches of Vir-
ginia was tolerated.
Wills also believes that in speaking of "false religions," Jefferson
claimed to know the true one and was thus not a relativist as respects
religious truth.52 Once again this does not seem to be the case. The
religions Jefferson deemed false that were forced on others were ones
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that placed certain authorities such as revelation and tradition over
individual reason; further, they were religions caught in superstitions.
Like Bolingbroke, Jefferson thought that the truth claims of such reli-
gions and authorities could not withstand the test of rational scrutiny.
To Jefferson only unlimited rational scrutiny born of "reason alone,"
or reason without any restraints, could determine truth in religion. He
maintained in his 1776 notes onreligion, therefore, that there was no
alternative to each individual's reliance on "h[i]s own Und[er]st[andin]g,
wh[ether] mo[re] or less judic[iou]s," even if "oth[er] mens Und[er]-
st[andin]g[s] [were] better."53 Yet he also maintained that the struc-
tural differences between the minds or rational faculties of different
individuals resulted in different perceptions of religious truth, an idea
he adopted early in life (see chapter 5).
Truth in religion was, therefore, relative to Jefferson. Moreover, he
was tentative in his approach to religious truth, believing that no one
could be certain of having arrived at correct rational determinations of
that truth. He mentioned this idea to Miles King in a way that demon-
strated his relativism: "Our particular principles of religion are a sub-
ject of accountability to our God alone, I enquire after no man's, and
trouble none with mine; nor is it given to us in this life to know whether
yours or mine, our friends or our foes, are exactly the right."54 King
claimed to have had a revelation from God, and Jefferson's response to
that claim spelled out his ideas on individual reason in religion:
Whether the particular revelation which you suppose to have been
made to yourself were real or imaginary, your reason alone is the
competent judge. For dispute as long as we will on religious tenets,
our reason at last must ultimately decide, as it is the only oracle
which God has given us to determine between what really comes from
Him and the phantasms of a disordered or deluded imagination.
When He means to make a personal revelation, He carries conviction
of its authenticity to the reason He has bestowed as the umpire of
truth. You believe you have been favored with such a special commu-
nication. Your reason, not mine, is to judge of this; and if it shall be
His pleasure to favor me with a like admonition, I shall obey it with
the same fidelity with which I would obey His known will in all cases.
Hitherto I have been under the guidance of that portion of reason
which He has thought proper to deal out to me. I have followed it
faithfully in all important cases, to such a degree at least as leaves me
without uneasiness; and if on minor occasions I have erred from its
dictates, I have trust in Him who made us what we are, and know it
was not His plan to make us always unerring.55
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These comments, although made in 1814, were retrospective about
jefferson's use of reason, as is evidenced by his statement that "hith-
erto" he had "followed" it "faithfully in all important cases." The
text of the King letter thus indicates jefferson's commitment to reason
as a guide in his life since the early years of his adulthood, especially in
matters of religion. He significantly acknowledged the limitations of
that guide when he described his rational faculty as "that portion of
reason" which God had given him. The overall thrust of his comments
to King was that he could not be certain of the determinations of truth
about God and religion made by his reason, nor could any others be
certain of theirs. Contrary to Wills's view, therefore, jefferson was
never assertive about his own determinations of religious truth. His
comment to King, "I trouble none with mine," in reference to his de-
terminations of truth in religion is evidence of his lack of assertiveness.
Yet, notwithstanding the uncertainty of individual rational determina-
tions of religious truth, jefferson affirmed to King that each man had
no alternative to the use of his reason in religion, since it was "the only
oracle which God has given us" in matters of religion. His letter to
King thereby reiterated a theme stressed in his 1776 notes on religion,
when he said that there was no alternative to each individual's reliance
on "h[i]s own Und[er]st[andin]g, wh[ether] mo[re] or less judic[iou]s"
when it came to finding religious truth.
Statutory Separation of Church and State
A vital part of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom was the
Lockean idea of separating church and state functions. This is seen in
a provision deleted by the assembly that stated, "The opinions of men
are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction."56
jefferson, however, used similiar language, which was not deleted and
conveyed a separation of church and state meaning, when he men-
tioned implicitly the Lockean idea that force or coercion exercised by
government in religion corrupts government. That language is found
in the preamble in the passage referring to the Virginia law that sub-
jected those who did not believe in God, the Trinity, the truth of Chris-
tianity, or the divine authority of scripture to an "incapacity to hold
any office. "57 It states: "Our civil rights have no dependence on our
religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geom-
etry; that therefore the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public
confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of being called to offices
of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that
religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and
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advantages to which, in common with his fellow citizens, he has a
natural right." Locke said that government was corrupted when it
entered an area where it did not belong by coercing religious opinion,
as did the Virginia law referred to in this passage. According to
jefferson, this law was also a bribe and therefore a corruption on the
part of government. It bribed those seeking public office to subscribe
to certain religious beliefs. jefferson then chastised the corrupting in-
fluence of such law on both the bribed and the briber in the preamble
by stating that "though indeed these are criminal who do not with-
stand such temptation, yet neither are those innocent who lay the bait
in their way." In the succeeding clause he added that religion too was
tainted by this bribe. He did so in a way that reflected Locke's belief
that hypocrisy, which precluded salvation and was the result of using
force in religion, vitiated religion's function, which was the salvation
of souls, by stating "that it tends also to corrupt the principles of that
very religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of
worldly honours and emoluments, those who will externally profess
and conform to it. "58
jefferson concluded his preamble with the idea in Locke's Letter
that force, in addition to being alien to the function of church or reli-
gion, was unnecessary to disseminate religious truth. As Locke put it,
"Truth certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for
herself" without the use of force. 59 The preamble stated: "Truth is
great and will prevail if left to herself; that she is the proper and suffi-
cient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict
unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free
argument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is per-
mitted freely to contradict them."60 As long as reason and "arguments
and debate" born of reason were "free," or unobstructed by authority
or force that compromised their efficacy, jefferson believed they would
eventually perceive and reject error as well as perceive and accept truth.
Truth would thereby emerge triumphant. To jefferson, truth and free
reason were two sides of the same coin. Therefore, when authorities
such as scripture, tradition, or government force were used to control
reason and dictate truth in religion, the result was error. Although
truth could take care of itself, errors needed some nonrational author-
ity or force to sustain them, according to jefferson. He mentioned this
when he said, "It is error alone that needs the support of government,"
reflecting a similar statement from Locke in his Letter, "Errors indeed
prevail by the assistance of foreign and borrowed succours. "61
In the enacting passage of the Virginia Statute for Religious Free-
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dom, immediately following its preamble, Jefferson proscribed all use
of force in religion: "No man shall be compelled to frequent or sup-
port any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor
shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief;
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain,
their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities. "62 He thereby put
into law Locke's idea that the functions of church and state were sepa-
rate and that the use of force in religion was no part of either of those
functions. This legal prohibition of the use of force in religion not only
protected all individuals from persecution for their religious percep-
tions and beliefs but also made all religions and sects equal in the eyes
of the law. Jefferson mentioned this Lockean principle of legal equal-
ity to an American Jew when he wrote: "Our laws have applied the
only antidote to this vice [intolerance], protecting our religions, as
they do our civil rights, by putting all on equal footing. "63
The principle of equality before the law brought the laws of Vir-
ginia into accord with the God of the Declaration of Independence.
That God gave no religion, no people, and no individual special favor
by choosing one over others. Every person, no matter what his reli-
gious views, was treated equally by Him (see chapter 3). As the God of
the Declaration did not exclude or favor any person or religion, nei-
ther did the language of the enacting passage of the Virginia Statute
for Religious Freedom. All persons and religions were equally pro-
tected by that passage. This was no doubt Jefferson's intent when he
drafted it. Evidence of this intent may be seen in his 1776 notes on A
Letter concerning Toleration: observing that Locke excluded Catho-
lics and atheists from toleration, Jefferson stated, "Where he stopped
short, we may go on. "64
Despite Jefferson's intent and language in the statute, an attempt
was made in the assembly to restrict its protection to Christian sects
only: a proposed amendment would have changed the words of the
preamble to read "Jesus Christ, the holy author of our religion." As
Jefferson recalled, that attempt "was rejected by a great majority in
proof that they meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its [the
law's] protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mohame-
tan, the Hindoo and Infidel of every denomination. "65
Legal protection of all individuals, religions, and sects from perse-
cution by law had limitations in any government-including democ-
racy-according to Jefferson. These limitations existed because the
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moment any religion or sect that believed it was true and others false
was favored by the state, it would use that favor to persecute other
religions and sects, despite the fact that without such favor it would be
peaceful and even promote tolerance. This idea too came from Locke,
who said that where religions and sects "have not the power to carry
on persecution and to become masters, there they ... preach up tol-
eration," but "so soon as ever court favour has given them the better
end of the staff, ... then presently peace and charity are to be laid
aside." A religion or sect with power born of government favor, Locke
maintained, became "the most violent of these defenders of the truth,
the oppressors of errors, the exclaimers against schism. "66 jefferson
echoed these ideas in the aforementioned letter to a jew: "Your sect by
its sufferings has furnished a remarkable proof of the universal spirit
of religious intolerance inherent in every sect, disclaimed by all while
feeble and practiced by all while in power. "67
Well aware that power in a democracy belonged to the majority,
jefferson feared the day when anyone religious group obtained a
majority in Virginia. It would then control the legislature and could
overturn the statute for religious freedom and pass laws legalizing per-
secution of those holding other religious beliefs. In an attempt to pro-
vide a sanction against any majority that might be tempted to do this,
he added a final clause to his statute that affirmed his belief that reli-
gious freedom was a natural right.
And though we well know that this assembly, elected by the people
for the ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no power to
restrain the acts of succeeding Assemblies, constituted with powers
equal to our own, and that therefore to declare this act irrevocable
would be of no effect in law; yet we are free to declare, and do
declare, that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of
mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the
present or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of
natural right. 68
The Virginia statute's protection of the right of religious freedom
via the Lockean principle of separating church and state became law
in the United States Constitution, and jefferson played a part in estab-
lishing that law. james Madison, though no less a champion of reli-
gious freedom than jefferson,69 did not include safeguards for the right
of religious freedom, or any other right, in his draft of the Constitu-
tion. jefferson wrote to Madison as soon as he read the Constitution
that he did not like "the omission of a bill of rights" and listed both
freedom of religion and freedom of the press among the rights he be-
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lieved should be included in such a bill. He then recommended that a
bill of rights be added to the Constitution. "A bill of rights," he said,
"is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth,
general or particular; and what no just government should refuse, or
rest on inference. "70 In 1791 the Bill of Rights, originally drafted by
Madison, was made part of the Constitution, and the first of its ten
amendments read, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. "71 The force of government was thereby precluded from
being used in church or religion. Jefferson regarded the First Amend-
ment with "sovereign reverence" because, as he stated, it constructed
"a wall of separation between Church and State," an idea he obtained
from Locke's Letter concerning Toleration. 72
By specifying the "free exercise" of religion, the First Amendment
guaranteed freedom of worship, thought, speech, and assembly in re-
ligious matters, as did the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. By
specifying freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and peaceful as-
sembly in political matters, the amendment extended the spirit of
Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, which included free-
dom for atheists and secular thought, to politics. Finally, in qualifying
the right of political assembly by the word "peaceable," the First
Amendment ruled out the use of force in politics as it did in religion,
leaving political disputes to be decided peacefully by the will or "con-
sent" of the people via the ballot. Thus American constitutional law
provided the means to maintain political peace as well as religious
peace within a nation, two of John Locke's aims in the seventeenth
century.73 In enforcing that law, governmental power would come to
be used against those who disrupted peace by applying force in reli-
gion or politics.74
Public Argument and Individual Judgment
Jefferson had emphasized freedom of speech and assembly in the Vir-
ginia Statute for Religious Freedom's enacting passage when he wrote,
"All men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion."75 This of course gave individuals the
right to express their religious views publicly and to maintain those
views by reason or argument in conjunction with their public expres-
sion. This passage reveals Jefferson's disposition toward religion. To
him it was not sufficient to state "I believe" and merely recite religious
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opinions without any rational justification. Such affirmations were
the method of faith, and Jefferson, as an advocate of reason, thought
that religious opinion should be justified by arguments born of rea-
son. Since the statute gave all men the freedom to profess and argue
their religious views, they could publicly examine and criticize one
another's professed opinions. Thus, an open forum of different reli-
gious views would emerge if the right of professing and arguing reli-
gious opinions was exercised as a result of Jefferson's statute. In such
a forum only well-argued beliefs based on substantial evidence could
be expected to be "by argument" maintained and thereby survive.
The source of Jefferson's ideas on the open-forum approach to reli-
gion is found in the 1776 notes he made from Shaftesbury's Character-
istics, idealizing the open forum of the Greeks: "The antients tolerated
visionaries & enthusiasts of all kinds so they permitted a free scope to
philosophy as a balance. as the Pythagoreans & latter Platonicks joined
with the superstition of the times the Epicurians & Academicks were
allowed all the use of wit & raillery against it. thus matters were bal-
anced; reason had [full] play & science flourished. these contrarieties
produced harmony. superstition & enthusiasm thus let alone never
raged to bloodshed persecution &c." Shaftesbury's theme of using "wit
& raillery" to tame the excessive and unproved claims of religion is
expanded in a further Jeffersonian paraphrase: "Nothing but free ar-
gument, raillery, & even ridicule will preserve the purity of religion. "76
Falsity in religion could withstand solemn and serious criticism but
not lighthearted, good-natured, humorous criticism in the form of wit
and raillery, according to Shaftesbury. Of the former type he stated,
"That Imposture shou'd dare sustain the Encounter of a grave Enemy,
is no wonder. A solemn Attack, she knows, is not of such danger to
her." Of the latter type he said, "There is nothing she [imposture]
abhors or dreads like Pleasantness and good Humor," because impos-
ture would be "detected and expos'd" by criticism in the form of good-
natured wit and raillery.77 Echoing Shaftesbury, Jefferson cited an ex-
ample of the effectiveness of wit and raillery as an antidote to the
excessive and erroneous claims of religion. In his Notes on the State of
Virginia, when discussing the freedom of religion practiced in Penn-
sylvania and New York, he wrote, "If a sect arises, whose tenets would
subvert morals, good sense has fair play, and reasons and laughs it out
doors."78
Multiple competing religions and sects would be conducive to the
effectiveness of an open forum, since each one or a combination of
several could and would tame the abuses of another or several others,
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according to Jefferson. As he expressed this idea in Notes, "Difference
of opinion is advantageous in religion. The several sects perform the
office of a Censor morum over each other. "79 Given this comment and
the statement in the enacting clause "that men shall be free to profess
and by argument to maintain" their views on religion, it is clear that
Jefferson intended the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom to pro-
vide an open forum in matters of religion through encouraging the use
of individual reason and freedom of expression in religion. Indeed, the
right of individuals to argue their religious beliefs and criticize those
of others in such a forum, provided by Jefferson's statute, brought
legal protection to his idea that individual reason should be exercised
in an unlimited way in religion. That right enabled individuals to in-
ject their reason without any restrictions in religion, which was here-
tofore largely the domain of faith and belief, a domain that claimed
the authority of scripture and tradition over individual reason.
In providing an environment conducive to the use of individual rea-
son in religion, Jefferson's Virginia statute brought religion into ac-
cord with the politics of the Declaration of Independence and the Sec-
ond Treatise. Lockean political theory rested on the principle that
individuals had the capacity and right to judge the morality of their
government and accept or reject that government on the basis of their
judgments. Institutionalized Christian religions, however, because of
their belief in the fall of man and their moral authority over their
congregations, had often denied that individuals had either the capac-
ity or the right to judge their churches and clergymen. On the con-
trary, institutionalized religions and their ecclesiastical authorities
claimed the moral authority to judge their congregations and anyone
in them. Instead of the people having moral control and authority
over their religious leaders, those leaders, especially in colonial America
(see chapter 1), assumed some form of moral authority over the people.
Jefferson's argument in the preamble of the Statute for Religious
Freedom took a very different approach. It turned the moral authority
of religion upside down. Of voluntary as compared to forced financial
support of the clergy by the individual, Jefferson stated, "Forcing him
to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is de-
priving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to
the particular pastor whose morals he would make his pattern, and
whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness. "80 The premise
underlying this statement is that each man has knowledge of morality
and therefore the capacity to judge not only the "pastor whose morals
he would make his pattern" but all clergymen. He could reject any
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one or all of them if they performed or encouraged action that he
deemed immoral. Further, he could exercise a powerful sanction against
those he judged adversely after the passage of the Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom; he could withhold financial support. In fact, the
voluntary financial support of religion had great potential to democ-
ratize the religions of America, as the Unitarian clergymen of Massa-
chusetts recognized. When their state repealed its laws enforcing fi-
nancial support of religion in the early 1820s, they not only lamented
the financial loss but believed their congregations would, as a result of
controlling the purse strings of their church, inevitably dictate what
was heard from the pulpit. 81
Jefferson's statute thus placed individual human beings in a posi-
tion vis-a-vis their religion and its leaders similar to the one they held
vis-a-vis their government and its leaders in Lockean politics. They
could exercise moral control over religion and ecclesiastical authority
just as they did over their leaders in government and governmental
authority. As a result, religion would not become, or at least would
have difficulty in becoming or remaining, a tyrannizing force in the
lives of the people, just as government would in Lockean politics.
The State and Religious Pluralism
One effect of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and the Bill of
Rights of the federal Constitution was religious pluralism. This out-
come was not universally approved, for some held that one religion,
established, supported, and enforced by the government, was a neces-
sary element of a state. It encouraged the people to support the gov-
ernment and uphold its laws, and provided a cohesive force to mold
the people into a national unit in a time of crisis. Freedom of religion
resulted in divergent religious opinions, and those who subscribed to
the one-religion theory feared that this diversity would disrupt na-
tional unity, make the people apathetic to the laws of the land, and
lead eventually to anarchy. Cicero, whom Jefferson had read before he
drafted the Declaration of Independence, argued that a state religion
was of such vital importance to an effective government and a healthy
state that it should be preserved by force even if false. 82 Conyers
Middleton, whom Jefferson read in 1776 and who wrote on Cicero,
argued similarly in A Letter to Dr Waterland, where he mentioned
Cicero's views.83
Locke, however, in his Letter concerning Toleration, maintained
that all efforts to attain uniformity of religious opinion by force were
futile because "diversity" of religious views "cannot be avoided. "84
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Jefferson agreed. He believed that differences in the structures of the
minds of individuals caused them to come to different conclusions
about the nature of God and religion, as evidenced by the fact that
religious pluralism existed despite all efforts to attain religious unifor-
mity by force. In his 1776 notes on his arguments to the Virginia as-
sembly, after asking, "Is UnitIor]m[i]ty Attainable" in religion, he an-
swered, "Mill[io]ns. burnt-tort[ure]d.-fin[e]d-impris[one]d. yet men
differ. "85 In Notes on the State ofVirginia he expanded the point, added
an indictment of Christian religious persecution, and reiterated the
Lockean idea that force in religion leads to hypocrisy and error: "Is
uniformity attainable? Millions of innocent men, women, and chil-
dren, since the introduction of Christianity, have been burnt, tortured,
fined, imprisoned; yet we have not advanced one inch toward unifor-
mity. What has been the effect of coercion? To make one half of the
world fools, and the other half hypocrites. To support roguery and
error all over the earth." 86
Apart from his view that diversity in religion was unavoidable, Locke
asserted, contrary to Cicero, that if all religions were made equal be-
fore the law and allowed free expression of their different views, the
result would be widespread citizen support of government. Conversely,
he implied, if the law favored one religion and persecuted others in
order to attain religious uniformity, it would cause some of those per-
secuted not to support or even to turn against the government. He
expressed these ideas in A Letter concerning Toleration:
Take away the penalties unto which they [those who had religious
views different from the magistrate's] are subjected, and all things will
immediately become safe and peaceable. Nay, those that are averse to
the religion of the magistrate will think themselves so much the more
bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth as their condition
is better in that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate
congregations, like so many guardians of the public peace, will watch
one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of
the government, because they can hope for nothing better than what
they already enjoy; ... how much greater will be the security of
government where all good subjects, of whatsoever church they be,
without any distinction upon account of religion, enjoying the same
favour of the prince and the same benefit of the laws, shall become
the common support and guard of it, and where none will have any
occasion to fear the severity of the laws but those that do injuries to
their neighbors and offend against the civil peace?87
There seems little doubt that this was Jefferson's source for the prin-
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ciple, used in his Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, that all reli-
gions and persons are equal before the law regardless of their religious
beliefs.
Approximately twenty years after the United States Constitution
and Bill of Rights became law, Jefferson stated that the American ex-
periment with religious freedom and religious equality before the
law had demonstrated that Locke was right and men like Cicero wrong.
Not only New York and Pennsylvania, which had practiced Locke's
ideas on religion before and during the Revolutionary War, but also
Virginia and the United States as well by that time had proved that
religious freedom and equality before the law, resulting in religious
pluralism, was the "best support" of government and its laws, as Locke
had said.88 Far from being detrimental to the state, freedom of religion
had improved and enhanced it, according to jefferson, who, sounding
much like Locke, asserted in 1808: "We have solved by fair experi-
ment, the great and interesting question whether freedom of religion is
compatible with order in government, and obedience to the laws. And
we have experienced the quiet as well the comfort which results from
leaving everyone to profess freely and openly those principles of reli-
gion which are the inductions of his own reason, and the serious con-
victions of his own inquiries."89 When he spoke of "leaving everyone
to profess freely and openly" their religious views in this passage,
jefferson echoed the language he had used in the enacting clause of the
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. He also affirmed, as he did in
that statute, that views professed should be based on an individual's
"own reason." He even stated the type of reason to be used: "the
inductions of his own reason, and the serious convictions of his own
inquiries." This reference to inductive reason and inquiry demonstrates
that jefferson adhered to the use of a sense-based critical reason in
religion, the Bolingbrokean or Lockean type that he had adopted in
the years prior to the Declaration that gave rise to the natural religion
and natural theology of the Declaration of Independence.
From jefferson's perspective as a proponent of democratic Lockean
politics, an obvious benefit of religious pluralism, fostered by legally
protected freedom of religion, was that it prevented a particular reli-
gion from having a majority. The absence of such a majority prevented
any religion not only from using the power of government to enhance
its own position and persecute others, but also from taking complete
control of political power. This prevention applied to all religions in-
cluding those in which the clergy or ecclesiastical authority dominated
the minds of its followers. If such a religion ever did gain a majority
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and thereby control the government, its ecclesiastical authority would
dictate the normative direction of the government and its laws, backed
by unthinking followers who would have the political power to carry
out the dictates of their clergy.9o Thus, a majority of unthinking fol-
lowers of ecclesiastical authority could nullify a Lockean democracy
in which the people were supposed to provide the normative content
of and pass moral judgment upon their government. To put it another
way, a majority of unthinking followers of an authoritarian church
could transform a democratic government into a de facto monarchy
or oligarchy, depending on the nature of the ecclesiastical authority of
their church.
This disastrous impact of authoritarian faith religions on the minds
of men, which resulted in mental tyranny and the linkage of such tyr-
anny to political tyranny, was mentioned by Jefferson in a letter to
John Adams in 1818, when he wrote, "The revolution in South America
will succeed against Spain. But the dangerous enemy is within their
own breasts. Ignorance and superstition will chain their minds and
bodies under religious and military despotism. "91
Considering the fact that most institutionalized religions in America
in the eighteenth century were based on faith and were sectarian in the
sense of being founded on authoritarian theological or ecclesiastical
exclusivism rather than the free unlimited reason of the individual, the
minds of their followers were or had the potential to be dominated by
their clergy. Therefore, the religious pluralism fostered by American re-
ligious law protected not only religious freedom but also political free-
dom. Jefferson was aware of this protection because A Letter concern-
ing Toleration, which he had read carefully, contained the foregoing
passage, which stated, "The several separate congregations" were "like
so many guardians of the public peace," and they "will watch one an-
other that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of govern-
ment." In other words, religious pluralism "performed the office of a
Censor morum over each other [religion]" that protected the state as
well as other religions from being dominated by one religion's ecclesias-
tical authority. Only if a balance of political power existed between
different and conflicting religions would the state be safe from domina-
tion by the moral or doctrinal authority of one religious institution. As
long as religious pluralism existed, any attempt by one religion to ob-
tain dominion in politics over all others would be in the mutual interest
of all others to block since none wanted to be dominated by another.
Therefore, if one religion did attempt to dominate politically, all or most
others would form an alliance to defeat that religion.
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Unitarianism and the Declaration's Theology
A politics based on individual reason was best served and preserved
by a religion similarly based, as the young Jefferson had learned from
reading Bolingbroke (see chapter 5). This knowledge must have wor-
ried Jefferson, since he was painfully aware of the disparity between
the individual reason-based politics of the new United States and its
predominantly faith-based religions. Adding to his worries was his
knowledge that maintaining a legal balance of power among faith-
based authoritarian religions was a precarious method of preserving
religious and political freedom, because all such balances could be
altered and thereby destroyed. In his native Virginia before 1776 he
had witnessed how large immigrations of people of a similar faith
could disrupt the stability of political power between religions.92 In
the long run, he believed, the best safeguard against the potential for
tyranny in both religion and politics of sectarian faith-based religions
was education (see chapter 5). Through education individuals would
be liberated from religious superstition and clerical domination and
learn to reason for themselves, an outcome conducive to both reli-
gious and political freedom. But an intermediate or "more proximate"
remedy to the dangers posed by authoritarian religions emerged after
passage of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and the federal
Bill of Rights, according to Jefferson. That remedy was "Unitarian-
ism," which he had "no doubt" would "ere long, be the religion of the
majority from north and south. "93
The basic tenets of Unitarianism were a denial of the Trinity and
acceptance of the unity of God and the humanity of Jesus; a denial of
original sin and a belief in the essential goodness of man; and a belief
in man's perfectibility through rational humanitarian means.94 More
important, from Jefferson's perspective, Unitarians rejected any "uni-
versal, exclusive, or binding definition" of creed.95 Unitarian Joseph
Priestley-who had an impact on Jefferson's religious views96 after he
emigrated in 1794 to Philadelphia, where Jefferson attended his lec-
tures-attributed this rejection to a belief that no doctrine or creed
was necessary to attain salvation; rather, salvation was earned by moral
actions and had nothing to do with either doctrinal faith or grace.97
Jefferson feared, however, that Unitarians would "fall into the fatal
error of fabricating formulas of creed and confessions of faith, the
engines which so soon destroyed the religion of Jesus, and made of
Christendom a mere Aceldama." He praised the Quakers for-not fall-
ing into this error and added, "Be this the wisdom of Unitarians. "98
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To jefferson, surrendering one's reason to a system of creedal doc-
trines, even by choice, was not only ineffective in attaining salvation
and led to bigotry but also an offense to one's self. Such a surrender
was using freedom to become unfree, for after pledging allegiance and
obedience to a creed, the individual was bound to that creed, became
a follower as well as an advocate of its system of beliefs, and thus
suspended his critical reason with regard to those beliefs. jefferson
expressed these ideas in personal terms: "I never submitted the whole
system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever, in
religion, in philosophy, in politics or in anything else, where I was
capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction, is the last degrada-
tion of a free and moral agent. "99
The Unitarian Church, by not requiring any universal or binding
creedal commitment, allowed individuals to maintain the freedom of
their critical reason and moral choice in religion and still be members.
As a result, Unitarians were without any binding ecclesiastical or cleri-
cal authority that told them what to believe and what was right and
wrong, which allowed for religious pluralism within the Unitarian
Church. To jefferson, the political implications of this were extremely
important. It left Unitarians free to make moral and rational decisions
in politics, decisions the ecclesiastical and clerical authority of most
orthodox colonial denominations claimed the moral authority to make
for their congregations (see chapter 1). Consequently, Unitarianism
was consistent with Jefferson's liberal religious and political views.
Jefferson in effect said this, along with his opinion that Unitarianism
was an emergent religionthat would soon become dominant in America
as a result of the practice of free religious inquiry fostered by Ameri-
can law, in a statement he made in 1822: "I rejoice that in this blessed
country of free enquiry and belief, which has surrendered its creed and
conscience to neither kings nor priests, the genuine doctrine of one
only God is reviving, and I trust there is not a young man now living in
the United States who will not die an Unitarian."loo
Unitarianism was not only in accord with the use of individual criti-
cal reason in religion as espoused and put into practice by the Enlight-
enment and jefferson; it was a product of the Enlightenment and criti-
cal reason.10l It would seem, therefore, that jefferson regarded it as the
religious counterpart of the University of Virginia, which Charles
Sanford described as "an institution that would foster the develop-
ment of the ideals of the Enlightenment by which he had lived all his
life. "102 Indeed, Unitarianism was perceived by jefferson as a religion
that corresponded generally with the theology of the Declaration of
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Independence and one that, like that theology, was conducive to the
efficacy of the political theory of that document. As a religion based on
individual reason and judgment, it served and preserved the similarly
based politics of the Declaration. It was thereby a religion in accord
with what Jefferson as a young man had learned from Bolingbroke.
Conclusion
It should now be clear that Thomas Jefferson was very much the eclec-
tic. Many thinkers contributed to his worldview, principally Henry St.
John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke; John Locke; Henry Home, Lord
Kames; and Thomas Reid. Bolingbroke gave Jefferson his heterodox
views on religion, which emphasized a deistic, universal, impartial God
of natural religion whom Jefferson referred to in the Declaration of
Independence as "Nature's God." Locke contributed the political theory
of the Declaration and added an egalitarian element to the God of that
document, a God who created all men equal. He and Bolingbroke also
contributed to Jefferson's ideas on reason without restraint in the search
for truth, including religious truth.
Jefferson's ideas on religious freedom and their relation to political
freedom were predominantly Lockean as well. Jefferson did not go
along with Locke's epistemology, however. Locke's political philoso-
phy depended on the ability of the reason of each individual to find
the moral laws of nature easily and independently, yet Locke said that
these laws were not easily found with reason, using the epistemolgy he
promulgated. For Jefferson, it was Kames who bridged this gap be-
tween Lockean political thought and epistemology with his concept of
man as a being who could independently and easily find the moral
laws of nature by using his moral sense and a minimal amount of
reason.
Reid's contribution was to rescue the senses and reason of man,
faculties precious to Jefferson as an apostle of reason, from the on-
slaught of philosophical skepticism. Reid claimed that Locke's episte-
mology-which stated that ideas of objects perceived by the senses
mediated in the mind between the object perceived and the perceiver-
was a principal cause of philosophical skepticism. Reid's commonsense
philosophy rejected the notion of such mediating ideas in the process
of perceiving truth. Kames also contributed to the defeat of philo-
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sophical skepticism, especially as respects the self of man, and also to
the meaning of "self-evident" that jefferson used in the Declaration.
jefferson's political thought as stated in the Declaration, therefore, did
not derive exclusively from Locke or the Scottish Enlightenment think-
ers, as Carl Becker and Garry Wills have maintained.
Some revisionist scholars, such as Garry Wills, perceive a communi-
tarian element in jefferson and the Declaration; others, such as j.G.A.
Pocock, though acknowledging an element of Lockean individual rights
in the Declaration, maintain that it was a useful but short-lived aspect
of jeffersonian thought, giving way to a communitarian perspective
after 1776. The Lockean ideas stated in the Declaration, however, as
well as jefferson's subsequent emphasis on individual rights and
Kamesean moral sense, are irreconcilable with the conclusions of ei-
ther category of revisionists. jefferson later emphasized individual rights
to the extent of believing that if the community claimed rights super-
seding those of the individual, the result would be slavery. This
anticommunitarian idea may have been implicit in Lockean theory
contained in the Declaration, but jefferson expressed it explicitly in
1782: "If we are made in some degree for others, yet in a greater are
we made for ourselves. It were contrary to feeling and indeed ridicu-
lous to suppose a man had less right in himself than one of his neigh-
bors or all of them put together. This would be slavery and not that
liberty which the bill of rights has made inviolable and for the preser-
vation of which our government has been changed."l
Not only Locke's stress on individual rights but Kames's moral-
sense concept of man upheld the ideas jefferson expressed in this state-
ment. Kames believed that benevolence, or the performance of actions
that benefited others, was not always a duty; if it were, individuals
would be bound to live their lives for the benefit of others, making
each one a slave to actions on behalf of "one of his neighbors or all of
them put together." Thus, benevolence seen as always a duty would
have a similar impact on the individual as would community rights
that superseded those of the individual. To Kames, however, only jus-
tice, or refraining from acts that harmed others, was always a duty.
God, he believed, made justice a duty in man via the moral sense be-
cause He made man sociable by nature, and if men harmed one an-
other they could not be sociable. Benevolence, though also part of
Kames's moral philosophy, was not always a duty because society could
exist without it.
I have argued that Kames's ideas on the moral sense were held by
jefferson during the writing of the Declaration and that he continued
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to hold these ideas during his later years. This continuity is substanti-
ated in a letter jefferson wrote in 1816: "Assuming the fact, that the
earth has been created in time, and consequently the dogma of final
causes, we yield, of course, to this short syllogism. Man was created
for social intercourse; but social intercourse cannot be maintained
without a sense of justice; then man must have been created with a
sense of justice."2
Even if benevolent acts were not always a duty, the heterodox the-
ology of Jefferson and the Declaration nevertheless provided a power-
ful inducement to their performance-apart from their giving pleasure
to the performer, which Kames said was an effect of such acts. Salva-
tion, according to that theology, was earned by individuals through
the performance of moral actions, which included benevolent acts. In
this way the theology of Jefferson and the Declaration, to borrow a
phrase used by Thomas Pangle about Locke's ideas, "narrowed the
gap between individual self-interest and communal welfare"-even
though it did not close it.3
Kames's concept of man was the cornerstone of jefferson's Lockean
political theory as stated in the Declaration, whereas the Christian
view of fallen man and original sin was antithetical to that theory.
Kamesean man was able to provide his own moral direction indepen-
dent of scripture, church, and clergy. He could therefore be trusted to
provide moral direction to his government and, consequently, to have
authority over that government. According to jefferson, the political
implication of the Christian original sin concept of man was to give
scripture, church, and clergy moral authority over government. Mo-
rality supplied this way was needed by government for its moral
direction, since men tainted by original sin could not be trusted to
supply that direction. The Christian concept of man thereby precluded
the Lockean democracy specified in the Declaration, where the people
had moral authority over their government because they were able to
supply its moral direction independent of scripture, church, and clergy.
Indeed, the Christian concept of man had frequently resulted in the
establishment of authoritarian rule said to be divinely ordained, with
the people having no authority over their government at all.
The importance of Kames's moral-sense concept of man to the effi-
cacy of the Declaration's political theory was expressed by jefferson in
a letter to David Hartley in 1787. In the United States, he said, "we
shall have the difference between a light and a heavy government, as
clear gain. I have no fear, but that the result of our experiment will be,
that men may be trusted to govern themselves without a master. Could
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the contrary of this be proved, I should conclude, either that there is
no God, or that he is a malevolent being."4 Here Jefferson defined a
"heavy" government as "a master" having absolute authority over its
subjects, and a "light" government as one that gives the people au-
thority over their government because they are able, and therefore
"trusted," to supply its moral direction.
A moral breakdown of society under a "light" government would
prove the people incapable of supplying its moral direction-but
Jefferson confidently maintained in his letter to Hartley that this would
not happen. If it did, there were two implications: either "there is no
God" or "he is a malevolent being." A God who created persons as
social yet simultaneously morally defective beings, as did the Chris-
tian God, who created men who would fall and thereby become mor-
ally tainted, would be "malevolent." Persons with God-given social
instincts and God-given moral deficiency would be unable to refrain
from inflicting harm and pain on each other unless they were under
the dominion of a "master," a government having absolute authority.
But authoritarian governments too inflicted pain on their subjects, the
pain of tyranny and despotism, as Jefferson specified in the Declara-
tion. Therefore, his statement to Hartley implied, the Christian con-
cept of original sin, if proved true, left human beings in a cruel and
painful dilemma: they could suffer in a democracy at the hands of one
another because they and the government they controlled lacked moral
direction because men were morally tainted, or they could suffer the
tyranny of a Leviathan repressing and oppressing them. In a democ-
racy, people would inflict suffering horizontally on one another; un-
der authoritarian rule, government would inflict suffering vertically
on the people from its position of absolute authority over them.
Jefferson implied, in this statement to I-Iartley, that a benevolent
God would not manifest the cruelty or malevolence of placing humans
in this painful dilemma by creating them as social and yet simulta-
neously morally deficient beings, as did the Christian God of revela-
tion. The dilemma was avoided by Jefferson's rationally known
"Nature's God" who created men as both social and moral beings,
like those Kames described. The moral men of Jefferson's and the
Declaration's theology, unlike the morally tainted men of Christianity,
would be able to earn their salvation by their own moral actions and
to govern themselves in a Lockean democracy to which they supplied
moral direction, independent of scripture, church, and clergy.
Late in his life, Jefferson did not waver in his commitment to the
heterodox theology and Lockean liberal political theory of the Decla-
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ration. Not long before his death in 1826, he designed his own tomb-
stone with an inscription that listed the three achievements for which
he wanted to be remembered: "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson-
Author Of the Declaration of American Independence-Of The Stat-
ute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and-Father of the University
of Virginia."5 In the first of these achievements Jefferson stated his
heterodox theology and Lockean political theory. In the second he
protected that theology and theory from authoritarian sectarian or-
thodoxy. In the third he provided for the actualization of the reason of
each individual and encouraged its unlimited use, which he believed
would liberate mankind from what he regarded as the false claims of
revelation and the scriptural and ecclesiastical authority that resulted
from those claims. This actualization of reason, he believed, would
cause individuals to look to their own reason and moral sense in both
religion and politics.
Perhaps the greatest testimony to his lasting commitment to the
Declaration's political theory and heterodox theology is to be found in
a statement made just ten days before his death. Commemorating the
document's fiftieth anniversary, he wrote:
May it [the Declaration] be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to
some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all,) the signal of
arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and
superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume
the blessings and security of self-government. That form which we
have substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of
reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened, or opening, to
the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has
already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of
mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored
few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace
of God. These are grounds of hope for others.6
Significantly, Jefferson here indicted orthodox Christian authorities
for their offenses against the freedom and rights of man. Among these
were the bondage of "chains under which monkish ignorance and su-
perstition had persuaded them [men] to bind themselves." He also
repudiated "the grace of God" as an offense. From the time of his
extracts of Bolingbroke's writings, Judeo-Christian "grace" to Jefferson
meant privilege or partiality extended by God to some men over oth-
ers. Grace was thus alien to the impartial, universal, and egalitarian
"Nature's God" of Bolingbroke, Locke, and the Declaration; it was a
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tool used by some men to claim privilege and authority over "the mass
of mankind," who, under the spell of "monkish ignorance and super-
stition," accepted those claims. That acceptance destroyed or restricted
the people's freedom, their equality, their reason, and their rights. As
Jefferson put it, "a favored few," as a result of grace, were "booted
and spurred" and rode "the mass of mankind," who were taught to
believe they were "born with saddles on their backs" and therefore
accepted the privilege and authority claims of the "favored few."
Liberation from the offenses committed by orthodox religious au-
thority and belief could be found in the ideas and ideals of the Decla-
ration. Its democratic political theory would assure "the blessings ...
of self-government" and "the rights of man"-provided that "all eyes
were opened" and people freed themselves from "monkish ignorance
and superstition." What would open the eyes of the people? Jefferson's
answer affirmed a long-held view: "the unbounded exercise of reason
and freedom of opinion." Here Jefferson rejected, as he had while a
student, any boundaries or restraints on individual reason, such as the
scholasticism that restrained reason with ecclesiastical authority and
tradition in Catholicism, or scripture and ecclesiastical authority in
Protestantism.
Implicit in this final statement of Jefferson on the Declaration is an
affirmation of the heterodox theology of that document, since that
theology rejected and opposed monkish ignorance, superstition, grace,
and any restraints on individual reason, as Jefferson did in this state-
ment. Indeed, when he said of the Declaration, "May it be to the world,
... the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish
ingnorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves,
and assume the blessings and security of self-government," he stated
both the political theory and the theological parts of the Declaration.
Significantly, he did this in a manner that made the Declaration's the-
ology, which rejected the authority of orthodoxy, a prerequisite to the
efficacy of its political theory. He did this by first mentioning his hope
that men would be aroused by the Declaration to "burst the chains
under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them
to bind themselves." The theology of "Nature's God" in the Declara-
tion, with its emphasis on the authority of individual reason in reli-
gion, would accomplish this bursting. Then, in their newfound free-
dom, he mentioned his hope that men would "assume the blessings
and security of self-government" as described in the Declaration. Thus,
the Declaration of Independence with its Lockean democratic political
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theory and theology born of "Nature's God" attacked two claims of
absolute authority-that of any government over its subjects and that
of any religion over the minds of men as respects religious and moral
truth-by putting the authority of both government and religion in the
hands of the individual human beings that make up the populace.
ApPENDIX
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The Declaration of Independence
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and
equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle
them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happi-
ness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed,
that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles
and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to Them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dic-
tate that Governments long established should not be changed for light
and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that
Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are suferable, than
to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accus-
tomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing
invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them under
absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security. Such
has been the patient Sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the
Necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of Gov-
ernment. The History of the present King of Great-Britain is a History
of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the
Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this,
let Facts be submitted to a candid World.
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He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and neces-
sary for the public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and
pressing Importance, unless suspended in their Operation till his As-
sent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly ne-
glected to attend to them.
He has refused to pass other Laws for the Accommodation of large
Districts of People, unless those People would relinquish the right of
Representation in the Legislature, a Right inestimable to them and
formidable to Tyrants only.
He has called together Legislative Bodies at Places unusual, uncom-
fortable, and distant from the Depository of their public Records, for
the sole Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance with his Mea-
sures.
He has dissolved Representive Houses repeatedly, for opposing with
manly Firmness his Invasions on the Rights of the People.
He has refused for a Long Time, after such Dissolutions, to cause
others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of
Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise;
the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the Dangers of
Invasion from without, and Convulsions within.
He has endeavored to prevent the Population of these States; for
that Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners;
refusing to pass others to encourage their Migrations hither, and rais-
ing the Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.
He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his
Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.
He has made Judges dependent of his Will alone, for the Tenure of
their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.
He has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither Swarms
of Officers to harass our People, and eat out their Substance.
He has kept among us, in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without
the Consent of our Legislatures.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior
to the Civil Power.
He has combined with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign
to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his
Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:
For quartering Large Bodies of Armed Troops among us:
For protecting them, bya mock Trial, from Punishment for any
Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:
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For cutting off our Trade with all Parts of the world:
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:
For depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury:
For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences:
For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighboring
Province, establishing therein an arbitrary Government, and enlarging
its Boundaries, so as to render it at once an Example and fit Instru-
ment for introducing the same absolute Rule into these Colonies:
For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws,
and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:
For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves in-
vested with Power to legislate for us in all Cases whatsoever.
He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Pro-
tection and waging War against us.
He has plundered our Seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns,
and destroyed the Lives of our People.
He is, at this Time, transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenies
to compleat the Works of Death, Desolution, and Tyranny, already
begun with circumstances of Cruelty and Perfidy, scarcely paralleled
in the most barbarous Ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civi-
lized Nation.
He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high
Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the Executioners
of their Friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.
He has excited domestic Insurrections amongst us, and has endeav-
ored to bring on the Inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless Indian
Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished De-
struction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions.
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress
in the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered
only by repeated Injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by
every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free
People.
Nor have We been wanting in Attention to our British Brethren. We
have warned them from Time to Time of Attempts by their Legislature
to extend an unwarrantable Jurisdiction over us. We have reminded
them of the Circumstance of our Emigration and Settlement here. We
have appealed to their native Justice and Magnanimity, and we have
conjured them by the Ties of our common Kindred to disavow these
Usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our Connections and
Correspondence. They too have been deaf to the Voice of Justice and
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of Consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the Necessity, which
denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of Man-
kind, Enemies in War, in Peace, Friends.
We, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS, Assembled, appealing to the
Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in
the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies,
solemnly Publish and Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of
Right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they
are absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all
political Connection between them and the State of Great-Britain, is
and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as FREE AND INDEPEN-
DENT STATES, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace,
contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and
Things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do. And for the
support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of
divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our
Fortunes, and our sacred Honor. ~:.
~:-The text used here is "The First Printing of the Declaration of Independence,
as inserted in the Rough Journal of Congress," from Julian P. Boyd, The Dec-
laration of Independence: The Evolution of the Text (Washington, 1943),
Plate X. In his 1945 edition of this work, Boyd refers to this document as
"The First Official Text of the Declaration of Independence."
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far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it." As respects
laws passed by the legislative Locke said, "These Laws also ought to be
designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the People" (Locke,
Two Treatises, pp. 355-56, 363).
31. Ibid., p. 367.
32. The same language was used in the rough draft (Boyd, Declaration of
Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 2 of plate 5)..
33. The word "utterly" was added to the rough draft language (ibid.).
34. The phrase "in the Legislature" was added to the rough draft lan-
guage (ibid.).
35. Locke, Two Treatises~ p. 408.
36. Ibid., pp. 398-99.
37. The word "only" was added to the rough draft language after "Tyrants"
(Boyd, Declaration of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 2 of plate 5).
38. The same language was used in the rough draft (ibid.).
39. Locke, Two Treatises~ p. 409.
40. The same language was used in the rough draft (Boyd, Declaration of
Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 2 of plate 5).
41. The phrase "long Time, after such Dissolutions" was originally "long
space of time" in the rough draft (ibid.).
42. The word "Constitution" was "constitutions" in the rough draft; oth-
erwise, the same language was used (ibid., plate 10 and pp. 2, 4 of plate 5).
43. The rough draft did not contain the words "Acts of" (ibid., plate 10
and p. 2 of plate 5).
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44. The same language was used in the rough draft (ibid.).
45. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 362.
46. This language is the same as that of the rough draft (Boyd, Declara-
tion of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 3 of plate 5).
47. Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 402, 420.
48. Ibid., pp. 335-36.
49. Government Commonplace Book, pp. 22-23.
50. Chinard in ibid., p. 23.
51. This is the same language contained in the rough draft (Boyd, Decla-
ration of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 4 of plate 5).
52. The words "an unwarrantable" and "us" were inserted in place of
"a" and "these our states," respectively, in the rough draft (ibid.).
53. Ibid.
54. This language is the same in the rough draft (ibid.).
55. See Jefferson, Summary View, pp. iv, 5.
56. Government Commonplace Book, pp. 64-65, 137, 186. Robert
Willman mentions Blackstone's view that the source of feudalism was "the
German tribal organization" ("Blackstone and the Theoretical Perfection of
English Law," p. 45). Caroline Robbins's research led her to conclude that
Jefferson's "obsession" with the Saxon myth was partly due to his reading of
Obadiah Hulme, An Historical Essay on the English Constitution (The Eigh-
teenth Century Commonwealthman, pp. 363-64).
57. As one of the revisers of the law of the state of Virginia after the
adoption of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson said of the common
law that the revisers "only needed to go over Saxon statutes and found in
general [that they] only had to reduce law to its ancient Saxon condition to
make it what it should be" (quoted in Dumbauld, Thomas Jefferson and the
Law, p. 135.
58. Jefferson, Summary View, p. v.
59. Ibid., p. 6. Jefferson retained this idea after the Revolution as settlers
migrated from the original states across the continent; he believed that "squat-
ter sovereignty" would result in a series of "sister republics," according to
Goetsmann, "Savage Enough to Prefer the Woods," p. 109. See also Wiltse,
"Thomas Jefferson on the Law of Nations," pp. 69-70.
60. Jefferson, Summary View, p. 6.
61. This argument, although specifically applicable to the colonies, falls
within the general appeal to the Saxons made by some in the eighteenth cen-
tury' according to Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, p. 239.
62. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 345.
63. Boyd, Declaration of Independence (1943), pp. 19-20; Papers (Boyd
and Cullen), 1:415-16.
64. Jefferson to James Madison, 30 August 1823, in Writings (Ford), 10:266.
65. Jefferson to Henry Lee, 8 May 1825, in ibid., p. 343.
66. Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, 30 May 1790, in Writings
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(Lipscomb and Bergh), 8:31. On Jefferson's "Federalist" reference, see
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist Papers.
67. Boyd, Declaration ofIndependence (1943), pp. 13,21. See also Dana,
"The Political Principles of the Declaration," pp. 319-43.
68. C. Smith,]ames Wilson, pp. 26, 55; and Hill, George Mason, Consti-
tutionalist, p. 140.
69. Becker, Declaration of Independence, p. 27; Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution, pp. 27, 36; and Dworetz, The Unvar-
nished Doctrine, pp. 65-96. For reservations about the familiarity and influ-
ence of the Second Treatise in the colonies at the time of the Revolution, see
Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies," p. 581;
Tate, "The Social Contract in America," pp. 376-78; and Dunn, "The Poli-
tics of Locke in England and America," pp. 79-80.
70. In response to Miles King's claim to have had a divine revelation from
God, Jefferson expressed a polite skepticism: "Whether the particular rev-
elation you suppose to have been made to yourself were real or imaginary,
your reason alone is the competent judge. For dispute as long as we will on
religious tenets, our reason at last must ultimately decide, as it is the only
oracle which God has given us to determine between what really comes from
Him and the phantasms of a disordered or deluded imagination. When He
means to make a personal revelation, He carries conviction of its authentic-
ity to the reason He has bestowed as the umpire of truth. You believe you
have been favored with such a special communication. Your reason, not
mine, is to judge of this; and if it shall be His pleasure to favor me with a like
admonition, I shall obey it with the same fidelity with which I would obey
His known will in all cases. Hitherto I have been under the guidance of that
portion of reason which He has thought proper to deal out to me. I have
followed it faithfully in all important cases, to such a degree at least as leaves
me without uneasiness; and if on minor occasions I have erred from its dic-
tates, I have trust in Him who made us what we are, and know it was not His
plan to make us always unerring" (26 September 1814, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 14:197.
71. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:79.
72. Locke, Ofthe Conduct of the Understanding, p. 56 (hereafter cited as
Conduct).
73. Jefferson to Meeting of the Visitors, University of Virginia, 7 October
1822, in Writings (Lipscomb and Bergh), 19:414.
74. Locke, Conduct, pp. 59-60.
75. Jefferson to Peter Carr, 10 August 1787, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh), 6:261, 258.
76. Literary Commonplace Book (Wilson), pp. 97, 227.
77. Ibid., pp. 120, 227.
78. Ibid., pp.71-72, 228. Chinard's edition of the Literary Commonplace
Book gives a slightly different translation.
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79. Locke, Two Treatises~ pp. 304, 271.
80. Ibid., pp. 269-71, 284.
81. Ibid., pp. 269-71.
82. Ibid., pp. 357-58, 360, 363: "A Man, as has been proved, cannot
subject himself to the Arbitrary Power of another; and having in the State of
Nature no Arbitrary Power over the Life, Liberty, or Possession of another,
but only so much as the Law of Nature gave him for the preservation of
himself, and the rest of Mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the
Common-wealth, and by it to the Legislative Power, so that the Legislative
can have no more than this. Their Power in the utmost Bounds of it, is
limited to the publick good of the Society. It is a Power, that hath no other
end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, en-
slave, or designedly to impoverish the Subjects. The Obligations of the Law
of Nature, cease not in Society, but only in many Cases are drawn closer, and
have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed to them, to inforce their
observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men,
Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Mens
Actions, must, as well as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable
to the Law of Nature, i.e. to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration,
and the fundamental Law of Nature being the preservation of Mankind, no
Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against it....
"For all the power the Government has, being only for the good of the
Society, as it ought not to be Arbitrary and at Pleasure, so it ought to be
exercised by established and promulgated Laws: that both the People may
know their Duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the Law, and the
Rulers too kept within their due bounds, and not to be tempted, by the Power
they have in their hands, to imploy it to such purposes, and by such mea-
sures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly....
"These are the Bounds which the trust that is put in them by the Society,
and the Law of God and Nature, have set to the Legislative Power of every
Commonwealth, in all Forms of Government. First, They are to govern by
promulgated established Laws. ... Secondly, These Laws also ought to be
designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the People."
83. Ibid., pp. 426-27: "Here, 'tis like, the common Question will be made,
Who shall be judge whether the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their
Trust? This, perhaps, ill affected and factious Men may spread among the
People, when the Prince only makes use of his due Prerogative. To this I
reply, The People shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his Trustee
or Deputy acts well, and according to the Trust reposed in him, but he who
deputes him, and must, by having deputed him have still a Power to discard
him, when he fails in his Trust? If this be reasonable in particular Cases of
private Men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment;
where the Welfare of Millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not
prevented, is greater, and the Redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?"
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84. Jefferson's rough draft version: "We hold these truths to be sacred
and undeniable; that all men are created equal and independent; that from
that equal creation they derive rights, inherent & inalienable, among which
are the preservation of life, liberty, & the pursuit of happiness; that to secure
these ends, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to
abolish it, & to institute new government, laying it's foundation on such
principles & organising it's powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety & happiness." Boyd believes that Jefferson him-
self changed "sacred and undeniable" to "self-evident." With two excep-
tions, he also made the other changes that appear in the first printing as
approved by the Continental Congress, for these changes appeared in the
rough draft in Jefferson's handwriting when it was submitted to the Con-
gress, and John Adams in a letter to Timothy Pickering did not attribute any
of them to himself, Benjamin Franklin, or the committee to whom Jefferson
first submitted his draft. The Congress made the two changes that were not
Jefferson's. They replaced the words "inherent and" with "certain" and
changed "inalienable" to "unalienable." See Boyd, Declaration of Indepen-
dence (1943), plate 10, p. 1 of plate 5, and pp. 24-26, 32; John Adams,
Works, 2:514. Jefferson to James Madison, 30 August 1823, attributed a
few other changes to Franklin and Adams: "You have seen the original pa-
per [rough draft] now in my hands, with the corrections of Dr. Franklin and
Mr. Adams interlined in their own handwritings. Their alterations were two
or three only, and merely verbal" (Writings [Lipscomb and Bergh], 15:461).
For a detailed account of the writing of the Declaration, see also Hazelton,
The Declaration of Independence: Its History, pp. 141-55.
85. Two references to God in the final paragraph of the Declaration have
more orthodox Judeo-Christian connotations: "appealing to the Supreme
Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions" and "with a firm
Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence." Neither of these references
was written by Jefferson, however. Both were inserted by Congress (Boyd,
Declaration of Independence (1943), p. 34).
Chapter 4. Kames and the Moral Sense
1. A. Koch, The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, p. 4.
2. Jefferson to Robert Skipwith, 3 August 1771, in Papers (Boyd and
Cullen), 1:80.
3. Hume, Essays and Treatises, 1:179.
4. Bolingbroke regarded scripture as history and commented on the cleri-
cal corruption of scripture in his Letters on the Study and Use ofHistory (in
Works, 2:347-49): "I have said so much concerning the share which divines
of all religions have taken in the corruption of history, that I should have
anathemas pronounced against me, no doubt, in the east and west, by the
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dairo, the mufti, and the pope, if these letters were submitted to ecclesiasti-
cal censure; for surely, my Lord, the clergy have a better title, than the sons
of Apollo, to be called 'genus irratabile vatum.' What would it be, if I went
about to shew, how many of the Christian clergy abuse, by misrepresenta-
tion and false quotation, the history they can no longer corrupt? And yet this
task would not be, even to me, an hard one.... No scholar will dare to deny,
that false history, as well as sham miracles, has been employed to propagate
christianity formerly: and whoever examines the writers of our own age, will
find the same abuse of history continued. Many and many instances of this
abuse might be produced. It is grown into custom, writers copy one another,
and the mistake that was committed, or the falsehood that was invented by
one, is adopted by hundreds." Compare the following anticlerical statement
of Jefferson: "I have contemplated on their order from the Magi of the East
to the Saints on the West, and I have found no difference of Character, but of
more or less caution, in proportion to their information or ignorance of
those on whom their interested duperies were to be plaid off" (Writings [Ford],
10:12-13). Jefferson, like Bolingbroke, used genus trratabile vatum in de-
scribing the clergy in his letters of 15 February 1818 to Albert Gallatin and
19 July 1822 to Benjamin Waterhouse (both in Writings [Lipscomb and
Bergh], 14:259, 15:391).
5. Bolingbroke, Works, 4:412-13: "Such is the knavery and such the
folly of mankind, that no example, antient nor modern, pagan nor christian,
can be produced of such an order of men [priests] once established that has
not aimed at acquiring from their institution, and that has not acquired,
sooner or later, immoderate wealth and exorbitant power.
"Few men are so little acquainted with the history of the christian world
as not to know, that the wealth of this church is equal, at least in many
countries, to that of the egyptian church; that the influence of the antient
could be greater than that of the modern magi over all ranks of men; and
that the bishop of Rome has exercised, even over kings in many countries, a
power which he claimed, in all, of the same nature with that of the ethiopian
church over kings of one country." Compare Jefferson on Christian and Jewish
priestcraft: "I abuse the priests, indeed, who have so much abused the pure
and holy doctrines of their Master, and who have laid me under no obliga-
tions of reticence as to the tricks of their trade. The genuine system of Jesus,
and the artificial structures they have erected, to make them the instruments
of wealth, power, and preeminence to themselves, are as distinct things in my
view as light and darkness; and while I have classed them with soothsayers
and necromancers, I place Him among the greatest reformers of morals, and
scourges of priest-craft that have ever existed.... But His heresies against
Judaism prevailing in the long run, the priests have tacked about, and rebuilt
upon them the temple which He destroyed, as splendid, as profitable, and as
imposing as that" (to Charles Clay, Esq., 29 January 1815, in Writings
[Lipscomb and Bergh], 14:233).
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6. Becker, The Declaration of Independence, p. 31.
7. Jefferson to Charles Clay, Esq., 29 June 1815, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 14:233-34. For hierarchical aspects of Christian sects other than
Catholicism, see Stout, "Religion, Communications, and the Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution," pp. 525-26; Willard, "The Character
of a Good Ruler," p. 251; and Foster, Their Solitary Way, p. 18.
8. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 271.
9. See chapter 3, notes 82, 83.
10. Dunn, The Political Thought ofJohn Locke, pp. 182-83.
11. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 351.
12. Locke, Human Understanding, p. 549.
13. Dunn, The Political Thought ofJohn Locke, p. 192.
14. Locke, Works, 2:532, 535. For a reconciliation of The Reasonable-
ness of Christianity and Human Understanding, see Ashcraft, "Faith and
Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy," pp. 194-223.
15. A meaning of the Second Treatise was that most men had to look to
those with superior rational capacity for moral knowledge, according to
Aarsleff, "The State of Nature and the Nature of Man in Locke," p. 133.
16. Human Understanding was on a 1767 reading list of books Jefferson
recommended to a law student in his care; see The Complete Jefferson, pp.
1043-47. Although the original and Jefferson's first copy of that original list
are missing, Jefferson sent another copy to John Minor (30 August 1814, in
Writings [Ford], 11:480), stating that it was "without change" except that
books published later had made it possible "in some of the departments of
science to substitute better for less perfect publications which we then pos-
sessed. "
17. Jefferson briefly paraphrased Reasonableness in October or Novem-
ber 1776 (Papers [Boyd and Cullen], 1:525, 529, 549-50).
18. See White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution, p. 275.
19. Government Commonplace Book, pp. 167, 13, 95-135.
20. Chinard in ibid., p. 19.
21. Wills, Inventing America, p. 201.
22. Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment," pp. 514, 522.
23. See The Complete Jefferson, pp. 1043-47.
24. Kames, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion,
pp. 95-96 (hereafter cited as Essays). J. Ferguson, in The Philosophy of Dr.
Samuel Clarke and Its Critics, pp. 170-75, wrote that Clarke's moral theory
was based on the rationally determined "fitness or unfitness of certain kinds
of conduct of some persons to other persons which arises from the different
relations in which people may stand to one another." Such a rationally made
moral determination was similar to Locke's rationally demonstrated law of
nature in that it was "as evident as that in mathematics" once deduced by
using abstract reason.
25. "The greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for Demon-
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stration; nor can carry a chain of Proofs, which in that way they must always
depend on for Conviction, and cannot be required to assent to till they see
the Demonstration" (Locke, Works, 2:535).
26. Kames, Essays, pp. 60, 99. Cf. Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Origi-
nal of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, pp. xiv-xv: "The weakness of our
Reason, and the avocations arising from the Infirmity and Necessitys of our
Nature, are so great, that very few Men could ever have form'd those long
Deductions of Reason, which shew some Actions to be in the whole advan-
tageous to the Agent and their Contrarys pernicious. The A UTHOR of Na-
ture has much better furnish'd us for a virtuous Conduct, than our Moralists
seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have
for the preservation of our Bodys. He has made Virtue a lovely Form to
excite our pursuit of it; and has given us strong Affections to be the Springs
of each virtuous Action."
27. It appears on his 1767 list of books recommended to a law student.
28. Kames, Principles of Equity, pp. 30-31. Broderick, "Pulpit, Physics,
and Politics," p. 58, points out that "introspection" plus "observation of
other men" gave the Scots a knowledge of human nature based on what they
deemed a crude kind of empiricism.
29. Kames, Essays, pp. 76, 88-90.
30. McGuinness, Henry Home, Lord Kames, p. 35. Jefferson, it seems,
read Hobbes. He took exception to Hobbes's idea (Leviathan, p. 89) that
"the Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more
are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that
forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law
be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it." Jefferson
expressed his disagreement when he said of a proposed work on morals by
Destutt Tracy, "I lament to see that he will adopt the principles of Hobbes,
or humiliation to human nature; that the sense of justice and injustice is not
derived from our natural organization, but founded on convention only" (to
Francis W. Gilmer, 7 June 1816, in Writings [Lipscomb and Bergh], 15:24-
25). Although this comment was made in 1816, it would seem probable that
he read Hobbes during the years before 1776 when he was reading exten-
sively, at which time he read Kames. Jefferson's awareness of Kames's as-
similation of parts of Hobbes's ideas on man as a result of reading Essays
may well have been what stimulated his interest in Hobbes.
31. Kames, Essays, p. 76.
32. Ibid., p. 63. Cf. Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, 1:61:
"This moral sense from its very nature appears to be designed for regulating
and controlling all our powers. This dignity and commanding nature we are
immediately conscious of, as we are conscious of the power itself. Nor can
such matters of immediate feeling be otherwise proved but by appeals to the
heart."
33. Kames, Essays, p. 123. See Forbes, "Natural Law and the Scottish
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Enlightenment," pp. 198-99, for Kames's ideas on determining the laws of
nature.
34. Kames, Essays, p. 99.
35. Locke, Works, 2:535.
36. Kames, Essays, pp. 59-60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 71, 128, 68. Kames defined
the law of nature as "rules of our conduct and behavior, founded on natural
principles, approved of by the moral sense, and enforced by natural rewards
and punishments" (p. 122).
37. Ibid., p. 19.
38. jefferson to Robert Skipwith, 3 August 1771, in Papers (Boyd and
Cullen),1:76-79.
39. Kames, Essays, p. 67.
40. jefferson to Peter Carr, 10 August 1787, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh), 6:257-58. Unlike jefferson, Locke believed in original sin, according
to Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity, pp. 211-14.
41. john Dewey, The Living Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson, p. 14, wrote
that the basis of jefferson's political theory was his faith in the moral nature
of man.
42. White, Philosophy of the American Revolution, pp. 118, 120-21.
43. Ibid., pp. 122-23, 268, 125.
44. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:33-34.
45. jefferson, Summary View, p. 12.
46. White, Philosophy of the American Revolution, p. 114.
47. Ibid.
48. "We are not left to gather our duty by abstract reasoning, nor indeed
by any reasoning. It is engraved upon the table of our hearts. We adapt our
actions to the course of nature, by mere instinct, without reasoning, or even
experience" (Kames, Essays, p. 316).
49. jefferson, Summary View, p. 22.
50. Kames, Essays, pp. 58-59.
51. This language from the first printing is identical to jefferson's in his
rough draft (Boyd, Declaration of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 1 of
plate 5).
52. jefferson to Henry Lee, 8 May 1825, in Writings (Ford), 10:343.
53. This language is identical to jefferson's in his rough draft (Boyd, Dec-
laration of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 1 of plate 5).
54. Wills, Inventing America, pp. 184, 191.
55. A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 261.
56. jefferson to Henry Lee, 8 May 1825, in Writings (Ford), 10:343.
57. Wills, Inventing America, pp. 184, 190-92.
58. jefferson to Richard Price, 12 july 1789, in Papers (Boyd and Cullen),
15:252.
59. "The moral sense, tho' rooted in the nature of man, admits of great
refinements by culture and education. It improves gradually like our other
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powers and faculties, 'till it comes to be productive of the strongest as well as
the most delicate feelings" (Kames, Essays, p. 143).
60. Kames, Elements of Criticism, 2:492, 485.
61. Kames, Essays, pp. 37-38.
62. jefferson to Thomas Law, 13 june 1814, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh),14:142-43.
63. Ibid., 14:144.
64. Kames, Elements of Criticism, 2:489, 492.
65. jefferson to Maria Cosway, 12 October 1786, in Bullock, My Head
and My Heart, pp. 38-39.
66. Ibid., p. 38.
67. Kames, Principles of Equity, p. 32.
68. jefferson to james Fishbach, 27 September 1809, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 12:315.
69. jefferson to Thomas Law, 13 june 1814, in ibid., 14:139, 141.
70. Ibid.
71. jefferson to William Short, 4 August 1820, in ibid., 15:261.
72. jefferson to William Short, 13 April 1820, in ibid., 15:245.
73. jefferson to F.A. Van Der Kemp, 25 April 1816, in ibid., 15:3.
74. jefferson's Extracts from the Gospels, p. 14. For the jefferson-Priestley
friendship, see Browne, "joseph Priestley and the American 'Fathers,'" pp.
142-43. For Priestley's influence, see also jefferson to his daughter Martha,
23 April 1803, in Family Letters, pp. 243-44.
75. jefferson to john Adams, 13 October 1813, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 13:389-90. For an excellent account of jefferson's views on
Christianity, see Kimball, "Thomas jefferson and Religion," pp. 161-67.
76. See jefferson's Extracts from the Gospels, p. 3. The work has also
been published as The jefferson Bible.
77. jefferson to Benjamin Rush, 23 September 1800, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 10:174.
78. jefferson to john Adams,S july 1814, in ibid., 14:149.
79. jefferson to William Short, 13 April 1820, in ibid., 15:245.
80. jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 29 March 1801, in ibid., 10:254. For
jefferson's anger at the Christian clergy, see Knoles, "The Religious Ideas of
Thomas jefferson," pp. 250-52.
81. jefferson to Benjamin Rush, 21 April 1803, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 10:385.
82. jefferson, The Life and Morals of jesus, in ibid., 20:51.
83. Criminal law punishments were supplemental to those provided by
nature to enforce its laws, according to Kames: "The purposes of human
punishments are, first to add weight to those which nature has provided"
(Historical Law Tracts, 1:73-74).
84. Ibid., 1:1-2. Kames's concept of atonement excluded the transfer of
punishment to an innocent party. "No maxim has a more solid foundation
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than that punishment cannot be transferred from the guilty to the innocent"
is a statement Jefferson extracted from Kames's Historical Law Tracts (Gov-
ernment Commonplace Book, pp. 98, 13).
85. Barker, "Natural Law and the American Revolution," pp. 312-13,
pointed out that natural law "proceeding from the nature of the universe-
from the Being of God and the reason of man" could be traced from Aristotle
and "the Stoic thinkers of the Hellenistic age"; it was "adopted by the Catholic
Church" and formed "the general teaching of the schoolmen and the
canonists." But Barker believed that the "general theory of the seventeenth
century" on natural law, "as we find it in Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke
(and also in Hobbes and Spinoza), is a modern secular theory."
86. Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, 21 April 1803, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 10:384.
87. Jefferson to John Adams, 5 May 1817, in ibid., 15:109.
88. Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility, p.
407.
89. Adams, Jefferson's Extracts from the Gospels, p. 41.
90. Priestley, Theological and Miscellaneous Works, 5:488-89: "It is ac-
knowledged that, to be a Christian, a man must believe some facts that are
of an extraordinary nature, such as we have no opportunity of observing at
present. But those facts were so circumstanced, that persons who cannot be
denied to have had the best opportunity of examining the evidence of them,
and who, if they had not been true, had any motive to pay any regard to
them, could not refuse their assent to them; that is, it was such evidence as
we ourselves must have been determined by, if we had been in their place;
and therefore, if not fully equivalent to the evidence of our own senses at
present, is, at least, all the evidence that, at this distance of time, we can have
in the case. It goes upon the principle that human nature was the same thing
then that it is now; and certainly in all other respects it appears to be so.
"That miracles are things in themselves possible, must be allowed, so long
as it is evident that there is in nature a power equal to the working of them.
And certainly the power, principle, or being, by whatever name it be denomi-
nated, which produced the universe, and established the laws of it, is fully
equal to any occasional departures from them."
91. Jefferson to Moses Robinson, 23 March 1801, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 10:237.
92. Jesus said unto them (the Jews), "If God were your Father, ye would
love me: for I proceeded forth and came from God; neither came I of myself,
but he sent me. Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye can-
not hear my word. Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your
father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in
the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh
of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it. And because I tell you the
truth, ye believe me not. Which of you convinceth me of sin? And if I say the
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truth, why do ye not believe me? He that is of God heareth God's words: ye
therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God."
Chapter 5. Obstacles to Reason
1. See Appleby, "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts," pp. 23-25,
for Jefferson's ideas on progress.
2. Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, 16 January 1811, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 13:4.
3. Jefferson had Bacon's writings bound on 28 October 1765, according
to Dumas Malone, who believes that Jefferson read all the books he owned
at that time of his life Uefferson and His Time, 1:103 n. 17).
4. Bacon, Novum Organon, pp. 14,17,11.
5. Ibid., pp. xxv (from that part of the outline of the "Instauratio Mag-
na" which relates to the Novum Organon), 83, 57. Isaac Kramnick wrote
that progress through science became "the theme of the age" during the late
Enlightenment ("Religion and Radicalism," pp. 522-24).
6. Thomas Jefferson's Garden Book, pp. 1, 7-8, 610-11; Thomas
Jefferson's Farm Book, pp. 1-5.
7. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture, p. 52. The Novum
Organon's "Great Instauration" was the basis for Jefferson's method of un-
derstanding nature, according to C. Miller, Jefferson and Nature, p. 11. For
other accounts of Bacon's influence on Jefferson, see S. Brown, Thomas
Jefferson, pp. 188-97; and Hellenbrand, The Unfinished Revolution; p. 159.
8. Bedini, Thomas Jefferson, Statesman ofScience, p. 92; Peden, preface
to Jefferson, Notes, pp. xiii-xiv.
9. Jefferson, Notes, p. 48.
10. Ibid., pp. 50-52, 66-70, 74, 84, 94-95, 103-5, 144-45, 167.
11. Bacon, Novum Organon, pp. 19,41-42.
12. Popkin, The History ofSkepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, pp. xiii-
XVI.
13. "Any doctrine, which leads to a distrust of our senses, must land in
universal scepticism. If natural feelings, whether from internal or external
senses, are not admitted as evidence of truth, I cannot see, that we can be
certain of any fact whatever. It is clear, from what is now observed, that,
upon this sceptical system, we cannot be certain even of our existence" (Ka-
mes, Essays, pp. 234-35).
14. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:79-80.
15. Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary Selections (Popkin transla-
tion), p. xxiv. If Jefferson read dialogue 24 between John Locke and Pierre
Bayle in George Lyttelton's Dialogues ofthe Dead (also on the 1771 Skipwith
book list), he would have seen (p. 271) that Bayle referred to his own phi-
losophyas "my scepticism."
16. Peter Bayle, The Dictionary Historical and Critical, trans. P. Des
Maizeau (the English edition recommended by Jefferson, according to Beller
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and Lee, editors of Selections from Bayle's Dictionary, p. xx), 4:653-54,
656.
17. Ibid., 4:655-56.
18. Ibid., 4:656; Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary Selections, p.
xxv.
19. Kames, Essays, pp. 383-84.
20. Reid's commonsense philosophy was foreshadowed in Kames's Es-
says, according to W. Lehmann, Henry Home, Lord Kames, p. 166; and
Laurie, Scottish Philosophy in Its National Development, p. 103. Walker,
The Scottish Jurists, p. 221, wrote that Kames and Reid knew each other
well and that Reid spent summers at Kames's home for years. Jefferson's
reading of Blackstone's Commentaries as a law student would have placed
him in contact with what Boorstin described in The Mysterious Science of
the Law, pp. 109-19, as a subtle version of commonsense philosophy.
21. Reid was born in 1710, Small in 1734. See Grave, Scottish Philoso-
phy ofCommon Sense, p. 1; and Ganter, "William Small, Jefferson's Beloved
Teacher," p. 506.
22. Davie, The Democratic Intellect, pp. 10-12.
23. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, pp. 25-26 (hereafter cited as
Inquiry).
24. Ibid., p. 60.
25. Locke, Human Understanding, pp. 47, 563.
26. Ibid., p. 135: "Such Qualities, which in truth are nothing in the Ob-
jects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their
primary Qualities, i.e. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of their
insensible parts, as Colours, Sounds, Taste, etc."
27. Reid said of Locke's view: "Mr Locke saw clearly, and proved incon-
testably, that the sensations we have by taste, smell, and hearing, as well as
the sensations of colour, heat, and cold, are not resemblances of any thing in
bodies; and in this he agrees with DesCartes and Malbranche. Joining this
opinion with the hypothesis, it follows necessarily, that three senses of the
five are cut off from giving us any intelligence of the material world, as being
altogether inept for that office" (Inquiry, pp. 209-10).
28. Ibid., pp. 23-24: "His [Berkeley's] arguments are founded upon the
principles which were formerly laid down by DesCartes, Malebranche and
Locke, and which have been very generally received. And the opinion of the
ablest judges seems to be, that they neither have been, nor can be confuted;
and that he hath proved by unanswerable arguments what no man in his
senses can believe.... As the Bishop [Berkeley] undid the whole material
world, this author [Hume], upon the same grounds, undoes the world of
spirits [minds], and leaves nothing in nature but ideas and impressions, with-
out any subject on which they may be impressed."
29. Grave, Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, p. 53.
30. As Reid put it, "The result of his [Berkeley's] inquiry was, a serious
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conviction, that there is no such thing as a material world; nothing in nature
but spirits and ideas, and that the belief of material substances, and of ab-
stract ideas, are the chief causes of all our errors in philosophy, and of infi-
delity and heresy in religion" (Inquiry, p. 23). See also Berkeley, Of the Prin-
ciples of Human Knowledge, part 1, The Age of Enlightment, pp. 132-33.
31. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 61, 57, 65.
32. Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature (hereafter, Treatise), p. 213: "Sup-
pose two objects to be presented to us, of which the one is the cause and the
other the effect; 'tis plain, that from the simple consideration of one, or both
these objects we never shall perceive the tie, by which they are united, or be
able certainly to pronounce, that there is a connexion betwixt them. "Tis
not, therefore, from anyone instance, that we arrive at the idea of cause and
effect, of a necessary connexion of power, of force, of energy, and of efficacy.
Did we never see any but particular conjunctions of objects, entirely differ-
ent from each other, we should never be able to form any such ideas.
"But again; suppose we observe several instances, in which the same ob-
jects are always conjoin'd together, we immediately conceive a connexion
betwixt them, and begin to draw an inference from one to another. This
multiplicity of resembling instances, therefore, constitutes the very essence
of power or connexion, and is the source, from which the idea of it arises."
For Locke's view that cause and effect could be determined and his philoso-
phy of science, see Yolton, "The Science of Nature," pp. 183-93.
33. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 30-31.
34. Ibid., pp. 504, 205, 3, 28.
35. Locke, Human Understanding, p. 525.
36. Reid, Inquiry, p. j33.
37. Ibid., pp. 534, 156.
38. Grave, Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, p. 3.
39. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 534, 34.
40. Jefferson to John Adams, 14 March 1820, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh), 15:239; Grave, Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, p. 2.
41. Jefferson to Robert Walsh, 9 January 1818, in Chinard, Jefferson et
les idealogues, pp. 173-74.
42. Jefferson to John Adams, 15 August 1820, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh), 15:275-76.
43. Bacon, Novum Organon, pp. 70,37.
44. Jefferson, Notes, pp. 159-60.
45. Bacon, Novum Organon, p. 37; Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, the
Apostle of Americanism, p. 512.
46. Jefferson to Charles Clay, 29 January 1815, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 14:233-34.
47. Jefferson to Thomas Seymour, 11 February 1807, in ibid., 11:156.
48. Bolingbroke, Works, 4:411-12.
49. Jefferson to Baron von Humboldt, 6 December 1813, and to Horatio
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G. Spafford, 17 March 1814, in Writings (Lipscomb and Bergh), 14:21,
119.
50. Jefferson to James Smith, 8 December 1822, in ibid., 15:409.
51. Literary Commonplace Book (Wilson), pp. 120, 227.
52. Jefferson, Notes, p. 159.
53. Jefferson to James Fishbach, 27 September 1809, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 12:315. For Jefferson's value of religious and intellectual plural-
ism and methods that would enable such pluralism to lead to progress in a
democracy, see T. Smith, "Discussion: Thomas Jefferson and the Perfectibil-
ity of Mankind," pp. 293-98.
54. Literary Commonplace Book (Wilson), pp. 20, 227.
55. Jefferson's Extracts from the Gospels, p. 17; Benjamin Rush to
Jefferson, 22 August 1800, ibid., p. 318.
56. Jefferson, Autobiography, pp. 62-63.
57. Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, 23 September 1800, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 10:175.
58. Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, 10 February 1814, in ibid., 14:85.
59. Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, 2 November 1822, in ibid., 15:405.
60. Jefferson to Joseph Priestley, 21 March 1801, in The Writings ofThom-
as Jefferson, ed. H.A. Washington, 4:373. According to Morgan, The Mean-
ing ofIndependence, p. 73, Jefferson viewed institutionalized Christianity as
the "dead hand of the past."
61. Honeywell, The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson, pp. 10-11,
14. No new university was included in the bill, but it made provision for the
brightest students in the grammar schools to attend William and Mary at
public expense. A separate bill was proposed to liberate William and Mary
from the control of the Anglican Church and to expand its curriculum. See
also Conant, Thomas Jefferson and the Development of American Public
Education, pp. 1-19.
62. Jefferson to J.C. Cabell, 28 November 1820, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 15:293.
63. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, the Apostle of Americanism, p. 510;
Honeywell, The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson, pp. 108-12; and
Commager, Jefferson, Nationalism, and the Enlightenment, p. 70.
64. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, the Apostle of Americanism, p. 510.
65. Jefferson to William Roscoe, 27 December 1820, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 15:303. Leonard W. Levy criticizes Jefferson's intention to po-
liticize his university by excluding instruction on the principles of the Feder-
alists and promulgating those of the Republicans Uefferson and Civil Liber-
ties, pp. 153-57).
66. Jefferson to William Short, 13 April 1820, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh), 15:247, 246.
67. Jefferson to Robert Taylor, 16 May 1820, in ibid., 15:253-55.
68. Locke, Conduct, pp. 12-13.
204 Notes to Pages 106-108
69. John Locke, On Politics and Education (New York, 1947), pp. 372-
74. Karl Lehmann mentioned Jefferson's preference for "original" authori-
ties to compilers and commentators, which he very likely got from Locke
(Thomas Jefferson, American Humanist, pp. 87-88). Passmore, "The Mal-
leability of Man in Eighteenth-Century Thought," pp. 21-25, mentions that
Locke's theory according to which men can be made virtuous through edu-
cation, contained in Some Thoughts concerning Education, in effect denies
original sin.
70. For Jefferson's devotion to reading classical "great masters" and his
continual advocacy of their study, see Wright, "Thomas Jefferson and the
Classics," pp. 195-217; and Chinard, "Thomas Jefferson as a Classical
Scholar," pp. 133-43.
71. Jefferson to Thomas Seymour, 11 February 1807, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 11:156.
72. Jefferson, Notes, pp. 147-48.
73. Jefferson expressed this in his "head and heart" letter to Maria Cosway
on 12 October 1786: "Morals were too essential to the happiness of man, to
be risked on the uncertain combinations of the head [reason]. She [nature]
laid their foundation, therefore, in sentiment [heart], not in science [scien-
tific reason]. That [sentiment or moral sense] she gave to all, as necessary to
all: this [scientific reason] to a few only, as sufficing with a few" (in Bullock,
My Head and My Heart, p. 38).
74. Jefferson to Monsieur Correa de Serra, 11 April 1820, Jefferson Pa-
pers, 51 R51, L38767.
75. Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 26 January 1799, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 10:78.
76. Jefferson to Dupont de Nemours, 24 April 1816, in ibid., 14:491-92.
Jefferson's use of "perfection" was consistent with the way it was used by
the enlightened of the eighteenth century, who made it a key word in their
vocabulary, according to Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Cen-
tury Philosophers, p. 47.
77. Jefferson to George Wythe, 13 August 1786, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 5:397. For Jefferson's ideas on education in relation to freedom,
see Bowers, "Jefferson and the Freedom of the Human Spirit," pp. 242-44.
78. "But of all the views of this law none is more important, none more
legitimate, than that of rendering the people the safe, as they are the ulti-
mate, guardians of their own liberty. For this purpose the reading in the first
stage, where they will receive their whole education, is proposed, as has been
said, to be chiefly historical. History by apprising them of the past will en-
able them to judge of the future; it will avail them of the experience of other
times and other nations; it will qualify them as judges of the actions and
designs of men; it will enable them to know ambition under every disguise it
may assume; and knowing it, to defeat its views" (Jefferson, Notes, p. 148).
79. The highest level of education was available to exceedingly few poor
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students, who had to survive intense competition with other poor students
at the lower levels to qualify for free university education in jefferson's sys-
tem (ibid., pp. 146-48). Locke's ideas in Some Thoughts concerning Educa-
tion were adapted to those qualified by "birth" and "capacities" to lead the
"life of average English gentlemen" (On Politics and Education, p. 205).
Chapter 6. Self-Evident Truths
1. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 304.
2. This language, used in the first printing of the Declaration, is identical
to that of jefferson's rough draft (Boyd, Declaration ofIndependence (1943),
plate 10 and p. 1 of plate 5).
3. This language from the first printing differs from the rough draft,
which states "that from that equal creation they derive rights inherent &
inalienable, among which are, life, liberty, & the pursuit of Happiness."
jefferson himself made the changes that appear in the first printing with the
exception of two: the Continental Congress deleted "inherent and" before
"rights" and inserted "certain"; it was also the Congress that changed "in-
alienable" to "unalienable" (ibid.). For anonymous British ridicule of the
Declaration's language, printed in a 1776 issue of Scott's magazine, see An
Englishman, "The Uncommon Sense of the Americans: Notes on the Decla-
ration," pp. 6-8.
4. Grant, John Locke's Liberalism, p. 6. On Locke's meaning of consent,
see Dunn, "Consent in the Political Theory of john Locke," pp. 153-82.
5. This language is identical to that in the rough draft (Boyd, Declara-
tion of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p.l of plate 5).
6. In the original rough draft, "self-evident" was "sacred & undeniable"
(ibid.).
7. Becker, The Declaration of Independence, p. 142. John C. Fitzpatrick
also said that Franklin made the alteration (The Spirit of the Revolution, pp.
11-12) but offered no reason for his opinion.
8. Boyd, Declaration of Independence (1943), p. 24.
9. Ibid., p. 1 of plate 5.
10. See chapter 3, note 84.
11. White, Philosophy of the American Revolution, p. 19.
12. Locke, Human Understanding, pp. 530-31.
13. Ibid., pp. 531-32.
14. White, Philosophy ofthe American Revolution, pp. 20-22, 268.
15. Hume, Treatise, pp. 299-300.
16. Ibid., p. 299.
17. Locke, Human Understanding, pp. 335, 618-19.
18. Hume, Treatise, pp. 300-301.
19. It should be pointed out that after finishing the Treatise, Hume him-
self was not pleased with his ideas on skepticism, including skepticism of the
self, as he stated in the appendix of that work (ibid., pp. 675-78). Kames,
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however, did not acknowledge that self-criticism but confined his criticisms
to what Hume said in the body of the Treatise. Because I present Hume's
comments in order to clarify Karnes's response to them, I have made no
reference to what Hume said in his appendix.
20. Karnes, Essays, p. 231.
21. Ibid., pp. 231-34.
22. Ibid., p. 234.
23. McGuinness, Henry Home, Lord Kames, p. 234.
24. Hume, Treatise, p. 300.
25. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 10.
26. Lovejoy, Essays in the History of Ideas, pp. 79-80.
27. Karnes, Essays, p. 234. Jefferson to John Adams, 15 August 1820, in
Writings (Lipscomb and Bergh), 15:273.
28. Karnes, Essays, pp. 231-32.
29. Jefferson to John Manners, 12 June 1817, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh), 15:124.
30. This language is identical to that of the rough draft (Boyd, Declara-
tion of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 1 of plate 5).
31. See note 3.
32. Jefferson to Judge John Tyler, 17 June 1812, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 13:165.
33. Jefferson to John Cartright, 5 June 1824, in ibid., 16:48.
34. Boyd, Declaration of Independence (1943), p. 1 of plate 5.
35. Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 129. For Jefferson's criticism of
Blackstone and his Commentaries for being antirepublican as well as lacking
depth of legal knowledge, see Waterman, "Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's
Commentaries," pp. 634-35.
36. For the original version of this passage and the subsequent changes
made, see chapter 3, note 84.
37. Karnes, Essays, pp. 234-35, 317.
38. Jefferson, Summary View, p. 135.
39. See Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 8-9;
Zuckert, "Thomas Jefferson on Nature and Natural Rights," pp. 137-66.
40. See chapter 3, note 84.
41. See W. Lehmann, Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish
Enlightment, p. 166; and Laurie, Scottish Philosophy in Its National Devel-
opment, p. 103.
42. Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 285, 278-79, 304. For Lockean ideas on
property, see Tully, A Discourse on Property; and Strauss, Natural Right and
History, pp. 234-49.
43. According to Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, 1:350,
Jefferson's "substitution of 'pursuit of happiness' for 'property' marks a com-
plete break with the Whiggish doctrine of property rights that Locke had
bequeathed to the English middle class."
44. Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 285, 287-88.
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45. Inaugural Address, 4 March 1801, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson,
p.292.
46. Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 350-51. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness, p.
29, describes the Lockean end of government.
47. "THE great end of Mens entring into Society, being the enjoyment of
their Properties in Peace and Safety, and the great instrument and means of
that being the Laws establish'd in that society.... But because the Laws, that
are at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and
need a perpetual Execution, or an attendance thereunto: Therefore 'tis nec-
essary there should be a Power always in being, which should see to the
Execution of the Laws that are made, and remain in force" (Locke, Two
Treatises, pp. 355, 364-65).
48. Dumbauld, Thomas Jefferson and the Law, pp. 132, 135-36.
49. Government Commonplace Book, pp. 95-135, 13.
50. Kames, Historical Law Tracts, 1:148-49. For Kames's ideas on prop-
erty, see Stein, "The General Notions of Contract and Property in Eighteenth
Century Scottish Thought," pp. 9-10.
51. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 271.
52. Jefferson to the Republicans of Georgetown, 8 March 1809, in Writ-
ings (Lipscomb and Bergh), 16:349.
53. Jefferson to Henri Gregoire, 25 February 1809, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 12:255.
54. "I advance it therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether
originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are
inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind" (Jefferson,
Notes, p. 143).
55. "We find among them numerous instances of the most rigid integrity,
and as many as among their better instructed masters, of benevolence, grati-
tude, and unshaken fidelity" (ibid.).
56. "State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will
decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led
astray by artificial rules" (Jefferson to Peter Carr, 10 August 1787); "Culti-
vators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigor-
ous, the most independent, the most virtuous" (Jefferson to John Jay, 23
August 1785, both in Writings [Lipscomb and Bergh], 6:257-58, 5:93). See
also Query 19 in Notes, pp. 164-65, for Jefferson's idea that being depen-
dent upon others for a living corrupted morals, a corruption he deemed preva-
lent in a manufacturing economy, whereas the ability to support himself and
his family independently contributed to a farmer's morality. For a discussion
of this query, see Marx, The Machine in the Garden, pp. 124-25.
57. "Be assured that no person living wishes more sincerely than I do, to
see a complete refutation of the doubts I have myself entertained and ex-
pressed on the grade of understanding alloted to them [blacks] by nature,
and to find that in this respect they are on a par with ourselves. My doubts
were the result of personal observation on the limited sphere of my own
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State, where the opportunities for the development of their genius were not
favorable, and those of exercising it still less so. I expressed them therefore
with great hesitation" (Jefferson to Henri Gregoire, 25 February 1809, in
Writings [Lipscomb and Bergh], 12:255).
58. The king "has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating
it's most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who
never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemi-
sphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. this piratical
warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN
king of Great Britain. determined to keep open a market where MEN should
be bought & sold. he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legisla-
tive attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce: and that this
assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now excit-
ing those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of
which he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom he also
obtruded them: thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties
of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of
another" (Boyd, Declaration of Independence (1943), p. 3 of plate 5).
Friedenwald, The Declaration ofIndependence, p. 132, called this subsequently
deleted provision "unquestionably one of the most forceful clauses that issued
from Jefferson's pen," whereas Commager, "The Declaration of Independence,"
pp. 179-87, said it was not only "bad history" but "rhetorical without being
passionate." For Jefferson's views on slavery and criticism of his actions in
their context, see Jordon, White over Black; Cohen, "Thomas Jefferson and
the Problem of Slavery," pp. 503-26; Diggins, "Slavery, Race, and Equality,"
pp. 206-28; J. Miller, The Wolf by the Ears. For more understanding accounts,
see Morgan, "Slavery and Freedom," pp. 5-29; Wills, Inventing America, pp.
293-306; and Dabney, The Jefferson Scandals, pp. 99-112.
59. Jefferson, Notes, p. 163.
60. Ibid., p. 60. See also note 58.
61. See Appleby, "Jefferson and His Complex Legacy," p. 10.
62. Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 173-74.
63. Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany, 4 April 1819, Jefferson Papers, 38353,
51 R5l.
64. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 284.
65. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, pp. 5-6.
66. "And that all Men may be restrained from invading others Rights,
and from doing hurt to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed,
which willeth the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of
the Law on Nature is in that State, put into every Mans hands, whereby
everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a De-
gree, as may hinder its Violation. For the Law ofNature would, as all other
Laws that concern Men in this World, be in vain, if there were no body that
in the State of Nature, had a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby pre-
serve the innocent and restrain offenders, and if anyone in the State of Na-
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ture may punish another, for any evil he has done, everyone may do so. For
in that State of perfect Equality, where naturally there is no superiority or
jurisdiction of one, over another, what any may do in Prosecution of that
Law, everyone must needs have a Right to do....
"Where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins, if the Law be transgressed to
another's harm. And whosoever in Authority exceeds the Power given him
by the Law, and makes use of the Force he has under his Command, to
compass that upon the Subject, which the Law allows not, ceases in that to
be a Magistrate, and acting without Authority, may be opposed, as any other
Man, who by force invades the Right of another" (Locke, Two Treatises, pp.
271-72, 400-401).
67. White, Philosophy of the American Revolution, pp. 162-63, 180-82.
68. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural Law, p. 60.
69. This language is identical with that of Jefferson's rough draft except
for the words "under absolute Despotism," discussed in chapter 3, note 19
(Boyd, Declaration of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 1 of plate 5).
70. Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 271-72, 400-401.
71. This language is identical with that of the rough draft (Boyd, Declara-
tion of Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 1 of plate 5).
72. Boorstin, The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson, p. 237.
73. Jones, The Pursuit of Happiness, p. 86. See also Ganter, "Jefferson's
'Pursuit of Happiness' and Some Forgotten Men," pp. 422-34, 558-85 (two
installments) .
74. Locke, Human Understanding, pp. 229-30.
75. Ibid., pp. 258-59.
76. Ibid., pp. 279, 266.
77. Ibid., pp. 236, 250-51, 254.
78. Ibid., pp. 238, 284.
79. Ibid., p. 241.
80. Ibid., pp. 254, 257, 262.
81. Ibid., pp. 263, 273.
82. Mason, Papers, p. 287.
83. Schlesinger, "The Lost Meaning of the 'Pursuit of Happiness,'" pp.
325-27.
84. The same language was used in the rough draft (Boyd, Declaration of
Independence (1943), plate 10 and p. 1 of plate 5).
85. Locke, Human Understanding, pp. 256, 270, 273-74, 267.
86. Ibid., p. 268. For the relationship of Locke's idea of freedom to hap-
piness, see Polin, "John Locke's Conception of Freedom," pp. 1-5.
87. Jefferson to John Page, 21 February 1770, in Papers (Boyd and Cullen),
1:36. A. Koch mentioned the influence of Locke's chapter "Of Power" on
Jefferson's "Pursuit of Happiness" but did not give a reason for her opinion
(Power, Morals, and the Founding Fathers, pp. 29-31).
88. Jefferson, Notes, p. 147.
89. "Man is a complex machine, composed of various principles of mo-
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tion, which may be conceived as so many springs and weights counteracting
and balancing one another. These being accurately adjusted, the movement
of life is beautiful, because regular and uniform. But if some springs or weights
be withdrawn, those which remain, acting now without opposition from
their antagonist forces, will disorder the balance, and derange the whole
machine. Remove those principles of action which operate by reflection, and
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and Bergh), 14:405.
92. Jefferson to M. De Warville, 15 August 1786, in ibid., 5:402.
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94. Locke, Human Understanding~pp. 269-70.
95. Jefferson to William Johnson, 12 June 1823, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 15:441. Jefferson's trust in the populace would ultimately lead
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96. Jefferson to William Johnson, 12 June 1823, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 15:440. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America~ p. 40, wrote
that "the Christian concept of sin and salvation" was made into a "pillar of
the status quo" by "reactionary church establishments" at the time of the
Revolution.
97. Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford, 17 March 1814, in Writings
(Lipscomb and Bergh), 14:119.
98. Meeting of the Visitors, 7 October 1822, in ibid., 19:416.
Chapter 7. Religious Freedom
1. Locke, Treatise and Letter, pp. 135-36. Jefferson's 1776 paraphrase:
"Every church is to itself orthodox, to others erroneous or heretical" (Pa-
pers [Boyd and Cullen], 1:546).
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and Bergh), 15:373-74.
7. Jefferson, Autobiography, p. 62.
8. Ibid.
9. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:530, 535-36; Kelly, The Athanasian
Creed, pp. 17-20.
10. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:535-36.
11. Ibid., 1:555.
12. Jefferson to James Smith, 8 December 1822, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 15:409: "The Athanasian paradox that one is three, and three
but one, is so incomprehensible to the human mind, that no candid man can
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edge of the Greek language that enabled him to translate New Testament
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15:429-30:
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ing the doctrine of Jesus, that the world was created by the Supreme,
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collection.
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20. The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. 251.
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33. Locke, Treatise and Letter, pp. 141-42.
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40. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:537.
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44. Locke, Treatise and Letter, p. 162.
45. The Portable Thomas jefferson, p. 251; Papers (Boyd and Cullen),
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and Bergh), 15:60.
47. The Portable Thomas jefferson, p. 251.
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century thinkers, see Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature, pp. 32-34.
49. The Portable Thomas jefferson, pp. 251-52.
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56. The Portable Thomas jefferson, p. 252.
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58. The Portable Thomas jefferson, p. 252.
59. Locke, Treatise and Letter, p. 153.
60. The Portable Thomas jefferson, p. 253.
61. jefferson, Notes, p. 160; Locke, Treatise and Letter, p. 153.
62. The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. 253.
63. jefferson to Mordecai M. Noah, 28 May 1818, jefferson Papers,
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38865).
64. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:548. For Locke's rationale in excluding
Catholics from toleration, see Greene, Religion and the State, p. 63.
65. Jefferson, Autobiography, p. 71.
66. Locke, Treatise and Letter, pp. 136-37.
67. Jefferson to Mordecai M. Noah, 28 May 1818, Jefferson Papers,
37988, S1 R50.
68. The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. 253.
69. See, e.g., Ketcham, James Madison, pp. 163-65; and Brant, "Madi-
son," pp. 3-24.
70. Jefferson to James Madison, 20 December 1787, in Thomas Jefferson,
Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, pp. 915-16 (cited hereafter as Writings
[Peterson]). Jefferson "converted Madison to the cause of adding the Bill of
Rights to the new Federal Constitution," according to Levy, "Jefferson as a
Civil Libertarian," p. 190. See also A. Koch, Jefferson and Madison, pp. 49,
56; and G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 542-43.
71. B. Mitchell and L.P. Mitchell, A Biography ofthe Constitution ofthe
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72. Jefferson to the Baptists of Danbury, 1 January 1802, in Writings
(Lipscomb and Bergh), 16:281-82. Separation of church and state did not
weaken religion or morals in America, according to Commager, The Empire
of Reason, p. 230.
73. See Tulley, "Locke," p. 616.
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Inaugural address, 4 March 1801: "And let us reflect that having banished
from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled
and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intoler-
ance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecu-
tions" (Writings [Lipscomb and Bergh], 3:318-19).
75. The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. 253.
76. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:548-49.
77. Shaftesbury, Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times, 1:31-
32.
78. Jefferson, Notes, p. 161.
79. Ibid., p. 160. For an abbreviated form of this statement, see his 1776
notes for arguments to the Virginia assembly, in Papers (Boyd and Cullen),
1:538.
80. The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. 252.
81. Howe, The Unitarian Conscience, pp. 216-17.
82. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:80; Writings (Ford), 11:480-85; Cicero,
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426.
83. See Middleton, History of the Life of Marcus Tullius Cicero; and
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not go along with Middleton's views on state religion, but he acknowledged
both Priestley's and Middleton's influence on him as a result of their use of
history in religion in a manner reminiscent of Bolingbroke's historical proofs:
"You are right in supposing ... that I had not read much of Priestley's
Predestination, his no-soul system, or his controversy with Horsley. But I
have read his Corruptions of Christianity, and Early Opinions of Jesus, over
and over again; and I rest on them, and on Middleton's writings, especially
his letters from Rome, and to Waterland, as the basis of my own faith. These
writings have never been answered, nor can be answered by quoting histori-
cal proofs, as they have done. For these facts, therefore, I cling to their learn-
ing, so much superior to my own" (to John Adams, 22 August 1813, in
Writings [Lipscomb and Bergh], 13:351-52).
84. Locke, Treatise and Letter, p. 163.
85. Papers (Boyd and Cullen), 1:538.
86. Jefferson, Notes, p. 160.
87. Locke, Treatise and Letter, p. 161. These ideas of Locke were based
on observation and experience, according to De Beer, in "Locke and English
Liberalism," p. 36.
88. jefferson, Notes, pp. 160-61; jefferson to john Thomas, 18 Novem-
ber 1807, in Writings (Lipscomb and Bergh), 16:291.
89. Jefferson to the General Meeting of Correspondence of the Six Bap-
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90. In 1780 joseph Galloway wrote in "The View from Outside," p. 21,
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authority of any sovereign power whatever." For the New England clergy's
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racy and the American Revolution," p. 179. Morgan, "The Revolution as an
Intellectual Movement," pp. 11-33, wrote that the clergy of all colonial sects
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See also Thornton, The Pulpit of the American Revolution, pp. 276-77.
91. Jefferson to John Adams, 17 May 1818, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh),15:170.
92. Jefferson, Autobiography, pp. 61-62.
93. jefferson to Thomas Cooper, 2 November 1822, in Writings
(Peterson), p. 1464. Natural religion such as Jefferson's, which rejected both
revelation and the divinity of Christ, logically anticipated Unitarianism, ac-
cording to Savelle, The Seeds of Liberty, p. 31. Bottorff, Thomas Jefferson,
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letters sometimes "meant the Unitarian sect" and sometimes "a theistic be-
lief in one God, not a god of three persons."
94. Geffen, Philadelphia Unitarianism, pp. 17-18, 144-45, 238; Howe,
Unitarian Conscience, p. 16.
95. Geffen, Philadelphia Unitarianism, p. 8.
96. jefferson's Exracts from the Gospels, p. 14. See also jefferson to his
daughter Martha, 23 April 1803, in Family Letters, pp. 243-44.
97. Gibbs, joseph Priestley, p. 25; Geffen, Philadelphia Unitarianism,
pp. 50, 239. See jefferson's outline of Unitarian principles in his letter to
Benjamin Waterhouse, 26 june 1822, in Writings (Lipscomb and Bergh),
15:383-85.
98. Ibid.
99. jefferson to Francis Hopkinson, 13 March 1789, in ibid., 7:300.
100. jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse, 26 june 1822, in ibid., 15:385.
Wood, "Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America," p. 638, wrote that
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101. Howe, Unitarian Conscience, pp. 5-6. For jefferson's liberal En-
lightenment religious views, see Schneider, "The Enlightenment in Thomas
jefferson," pp. 246-52.
102. Sanford, The Religious Life of Thomas jefferson, p. 66.
Conclusion
1. jefferson to james Monroe, 20 May 1782, in The Portable Thomas
jefferson, p. 365.
2. jefferson to Francis W. Gilmer, 7 june 1816, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 15:25. Despite jefferson's use of syllogistic reasoning here, he
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(Human Understanding, pp. 671-72): "And I readily own, that all right rea-
soning may be reduced to his [Aristotle's] Forms of Syllogism. But yet I think
without any diminuation to him I may truly say, that they are not the only,
nor the best way of reasoning, for the leading of those into Truth who are
willing to find it, and desire to make the best use they may of their Reason,
for the attainment of Knowledge."
3. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, p. 211.
4. Jefferson to David Hartley, 2 July 1787, in Writings (Lipscomb and
Bergh),6:151.
5. Randall, The Life of Thomas jefferson, 3:563.
6. Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman, 24 June 1826, in Writings (Lipscomb
and Bergh), 16:181-82.
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